Nigeria's Foreign Policy from 1960 – Global Era: What Went Wrong?

PALACKY UNIVERSITY IN OLOMOUC

(UNIVERZITA PALACKÉHO V OLOMOUCI)

FACULTY OF SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy from 1960 – Global Era: What Went

Wrong?

(Master’s Thesis)

Author: BA. Grace Eshiet

Supervisor: Ing. Mgr. Petra Mestánkova, Ph.D.

Olomouc, 2018

Declaration of Authorship

I do solemnly declare that I have written the present master’s thesis Nigeria Foreign Policy

for independence in 1960 to Global Era: What Went Wrong? independently and that I have

correctly acknowledged bibliographical references and quotations.

In Olomouc (date): Signature: …………………………………

Acknowledgement

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to all those who contributed to the

successful completion of my work.

My sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Dr. Petra Mestankova, whose scholarly

criticism, recommendation and support helped infuse academic soundness to my work. I

thank Dr. Lenka Duskova who took great pains to support me in my trying times; I also

appreciate her scholarly criticism which improved my research skills.

My thanks also extend to the Head of Department, Pavel Novacek for his support throughout

my studies. I appreciate the support from my lecturers, Radovan Dluhy-Smith, Tomas

Danek, Simona Safarikova, Jaromir Harmacek, Oprsal, Miroslav, Petr, Jurag, who

understood my controversial nature and appreciated my diverse opinion. I also thank the

PhD students; Lenka, Lucie, Eva, and Pavla who’s a sister to me. While I remain grateful to

Martin for being there, my unreserved appreciation goes to Radhka Radlikova, who was very

supportive before I set foot in Czech Republic. I also thank Mrs Gronychova and Jiri for their

support.

I am deeply grateful to my family who stood by me throughout the study period. I dedicate

this work to my Senior Sister, Barr Itoro Eze-Anaba, who’s been a mentor, my rock and

backbone in the last four years. Without Itoro, my studies would remain a dream. I am also

indebted to my mum, Eno, my siblings, Eze, Okon, Effiong, Eshiet, Mayen-Itoro, Nsima,

Nene, and all the grandchildren, including Kosibobo, Tima-baby, Dady’s son, Etoro, Eteka

and the rest, for the warm support.

My unreserved appreciation goes my friend Guillaume Maupin who has been there for me,

Samuel Odei who stood by me in trying times from 2015. I am also grateful to Fabio Iguavita

and Hali-ma for the time spent in reviewing my work and the recommendations. I will not fail

to mention Joy Steven and Steven Okoye for their warm support and for being around in

recent times; Jean-Michel, Patrice, Daniel, Chuks, Pailina, Floyed, Eliza, Francesca, Ntebo,

Alexis, Ette Ibibio, Nsisong, etc. Finally, I thank my former colleagues at DEEEP and

CONCORD Europe, Helen and Jerome, Tobias, Soledad and FEPS Europe for confirming

my participation to events where I also expanded my knowledge in the field.

Abstract

After many years of leading the continent and contributing to its liberation from the claws of

apartheid and racism, Nigeria’s power in Africa has declined and she’s unable to assert

herself or play such roles in the continent or within critical governance structures in recent

times. The study was aimed at establishing the factors that led to this decline. It is

established that Nigeria is facing severe internal challenges that is affecting her leadership

role. However, findings reveal that in her 58 years of existence since independence in 1960,

the different governments (military and civilian democratic) misunderstood the concept of

power in foreign policy, especially with changes in international system, from end of

apartheid in South Africa to the growing force of globalization. Despite her achievements

with the same foreign policy objectives in place, the absence of a unified foreign policy

approach has led to different interpretations, strategies and implementations by the fourteen

military and civilian governments from 1960 till date. The study has therefore established that

regime changes and leadership styles are major factors that have contributed to Nigeria’s

power decline in this global era.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter One is the introductory chapter. It focuses on the background to the study, the

statement of the problem, the objectives, motivations, justification and significance. It guides

through the research methodology, sources of data and data gathering techniques and

analysis.

Chapter Two reviews existing literatures and what has been written on the topic already. It

also covers the theoretical framework and the scope of study, and analyses frameworks

used in other studies.

Chapter Three covers extensively the main research. It covered Nigeria’s development

initiatives with the external community over five periods from 1953 prior to independence till

the present era. It examined the military governments and the civilian transitional democratic

settings situated within the five periods; the component of the policy and domestic

environment that shaped the foreign policy thrusts and Nigeria’s relationship with the rest of

the world.

Chapter Four discusses the findings. It strikes a comparison between the two dominant

governments in Nigeria - military authoritative regime and civilian transitional/democratic

government and establishes each government’s foreign policy thrust and implementation

and establishes which of the governments’ approaches contributed to Nigeria’s dwindling

influence.

Chapter Five conclude the study by answering concretely the hypothesis and research

questions.

CONTENT

Chapter One: ......................................................................................................................................... 11

1.0 Background of the Study ....................................................................................................... 11

1.1 Statement of the Problem .................................................................................................... 14

1.2 Objective of Thesis ................................................................................................................ 14

1.2.1 Main Thesis Objective ................................................................................................... 14

1.2.2 Specific Objectives ........................................................................................................ 14

1.3 Methodology – Research Design .......................................................................................... 15

1.3.1 Research Questions....................................................................................................... 15

1.3.2 Variables ........................................................................................................................ 15

1.4 Data Source: Inclusion and Exclusions .................................................................................. 15

1.5 Approach ............................................................................................................................... 16

1.5.1 First Period - 1953 Independence in 1966 (First Republic) ........................................... 16

1.5.2 Second Period – 1966-1979 Military Regimes .............................................................. 17

1.5.3 Third Period – 1979-1984 Democratic Governmenta (Second Republic) ..................... 17

1.5.4 Fourth Period - 1984 – 1999 Military Regimes (2 successful and 3 aborted coups) .... