Do Criminal Laws Deter Crime?
Deterrence Theory in Criminal
Justice Policy: A Primer
About this Publication
This publication discusses the
theory of criminal deterrence
as a factor in changing
criminal justice policy.
By Ben Johnson, Legislative
Analyst
January 2019
Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 2
The Economic Model of Deterrence ................................................................................... 3
Broad Policy Changes and Declining National Crime Rates ............................................... 8
Natural Experiments ......................................................................................................... 12
Policy Considerations ........................................................................................................ 16
Using Deterrence Theory to Develop Policy ..................................................................... 17
Questions to Ask When Assessing Policy .......................................................................... 18
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 18
This publication was prepared by Ben Johnson, a legislative analyst specializing in the area of criminal
justice policy. Questions can be addressed to Ben at 651-296-8957.
Minnesota House Research Department provides nonpartisan legislative, legal, and
information services to the Minnesota House of Representatives. This document can
be made available in alternative formats.
www.house.mn/hrd | 651-296-6753 | 600 State Office Building | St. Paul, MN 55155
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Executive Summary
This publication discusses criminal deterrence, which is one theory legislators can use to assess
possible changes in criminal justice policy.
When legislators consider changes to criminal justice policy, they often face the question of whether
the changes will prevent people from committing crimes. Legislators in Minnesota may look to other
states to see if changes there produced any noticeable effect, but that information may not always
present a complete picture. Another tool for legislators is deterrence theory.
Deterrence theory was first described in the late 1700s, but received new attention in the 1960s.
Academic studies since then have looked at the relationship between the severity of punishment, the
certainty that a criminal will be punished, and the speed with which the punishment will be inflicted.
Looking at both long-term trends and smaller case studies, research has shed light on behaviors that
can be deterred most easily, policy changes that have little deterrent effect, and the types of actions
that are most likely to prevent people from committing crimes. For example, research has shown
that:
crimes involving conscious planning can be more easily deterred than those that relate to
addiction or sudden emotions;
increases to prison sentences that are already lengthy have little deterrent effect; and
policies that increase the likelihood of being caught deter crime more effectively than those
that increase punishment.
Deterrence theory can help legislators craft and assess policy proposals.
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Introduction
“Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their
attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first.”
1
John Jay, Federalist Papers
One of the primary responsibilities of a government is to protect its citizens from crime, but preventing
crime can take many forms. There is evidence that crime is disproportionately concentrated in
economically distressed areas and that reducing poverty can also reduce crime.
2
Addressing mental
illness can also lower crime rates.
3
There is an undisputed link between addiction and crime, and
providing chemical dependency treatment is particularly effective at reducing property crime rates.
4
The
most common method of addressing crime, though, is through enforcement and punishment.
The government identifies actions it wants to prohibitassault, selling drugs, driving while intoxicated,
speedingand establishes a consequence for people who take those actions. Consequences exist for
several reasons: they punish dangerous behavior, require some form of repayment to society,
incapacitate individuals who are seen as likely to commit other offenses, and send the message that
society has certain values, morals, or expectations.
Several theories of public safety support these policy methods of enforcing laws and punishing
offenders. The theory of incapacitation suggests that holding certain individuals in jail or prison will
prevent those individuals from committing new crimes. Rehabilitation theories suggest that directing
offenders to certain treatment or training programs will change that individual and keep him or her from
committing new offenses. Retributive theories suggest that a person who makes an intentional decision
to violate the law should be punished for that decision so that the person can pay a debt to society and
then return with a blank slate. Denunciation theory combines several other theories and holds that
punishing someone publicly will prevent others from committing the offense due to the stigma of the
offense, and will also serve as a form of retribution. Each of those theories can support criminal justice
policies and serve as a valid lens through which to view policies. But legislators often identify another
reason to justify changes to criminal lawdeterrence.
Deterrence is the theory that criminal penalties do not just punish violators, but also discourage other
people from committing similar offenses. Many people point to the need to deter criminal actions after
a high-profile incident in which an offender is seen to have received a light sentence. Some argue that a
tougher sentence would have prevented the tragedy and can prevent a similar tragedy from taking place
in the future.
But does the creation of a new crime, or the increase in an existing penalty, deter people from
committing crimes? The answer is complex. Legislators seeking to prevent or reduce crime through
enforcement and punishment have a variety of policy options to consider. Over the last fifty years,
academic studies have examined different techniques from a variety of angles. Legislators may choose
to draw on this information to craft effective policies, or assess the likely deterrent effect of proposed
legislation.
This publication focuses on the theory of general deterrence by explaining the theoretical basis of
deterrence theory, reviewing academic studies, and providing a summary of what legislators can
consider if deterrence is a goal.
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The Economic Model of Deterrence
“The first objective is to prevent all sorts of offences as far as this is worthwhile; therefore, the
value of the punishment must always be sufficient to outweigh the value of the profit of the
offence.”
5
Jeremy Bentham, 18th century philosopher
The Historical Roots of Deterrence Theory
The roots of modern deterrence theory stretch to the time when the United States was coming into
existence. An Italian philosopher and economist, Ceasare Beccaria, wrote Essay on Crimes and
Punishments in 1764 and Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher and reformer, wrote An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (introduction to the Principles) in 1781.
6
Beccaria wrote that laws exist to allow a united society, free from the threat of war and chaos. He
assumed that each individual member of this society will “always endeavor to take away from the mass,
not only his own portion, but to encroach on that of others.”
7
Laws were necessary, therefore, and a
violation of laws should result in punishment whose purpose “is no other, than to prevent others from
committing the like offence.”
8
He argued that punishment must be proportionate to the crime
committed because, if two crimes have an equal punishment, “there is nothing to deter men from
committing the greater” when that crime carries a greater advantage.
9
Beccaria also emphasized that
punishment should occur as immediately after the commission of a crime as possible and added that
crimes “are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than the severity of punishment.”
10
Bentham’s theories were similar. He began from the proposition that humans are governed by pain and
pleasure.
11
He argued that every action a person takes is to increase happiness. This principle of utility
held that people act to either produce advantage or prevent pain or unhappiness.
12
The value of a
pleasure or pain depends on its intensity, duration, certainty, and nearness.
Both theories of human behavior suggested that the desire to seek pleasure and increase one’s own
position by taking more than a fair share drives human actions. But, under the theory that action is
rational, people can be deterred from harming others by establishing punishments for certain acts.
Beccaria and Bentham expected potential criminals to compare the expected benefit of committing a
crime with the benefit of not committing a crime.
13
In short, the theory held that if you increase the cost
of committing a crime enough, people will not commit the crime.
A Modern Makeover
“The approach taken here follows the economists’ usual analysis of choice and assumes that a
person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by
using his time and other resources at other activities.”
14
Gary Becker, economist and sociologist
Deterrence theory received a modern makeover in 1968 when Gary Becker published Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach.
15
Becker, a professor of economics and sociology at the University
of Chicago, argued that understanding criminal behavior did not depend on whether individuals had
properly developed social standards, psychological inadequacies, or special inherited traits. Rather, he
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suggested, criminal behavior came down to an economic theory of choice: some individuals become
criminals because their individual benefits and costs are different from those of the noncriminal, and not
because the person has different basic motivations. Becker emphasized that an increase in the
likelihood of apprehension would have a greater impact on the number of offenses than an increase in
punishment. He also noted that making legal activities more attractive, such as an increase in legal
income, would shift the balance and make it more likely that a person would not commit a crime.
This model of deterrence is known as the economic model of rational deterrence.
16
Under the theory,
since criminal acts are the result of a rational, conscious decision, preventing crime involves finding the
balance between increasing the cost of crime and creating an expensive police state that eliminates
personal freedom. Once the cost of committing an offense is too high, criminals will not commit the
offense. The theory assumes that there is no difference between criminal and noncriminals, other than
their assessment of the costs and benefits of committing crimes.
17
The Three Components of Deterrence Theory: Certainty, Celerity,
and Severity
“Many public officials in the United States have advocated the use of more severe penal
sanctions as a means of deterring crime. Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted
to ascertain the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions, or to determine the possible impact of
longer prison sentences on levels of serious crime.”
18
George Antunes and A. Lee Hunt, professors
The works of Beccaria, Bentham, and Becker led to a theory of criminal deterrence involving a three-
pronged approach in which certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment work together to increase the
cost of an action so that a rational person will determine that the cost outweighs the benefit.
Certainty applies to the likelihood of being caught. The threat of a severe punishment is not effective
if there is no possibility of ever being caught.
Celerity applies to the speed of a consequence. A punishment imposed immediately after an offense
is more effective than one that is imposed years after the offense.
Severity of punishment is a necessary component since a rational person might commit a crime that
brings a benefit even if punishment is swift and sure when the punishment is insignificant. In addition,
the punishment serves as an example to others in society so that everyone is aware that a certain action
is unacceptable.
Under the economic theory of deterrence, an increase in the cost of crime should deter people from
committing the crime, and there is evidence that individuals who believe they are likely to be arrested
and punished are less likely to commit a crime than those who do not expect to be captured or
punished.
19
To increase the cost, the government can increase the likelihood that a person will be
caught, the speed with which a person receives a punishment, or the severity of that punishment.
Determining the extent to which these changes actually deter crime involves testing the assumption
that the crime rate will be lower if there is an increase in the certainty, celerity, or severity of legal
punishment.
20
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It is easiest to change the severity of punishment. Increasing the certainty that an offender will be
caught requires more enforcement efforts or a change in police practices. Attempts to increase the
speed of a consequence face constitutional challenges related to the right of due process, and also must
address the realities of a busy court system. Increasing the level of punishment, however, simply
requires legislation that strikes an existing penalty and replaces it with a greater penalty.
But are the three components equal?
Severity
Severity of punishment was long thought to be the key component in deterring criminal
behavior.
21
As a result, lawmakers relied on the use of severe sanctions to deter crime.
22
However, little research examined the deterrent effect of severe punishments until the 1960s.
Initial research supported the theory that severe punishments deter crime. A series of studies
examining homicide rates found that the severity of punishment for homicide had a deterrent
effect.
23
However, when the examination expanded beyond homicide, there was a surprise: the
severity of the penalty had a positive effect on the crimes of rape, assault, larceny, robbery,
burglary, and auto theft.
24
That is, severity of punishment did not deter crime. If anything, it had
the opposite effect.
Severe penalties may serve other valuable purposes in criminal justice policy. They may
incapacitate particular individuals and prevent those individuals from committing crimes for a
period of time, they may publicly denounce certain actions, or they may provide an opportunity
to provide rehabilitating treatment. However, as will be discussed in more detail below, multiple
studies have found that severe penalties rarely, if ever, have a deterrent effect. There are a few
possible explanations for this fact.
Not all crimes involve a rational decision
Criminal acts may be driven by many factors. Many crimes take place when the offender is
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
25
Others occur in the “heat of passion” when a person
experiences a strong emotion. It makes logical sense that a model assuming criminals engage in
a rational cost-benefit analysis before committing a crime would not accurately predict conduct
by people with an impaired ability to think rationally. But this does not explain why the severity
of punishment did not deter economic crimes like theft or burglary.
Subjective beliefs about severity do not match the likely sentence
On its face, severity of punishment appears to be an objective facta person commits an
offense and receives a known consequence. However, actual consequences may differ based on
multiple factors and a potential offender may not have accurate information about a likely
sanction.
26
The state can raise the maximum penalty for an offense, but that does not
necessarily change the expectations of someone who might be considering committing a crime.
If a person is weighing the benefits of committing a crime against the potential consequences of
that act, it is the potential offender’s actual belief about a likely sanction that matters.
27
The
majority of offenders who have been interviewed report that they did not know what potential
sentence they faced.
28
Not surprisingly, then, many reported that they did not consider the
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potential sentence at all before acting.
29
Increasing penalties cannot have any effect if potential
offenders are not aware of the change.
Even if offenders know what potential penalties they face, their assessment of those penalties
may be different than what lawmakers intend. Interviews with offenders show that longer
sentences have diminishing returns. That is, a potential offender does not view a sentence that
has been doubled as being twice as severe. Sentences of five years were seen to be only twice
as severe as a one-year sentence, and sentences of ten years were seen as four times as severe
as a sentence of a single year.
30
Longer sentences continued that trend. A sentence of 20 years
was perceived as only six times harsher than a sentence of one year, and less than half again as
harsh as a ten-year sentence.
31
Offenders who serve long sentences are more likely to reoffend
Studies indicate that individuals punished more severely commit more crimes in the future.
32
A
review of 50 studies dating as far back as 1958 showed that inmates who served longer prison
sentences, those with an average of about 30 months, had a higher recidivism rate than those
who served sentences with an average length of 12.9 months.
33
While there is some evidence of
specific deterrence related to shorter sentences, there is no such finding for longer sentences.
34
That is, studies have shown that offenders who serve shorter sentences are less likely to
reoffend while those who serve longer sentences are not.
Research has not shown prison to be the best method of preventing offenders from reoffending.
Individuals serving any prison time reoffended at a higher rate than those who remain in the
community.
35
This is true both in the United States and in Finland.
36
Several theories exist to
explain this result. Some inmates may learn new criminal skills while incarcerated.
37
Others may
feel additional resentment to society, losing any positive connections to work, family, and
noncriminal friends.
38
In addition, while the studies attempt to control for the seriousness of an
offense, offenders sent to prison have often shown a propensity toward criminal activities by
establishing a longer criminal history or failing to succeed while supervised on the community.
Prison may be a factor in increasing the likelihood that an individual will reoffend, but
differences between individuals sent to prison and those placed under supervision and kept in
the community make it difficult to determine how significant a role imprisonment plays.
Changes in severity have little effect if offenders do not expect to caught
In addition, the severity of punishment only deters crime when the certainty of being caught
and punished is high enough.
39
In other words, severity of punishment, independent of the
certainty of that punishment, is not associated with lower rates of crime.
40
If an offender does
not expect to be caught, the severity of the punishment does not factor into any decisions.
Certainty
Certainty of punishment is generally considered to be more important than the severity of that
punishment.
41
Indeed, studies suggest that the deterrent effect of certainty is far stronger than
that of severity.
42
In certainty, subjective certainty is more important than objective certainty.
43
That is, an
individual’s belief about whether punishment is likely is more important than the fact that
punishment is, or is not, actually likely. That subjective belief can come from publicity, but more
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often comes either from personal experience or anecdotal information from others in the
community.
44
The first perception that individuals form tends to be unreasonably high.
45
Individuals who commit offenses and successfully avoid punishment often increase their
offending behaviors based, in part, on the belief that avoiding arrest once suggests that
punishment remains unlikely.
46
Perception of risk can also be influenced by substance use, the
presence of peers, and other situations that influence a person’s emotional responses.
47
Like severity, increasing the certainty of punishment appears to produce diminishing returns.
There is evidence that the perceived probability of arrest must exceed 30 percent to have a
meaningful deterrent effect, and that the deterrent effect increases until the perceived
probability reaches about 70 percent.
48
But a probability above 70 percent offers only slightly
more deterrence than the 70 percent probability.
49
As Becker noted, there is a balance to be
found in certainty.
50
Raising the probability of arrest and conviction to 100 percent would
involve significant social costs, including paying for a vast police force and surrendering
individual privacy and liberty.
Celerity
Celerity, the speed with which a person receives a consequence for violating the law, has
received the least amount of attention in scholarly literature.
51
Studies suggest that the speed of
punishment may not have any deterrent effect.
52
At least one study suggests that individuals
prefer to get their punishment over as quickly as possible.
53
If correct, delayed punishment
could actually be perceived as a worse consequence than immediate punishment.
In summary, the economic model of deterrence suggests that most crimes are committed by
rational people who consider whether committing a crime is worth the risk of potential
punishment. The theory assumes more people would commit crimes if there was no risk of
punishment, and that increasing the risk will decrease crime. Risk could be increased primarily
by increasing the penalty a person might face or by increasing the likelihood that a person
would be punished. Both components must exist, but those that support the theory believe that
increasing the certainty of punishment is more effective than increasing the penalty for a
violation.
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Broad Policy Changes and Declining
National Crime Rates
Do national increases in police presence or increased penalties
explain the drop in crime since the 1990s?
“…it is very difficult to isolate and measure a deterrent effect precisely because a great many
things must happen before deterrence can occur.”
54
Raymond Paternoster, criminologist
Deterrence theory is difficult to test because there can be many different causes for changes in the
crime rate. However, the increases in crime from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and the
subsequent drop, provides an opportunity to assess whether policy changes enacted in the 1990s had a
deterrent effect. Crime rates in the United States rose dramatically from the early 1960s until about
1980.
55
They fell for a few years before spiking again in the early 1990s.
56
After that peak, crime rates
fell steadily for over a decade.
57
Indeed, with a few exceptions, crime rates have continued to fall.
Violent crime rates rose slightly in 2015 and again in 2016 while property crime rates continued to fall
during those years.
58
Sou
rce: FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports
59
Minnesota’s crime rate closely tracked the national averages. In 2016, crime in Minnesota reached its
lowest rate in 50 years.
60
While it fluctuated from year to year, the rate maintained a sustained peak
from 1975 to 1997 before beginning a steep decline.
61
While the drop in the crime rate is not disputed, there is no consensus about why the rate dropped. In
1994, the federal government passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which
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included tougher sentencing laws, money for additional police officers, and an increase in firearm
restrictions.
62
Several studies have attempted to determine which, if any, of these policies contributed
to the reduction in crime, but the results are unclear. Many of the studies fail to evaluate the
interaction of different policy changes, making their conclusions unreliable.
63
The Number of Police Officers Increased
The number of police officers in the United States increased in the 1990s.
64
The New York Police
Department increased its uniformed strength from 25,909 in 1990 to 40,285 by 2000.
65
Minnesota had
7,365 sworn officers in 1992,
66
7,994 in 1994,
67
and 8,606 in 2000.
68
But there is no consensus about
what impact the increased police presence had. There is some support for the conclusion that areas
with increased police presence and aggressive policing techniques saw a reduction in crimes like robbery
and burglary.
69
But many of those studies have been criticized for failing to account for other factors,
including the evidence that crime actually increased in areas just outside the targeted neighborhoods.
70
In addition, that period of time saw changes in policing techniques, which may have had more of an
impact than simply increasing the number of officers. Significantly, the crime rates in Canada fell at
nearly the same rate as those in the United States while the number of police officers per capita fell.
71
Sources: FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports and Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey
72
While there is some general support for the theory that increasing the number of police officers reduces
crime, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that a shift in the policy focus to certainty is
efficient.
73
Incarceration Increased
In addition to increasing the number of police officers, policy changes in the 1990s also increased the
number of individuals sent to prison nationwide.
74
Incarceration in Minnesota followed a similar trend.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that Minnesota’s incarceration rate per 100,000 residents began
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to grow steadily in the mid-1980s and peaked in 2015, at a level more than four times what it was in
1978.
75
There is support for the conclusion that the increased rate of incarceration reduced crime, but
the cause of that reduction remains unclear.
76
The underlying assumptions come under attack for failing
to account for the difficulty in determining the proper cause and effect relationship between
incarceration and crime rates.
77
That is, if incarceration is claimed to affect the crime rate, then the
crime rate should also affect the rate of incarceration.
78
While the threat of a prison sentence may have
a deterrent effect, incarcerating people also has an incapacitating effect. A person placed in prison is
incapacitated and does not have the opportunity to commit a new offense, so a reduction in crime could
be explained by the larger number of people who were incapacitated at a particular time. However,
even the assumption that higher rates of incarceration result in lower crime can be challenged.
Incarceration rates did increase across the country in the 1990s, but, similar to the rates in Minnesota,
the national incarceration rate also increased in the 1980s.
79
However, instead of declining, the crime
rate doubled.
80
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics
81
Comparisons with Canada again suggest that the situation is complicated. Admissions to Canadian
provincial, territorial, and federal prisons peaked in the early 1990s, but all admissions fell over the
following decade.
82
Incarceration rates in Canada actually declined while the country’s crime rate fell at
a rate nearly identical to the rate in the United States.
83
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Sources: Adult Correction Statistics Canada and Bureau of Justice Statistics
84
While the changes in the incarceration rate in Canada were relatively minimal, they stand in stark
contrast to the changes in the United States.
Other Factors
In addition to changes in the criminal justice system, the 1990s saw other changes. The Cold War came
to an end, unemployment was low, the economy grew, and household income peaked in 1999. Cities
also gained population, a change in the trend of increased suburban population.
85
As a result, it is
difficult to identify any single factor as being most responsible for the reduction in the crime rate from
the peak in the early 1990s.
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Natural Experiments
A focus on specific crimes and locations sheds additional light on
the deterrent effect of various policies
“Fortunately, direct and strong evidence with respect to severity and certainty effects can be
found in targeted studies of particular policy changes.”
86
Steven Durlauf, economist, and Daniel
Nagin, criminologist
Examining changes in penalties, incarceration rates, and the number of police officers at the national
level, or within Minnesota, shows some correlation between policy changes and crime rates, but does
not provide clarity on the specific effect of a particular change. However, other studies have taken a
narrower focus in an attempt to gather more specific information. This section reviews some of the
studies that help illuminate the deterrent effect of criminal justice policies.
Dismissal of the Denmark Police Resulted in an Increase in Crime
One early study used a unique situation in Denmark during World War II. With unrest and resistance
growing in the country, the occupying German army arrested the Danish police force late in 1944. Street
crimes, like robbery, rose sharply while the rate of other offenses that take place in less public areas did
not change dramatically.
87
The study suggests that police presence, which increases the likelihood of
punishment, deters some crime but does not deter offenses like domestic violence, which often take
place within a home.
Interviews with Burglars Highlight the Importance of Individual
Perception
A study of residential burglars in St. Louis focused on information from 105 criminals.
88
Of those 105
burglars, 21 were on probation, parole, or serving a suspended sentence. While 72 percent of the
subjects had been arrested for any offense, only 25 percent had been arrested and convicted of
burglary. The total lifetime burglaries of those who had never been arrested was twice that of those
who had been arrested for any offense. Those statistics provide support for the theory that there is a
connection between subjective belief of the certainty of being arrested and the likelihood that a person
will commit a crime. Those who had never been arrested likely believed that there was a very low
likelihood of being apprehended, and they committed burglary at twice the rate of those who had been
apprehended.
Studies of Three Strikes Laws Have Inconsistent Findings
California’s “three strikes” laws provided an opportunity to examine the effect of increased penalties on
repeat offenders. That law provided a dramatically increased penalty for a person’s third offense of
certain types of crime.
89
Proponents of the law touted the assumed deterrent effects that the law would
have and, in upholding the law, the Supreme Court cited deterrence as a valid justification for the
policy.
90
However, studies assessing the law are conflicted. While some studies suggest that individuals
with two strikes are less likely to reoffend, others found little, if any deterrent effect from the law.
91
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Administrative Sanctions Deter First-time Drinking and Driving
Offenders
Laws increasing penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol have received significant attention.
Individuals who drive while intoxicated face a variety of consequences including criminal sanctions like
fines or jail time, and administrative sanctions like the loss of a driver’s license. Studies suggest that
increased criminal penalties have little or no effect on recidivism.
92
Some states imposed mandatory jail sentences for drunk drivers, but individuals convicted under those
laws actually had higher rates of accidents or repeat offenses than those convicted before the
mandatory jail sentences went into effect.
93
Interviews with inmates suggested that individuals in prison
were actually more likely to drink and drive after their release.
94
In short, greater punishment in the
form of severe sentences is correlated with an increase in recidivism.
95
In Minnesota, the penalty for driving under the influence increases based primarily on the number of
prior offenses an individual has. Offenders with one offense, who faced the least significant
consequences for reoffending, committed repeat offenses at the lowest level while repeat offenders,
particularly those with five or more prior offenses, were the most likely to reoffend.
96
Several
jurisdictions, including Minnesota, increased penalties for first offenders by requiring an arrest for
someone with a first DWI or imposing mandatory jail sentences on those offenders. Some jurisdictions
found that a reduction in nighttime crashes that resulted in fatalities followed the increase in
penalties.
97
Of note, Arizona was an exception. There was no significant change in the number of
fatalities after the state increased penalties for first-time offenders.
98
In general, license suspensions
and revocations were found to have a greater deterrent effect.
99
The same was true for policies that
increased the certainty of detection, even in a study that found no effect from increased penalties.
100
In
summary, first-time offenders can be deterred from committing another DWI offense, but that
deterrence appears to be connected to an awareness of the likelihood of being caught and the specific
deterrent effect of short periods spent in jail and the loss of a driver’s license.
Increasing the Drinking Age Reduced Excessive Drinking by Teens
Researchers have also focused on issues related to drinking, particularly heavy drinking, by individuals
under age 21. Most states moved their minimum legal drinking age to 21 following federal legislation
encouraging that change, which passed in 1984.
101
Studies showed that the laws had a dramatic effect,
reducing alcohol consumption by those young adults and significantly reducing highway fatalities among
those under age 21.
102
However, underage drinking remains a significant public health issue, particularly
on college campuses. While colleges have attempted to improve their policies and enforcement, there
has not been a significant decline in binge drinking.
103
Indeed, there is some question as to whether the
minimum drinking age laws, and related “zero tolerance” policies for drinking and driving by underage
individuals actually caused the reduction in drinking and driving by young people. While the laws
correspond to a reduction in drinking and driving by those young people, studies do not necessarily
show that the laws caused the reduction.
104
Traffic Tickets Deter Some Drivers
A study of traffic tickets showed that men who received a citation for speeding were more likely to
receive subsequent speeding tickets, suggesting that there was no specific deterrent effect from traffic
tickets for those drivers.
105
There were noticeable demographic differences, though, showing that,
unlike men, women who received a ticket were less likely to be caught speeding again.
106
Increasing the
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fine for a speeding ticket was not seen to reduce speeding in Norway, though increasing the fines for
failing to wear a seatbelt did correlate with an increase in the number of people who wore seatbelts.
107
Focused enforcement efforts that included both a publicity campaign and increase in ticketing resulted
in a reduction in traffic accidents.
108
Banning drivers from using cell phones without a hands-free device
resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of drivers using phones without those devices, but did
not result in a significant reduction in accidents.
109
Banning a specific behavior, targeting enforcement,
and increasing awareness, appear to change driving behaviors. Imposing traffic tickets, or increasing the
fine for a particular driving offense, also appear to deter at least some drivers.
Harsh Sentences After the London Riots May Have Contributed to
Crime Reduction
In 2011, there were significant riots that included damage to property and looting in London following a
police shooting.
110
Approximately 3,000 people were arrested and received sentences that were harsher
than normal.
111
For example, one man received a sentence of six monthsimprisonment for stealing a
bottle of water and another was sentenced to ten months for stealing two left tennis shoes and leaving
them outside the store.
112
Before the riots, the crime rate in the areas where the riots took place was
significantly higher than the rate in other parts of London.
113
In the six months following the riots, the
overall crime rate in London decreased by about 3 percent compared to the pre-riot rate.
114
Rates in the
areas where rioting occurred dropped slightly more than the rate in other areas.
115
Crimes that
increased dramatically as part of the riots dropped the most significantly after the riots while there was
an increase in other crimes.
116
The authors of one study concluded that these statistics provide support
for the theory that the harsher sentences had a deterrent effect.
117
It is worth noting, though, that the crime rates in all of England and Wales had been declining steadily
since 2004.
118
Indeed, recorded crime data for London provided by the United Kingdom’s Office for
National Statistics shows that, similar to both the United States as a whole and the state of Minnesota,
the crime rate in England and Wales peaked in 1995 and has trended downward since.
119
Data focusing
only on London shows that the city’s total number of reported crime in the year ending March 31, 2011,
before the August 2011 riots, was 829,788.
120
Reported crimes in the year ending March 31, 2012, which
would include the riots, was 820,744.
121
Taking a slightly longer view, the total number of reported
crimes for the four-year period from March 31, 2006, to March 31, 2010, fell nearly 16 percent while the
total for the four-year period from March 31, 2011, to March 31, 2015, fell by 15 percent.
122
The
increased penalties for offenses during the riot may have had a deterrent effect within the
neighborhoods affected by the riots, but it is difficult to connect those sentences to the general trend of
reduced crime.
Transitions to Adult Court Do Not Change Behavior
Other studies have explored the transition from juvenile court to adult court. Juveniles can be put in
detention, but are not sent to prison unless they are tried as adults. If the threat of a prison sentence
has a deterrent effect, then a person who might commit a crime as a juvenile should be less likely to
commit the same offense as an adult. However, several studies found that there was no significant
change in offenders, even when they perceived that the threat of imprisonment had increased.
123
The
dramatic increase in potential punishment did not have a deterrent effect.
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Intensive Probation with Immediate Consequences Shows Some
Promise
Hawaii’s pilot project within its probation system provided an opportunity to examine the effect of
certainty and celerity. The program, known as Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE),
attempted to identify probation violations quickly and then provide an immediate consequence for the
violation.
124
The consequences involve jail time, but are limited to a few days. The program produced
excellent results in a short-term study.
125
A study that looked at the long-term effects still showed
positive results, but the difference between probationers in the HOPE program and those in traditional
probation was not as significant.
126
However, several jurisdictions received grants to replicate the
program. Early results in those jurisdictions show very little difference between participants in the new
program and those in traditional probation.
127
Increased Police Presence Reduces Some Crime
Several studies examine the increase or decrease of police presence in particular areas following specific
incidents. When there is a decrease in police presence in a certain area, crime tends to increase.
128
Conversely, when police increase their presence in a particular area, in response to changes in the threat
of terrorism, for example, crime in that area decreases.
129
Targeted Policing Has Proven Effective
Targeted policing, or hot-spot policing, has received significant attention. Studies of several
metropolitan areas show that a small number of neighborhoods or locations account for a very high
percentage of crime incidents.
130
Law enforcement agencies responded to this evidence by targeting
those areas with increased police presence. Following the increase in police presence, there was a
reduction in crime.
131
One study showed that doubling police presence produced a reduction in 6
percent to 13 percent of crime calls.
132
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Policy Considerations
Governments strive to prevent crimes from taking place to protect people from physical harm, having
their belongings taken, and other dangerous behaviors. There are many paths to improve community
safety and stability. For example, changes in education and economic conditions can have a significant
effect on crime rates. In addition, the traditional law enforcement activities of detecting and punishing
crimes do deter potential offenders. Drawing from the extensive literature related to deterrence,
policymakers can assess which types of changes are most likely to have a deterrent effect, and which are
less likely to reduce crime.
Criminalizing Behavior Appears to Deter that Behavior
When new laws prohibit actions that were legal, studies suggest that many people change their
behavior. The most common examples of this can be found in changes in traffic laws. When laws began
requiring that people wear seatbelts and imposing a fine for failing to wear them, more people began to
wear seatbelts. In states that have banned the use of cell phones while driving, fewer people drive while
talking on their phones. Many people prefer to follow laws and, even if following the law is
inconvenient, they will modify their behavior to comply with the law.
Increasing Some Fines May Deter Behavior
Where a fine is relatively low, an increase in that fine may deter some additional individuals. Again, this
effect is seen most often in traffic violations. Localized increases, like increasing the fine for speeding in
a construction zone, and general increases, like increasing the fine for failing to wear a seatbelt, result in
fewer violations.
Increasing Certainty of Detection Often Deters Behavior
Individuals who believe they are likely to be caught are less likely to commit crimes. Drivers slow when
approaching a squad car parked on the side of a highway, and crimes like theft or robbery drop when
visible police presence in an area increases. However, some increased enforcement efforts result in an
increase in crime in surrounding areas.
Perception Is Generally More Important than Reality
When a person weighs the benefits of violating a law against the potential consequences, that
individual’s belief about those consequences is what matters. Increases in enforcement or penalties will
only deter individuals who are aware of those increases. Publicized increases in enforcement, like the
“Click It or Ticket” program and increased DWI patrols, have been shown to have a deterrent effect.
Increasing Significant Penalties Does Not Appear to Deter Crime
Multiple studies found that increases in significant penalties did not have a deterrent effect. Interviews
with offenders show that they discount sentence increases. A five-year sentence, for example, is seen
as twice as severe as a one-year sentence, not five times harsher. A 20-year sentence is seen as six times
more severe than a one-year sentence. There may be important policy reasons to increase penalties
that are already long, such as removing a particular individual from the community for a longer period of
time, but those changes are unlikely to dissuade others from committing the same offense.
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Short Sentences May Prevent Reoffending, Long Sentences May
Not
People respond to sanctions. Most people convicted of a DWI do not reoffend. Probation models, like
Hawaii’s HOPE model and drug courts, have shown promising results from a system that uses limited
consequences, such as a few days in jail, for violations. However, individuals who spend longer periods
of time in prison are more likely to reoffend than those that serve sentences of about a year.
Using Deterrence Theory to Develop Policy
Legislators seeking to discourage people from taking particular actions can use deterrence theory to
inform policy choices. For example, if the goal is to reduce an action that is currently legal, studies
suggest that the most effective policies would include criminalizing the behavior, establishing a
reasonable consequence, developing an awareness campaign, creating periods of targeted
enforcement, and publicizing the results of the enforcement campaign.
In contrast, if the policy seeks to reduce the prevalence of an offense that is currently illegal and subject
to a modest fine, legislation that increased the fine combined with publicity about that change can have
a deterrent effect.
When the underlying action is a serious crime that can be punished by a prison sentence, increasing the
potential maximum sentence for that crime appears to have little deterrent effect. Instead, research
suggests that policies that increase the certainty that an offender will be caught are more effective.
Legislators may consider increased police focus in certain areas, but can also look for ways to increase
the involvement of other public or private institutions. Examples include the policy that requires bars
and restaurants to stop serving alcohol to individuals who are obviously intoxicated or the requirement
that hotels train employees to recognize the signs of sex trafficking and to properly report suspected
trafficking.
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Questions to Ask When Assessing Policy
Legislators considering policy proposals can use deterrence theory to assess what, if any, deterrent
effect the legislation is likely to have. Relevant questions include:
Is the action currently prohibited in any way?
Is the general public aware of any prohibition?
Are people who are likely to commit the offense aware of the consequences?
Is the offense one that usually involves some amount of planning, or is it something that is more
commonly done in the heat of passion or as the result of an addiction or mental health
disorder?
Does an existing penalty understate or exaggerate the seriousness of an offense to the extent
that a rational person would choose to commit one crime instead of another?
Does the offense result in a relatively immediate consequence?
Can a prohibition be enforced effectively so that a person committing an offense cannot avoid
detection?
Does the policy increase the likelihood that an offender will be identified?
Does the policy lend itself to targeted enforcement actions?
Can the policy harness the expertise of community organizations, businesses, and other entities
other than law enforcement to increase awareness and influence public perception about a
particular action?
Research suggests that there are several paths to deterrence depending on the nature of the offense
and the population most likely to commit the offense. For most policies, the answer to some of these
questions will be “yes,” and the answer to others will be “no.” Determining the likelihood of a deterrent
effect requires more than tallying the number of “yes” or “no” answers, however. Legislators can use
questions like these to understand how a policy will be implemented and better predict how a particular
prohibition or enforcement is likely to influence particular actions in specific populations.
Conclusion
Governments seek to protect citizens in a variety of ways. Regulations like health inspections, license
requirements, and building codes exist to assure the general public that businesses, professionals, and
buildings meet a basic level of expertise or safety. Criminal laws, in part, exist to create some assurance
that people are unlikely to harm one another, or take property that belongs to someone else. When
people believe they will be caught and punished, they are less likely to commit crimes. That is, an
appropriate level of punishment coupled with a high likelihood of being caught is likely to deter some
potential criminals. Legislators can consider those two prongs, certainty and severity of punishment, in
crafting legislation to deter crime.
Deterrence is not the only reason for significant penalties. Criminal laws indicate a community’s morals
and values, restrain potentially violent offenders, and impose punishment for actions that society finds
reprehensible. There may be strong policy justifications for increasing penalties based on those
considerations. But, if the goal of a policy change is to deter crime, research suggests that an increase in
the likelihood of being caught has a greater deterrent effect than an increase in the potential penalty.
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Endnotes
1
John Jay, “Federalist No. 3,” The Federalist Papers (1787).
2
Sara B. Heller, Brian A. Jacob, and Jens Ludwig, “Family Income, Neighborhood Poverty, and Crime,” in Controlling
Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs, eds. Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Justin McCary (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011).
3
Richard A. Van Dorn, Sarah L. Desmarais, John Petrila, Diane Haynes, and Jay P. Singh, “Effects of Outpatient
Treatment on Risk of Arrest of Adults with Serious Mental Illness and Associated Costs,” Psychiatric Services 64,
no. 9 (September 2013).
4
Denise C. Gottfredson, Brook W. Kearley, and Shawn D. Bushway, “Substance Use, Drug Treatment, and Crime:
An Examination of Intra-Individual Variation in a Drug Court Population,” Journal of Drug Issues 38, no. 2 (2008):
601-630.
5
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (introduction to the Principles)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 179.
6
Kevin C. Kennedy, “A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory,” Dickinson Law Review 88, no. 1 (1983-
1984); Kelli D. Tomlinson, “An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Federal Probation 80,
no. 3 (December 2016): 33-38.
7
Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, “An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, By the Marquis Beccarioa of Milan. With a
Commentary by M. de Voltaire. A New Edition Corrected,” (Albany: W.C. Little & Co., 1872).
8
Beccaria, 16.
9
Beccaria, 47.
10
Beccaria, 73, 94.
11
Bentham, 6.
12
Bentham, 7.
13
Steven Durlauf and Daniel Nagin, “Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” Criminology and Public
Policy 10, no. 10 (2011).
14
Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 78, no. 2 (1968):
169-217.
15
Becker.
16
Kevin C. Kennedy, “A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory,” Dickinson Law Review 88, no. 1 (1983-
1984).
17
Raymond Paternoster, “How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence,Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 100, no. 765 (2010).
18
George Antunes and A. Lee Hunt, “The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in
American States: An Extended Analysis,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 64, no. 486 (1973).
19
Paternoster.
20
Paternoster.
21
Kelli D. Tomlinson, “An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Federal Probation 80, no. 3
(December 2016): 33-38.
22
Antunes and Hunt.
23
Antunes and Hunt.
24
Antunes and Hunt.
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Minnesota House Research Department Page 20
25
Valerie Wright, “Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment,” The Sentencing
Project, November 2010.
26
Wright.
27
Paternoster.
28
James Austin and Lauren-Brooke Eisen, “How Many Americans Are Unnecessarily Incarcerated?” Brennan Center
for Justice at New York University School of Law (2016).
29
Austin and Eisen.
30
Paternoster.
31
Paternoster.
32
Kennedy.
33
Wright.
34
Austin and Eisen.
35
Wright.
36
Reino Siren and Jukka Savolainen, “No Evidence of Specific Deterrence under Penal Moderation: Imprisonment
and Recidivism in Finland,” Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 14, no. 2 (2013):
80-97.
37
Steven Durlauf and Daniel Nagin, “Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” Criminology and Public
Policy 10, no. 10 (2011).
38
Durlauf and Nagin.
39
Antunes and Hunt.
40
Antunes and Hunt.
41
Paternoster.
42
Durlauf and Nagin.
43
Kennedy.
44
Kennedy.
45
Sonja Schulz, “Individual Differences in the Deterrence Process: Which Individuals Learn (Most) from Their
Offending Experiences?” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 30, no. 2 (2014): 215-236.
46
Tomlinson.
47
Robert Apel, “Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal Deterrence,” Journal of Quantitative
Criminology 29, no. 1, (2013): 67-101.
48
Paternoster.
49
Paternoster.
50
Becker.
51
Tomlinson.
52
Tomlinson.
53
Tomlinson.
54
Paternoster.
55
Paternoster.
56
Paternoster.
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57
Paternoster.
58
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Crime in the United States,” Table 1 (2016).
59
FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports; See also: http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm and Nazgol
Ghandnoosh, “Federal Prisons at a Crossroads,” The Sentencing Project (2017) available at:
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/federal-prisons-crossroads/.
60
State of Minnesota Department of Public Safety, “Uniform Crime Report,” (2010), Table 13; State of Minnesota
Department of Public Safety, “Uniform Crime Report” (2017), Table 4.4.3; see also, Andy Mannix and C.J. Sinner,
“Crime rate in Minnesota hits a 50-year low, new BCA data show,Star Tribune (June 30, 2017).
61
DPS and Mannix and Sinner.
62
Paternoster.
63
Durlauf and Nagin.
64
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, “National Sources of Law
Enforcement Data” (October 4, 2016); available at: https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf.
65
Jarrett Murphy, “The NYPD has More Police Officers than 45 States,” City Limits.org (April 14, 2015); available at:
https://citylimits.org/2015/04/14/the-nypd-has-more-cops-than-45-states/.
66
Brian Reaves, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (1992).
67
Brian Reaves and Andrew Goldberg, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” Bureau of Justice
Statistics (1996).
68
Brian Reaves and Matthew J. Hickman, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” Bureau of Justice
Statistics (2000).
69
Paternoster.
70
Paternoster.
71
Paternoster.
72
Canada reports more property crimes than the United States while the United States reports more violent
crimes. Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey; see also:
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2015001-eng.htm; FBI UCS Annual Crime Reports; see
also: http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm.
73
Durlauf and Nagin.
74
Paternoster.
75
Bureau of Justice Statistics Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool Prisoners, available at:
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps.
76
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
77
Durlauf and Nagin.
78
Durlauf and Nagin.
79
Paternoster.
80
Paternoster.
81
Data collected from the Bureau of Justice Statistics bulletin “Prisoners 1925 81” and annual bulletins “Prisoners
in 1982” through “Prisoners in 2016.”
82
Larry Motiuk, Colette Cousineau, and Justin Gileno, “The Safe Return of Offenders to the Community Statistical
Overview, April 2005,” Correctional Service Canada; available at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/sr2005-
eng.shtml.
83
Motiuk, Cousineau, and Gileno.
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84
Adult Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011; available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/
85-002-x/2012001/article/11715-eng.htm#a1; Bureau of Justice Statistics bulletin “Prisoners 1925 81” and
annual bulletins “Prisoners in 1982” through “Prisoners in 2011.” See also, Roger Boe, “Comparing Crime and
Imprisonment Trends in the United States, England, and Canada from 1981 to 2001,” Research Branch
Correctional Service of Canada (2004); available at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/b29-eng.shtml.
85
Arthur Acolin, Richard Voith, and Susan Watcher, “City and Suburbs Has There Been a Regime Change?” Penn
Institute for Urban Research White Paper (June 2016).
86
Durlauf and Nagin.
87
Durlauf and Nagin.
88
Richard Wright, Scott H. Decker, Allison K. Redfern, and Dietrick L. Smith, “A Snowball’s Chance in Hell: Doing
Fieldwork with Active Residential Burglars,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 29, no. 2 (May 1992):
148-161.
89
See, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15-16 (2003).
90
Ewing v. California.
91
Durlauf and Nagin.
92
James L. Nichols and H. Laurence Ross, “The Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions in Dealing with Drinking Drivers,”
Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 6, no. 2, (April-June 1990): 33-60.
93
Nichols and Ross.
94
Jeff A. Bouffard, Nicole Niebuhr, and M. Lyn Exum, “Examining Specific Deterrence Effects on DWI Among
Serious Offenders,” Crime and Delinquency 63, no. 14 (2017).
95
Benjamin Hansen, “Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from Drunk Driving,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper (June 2014).
96
Recidivism by DWI Offenders in Minnesota, Research Department, Minnesota House of Representatives,
available at: http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/dwirecd.aspx?src=4.
97
Nichols and Ross.
98
H. Laurence Ross, Richard McCleary, and Gary LaFree, “Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving The
Arizona Case,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 81, no. 156 (1990-1991).
99
Ross, McCleary, and LaFree.
100
William N. Evans, Doreen Neville, and John D. Graham, “General Deterrence of Drunk Driving: Evaluation of
Recent American Policies,” Risk Analysis 11, no. 2 (1991).
101
Henry Wechsler and Toben F. Nelson, “Underage College Students’ Drinking Behavior, Access to Alcohol, and
the Influence of Deterrence Policies: Findings from the Harvard School of Public Health College Alcohol Study,”
Journal of American College Health 50, no. 5 (2002).
102
Wechsler and Nelson.
103
Wechsler and Nelson.
104
J.H. Hedlund, R.G. Ulmer, and D.F. Preusser, “Determine Why There Are Fewer Young Alcohol-Impaired
Drivers,” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Report No. DOT HS 809 348 (2001); available at:
https://icsw.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/feweryoungdrivers/.
105
Saranath Lawpoolsri, Jingyi Li, and Alisa R. Braver, “Do Speeding Tickets Reduce the Likelihood of Receiving
Subsequent Speeding Tickets? A Longitudinal Study of Speeding Violators in Maryland,” Traffic Injury Prevention
8, no. 1, (April 2007): 26-34.
106
Lawpoolsri, Li, and Braver.
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107
Rune Elvik and Peter Christensen, “The Deterrent Effect of Increasing Fixed Penalties for Traffic Offences: The
Norwegian Experience,Journal of Safety Research 38, no. 6, (2007): 689-695.
108
Dara N. Lee, “Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management 34, no. 1 (2014).
109
Anne T. McCartt, David G. Kidd, and Eric R. Teoh, “Driver Cellphone and Texting Bans in the United States,”
Annals of Advances in Automotive Medicine 58 (March 2014): 99-114.
110
Ravi Somaiya, “London Sees Twin Perils Converging to Fuel Riot,” The New York Times, August 7, 2011.
111
Brian Bell, Laura Jaitman, and Stephen Machin, “Crime Deterrence: Evidence from the London 2011 Riots,” The
Economic Journal 124 (May 2014): 480-506.
112
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
113
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
114
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
115
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
116
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
117
Bell, Jaitman, and Machin.
118
Alan Travis, “Crime rise is biggest in a decade, ONS figures show,” The Guardian, July 20, 2017.
119
Office for National Statistics, “Crime in England and Wales: Year ending December 2017,” Statistical Bulletin,
April 26, 2018.
120
Office for National Statistics, “Recorded Crime Data and Police force Areal Level (including pivot table)”;
available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/recordedcrimedataatpolicef
orcearealevelincludingpivottable.
121
Office for National Statistics, “Recorded Crime Data and Police force Areal Level (including pivot table)”;
available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/recordedcrimedataatpolicef
orcearealevelincludingpivottable.
122
For the year ending March 31, 2006, the total reported crimes in London was 992,557 while the total for the
year ending March 31, 2010, was 835,965. The total for the year ending March 31, 2011, was 829,788 and the
year ending March 31, 2015, had 705,881 total reported crimes. See, Office for National Statistics, “Recorded
Crime Data and Police force Areal Level (including pivot table)”; available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/recordedcrimedataatpolicef
orcearealevelincludingpivottable.
123
Durlauf and Nagin.
124
Sam Kornell, “Probation that Works: Swift and Certain Punishment Reduces Crime. Parolees Love It.” Slate, June
5, 2013; available at:
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/hawaii_hope_probation_program_reduces
_crime_drug_use_and_time_in_prison.html.
125
Eric Martin, “A Hopeful Approach: Understanding the Implications for the HOPE Program,” Corrections Today
(September/October 2017).
126
Martin.
127
Martin.
128
Durlauf and Nagin.
129
Durlauf and Nagin.
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130
Durlauf and Nagin.
131
Durlauf and Nagin.
132
Durlauf and Nagin.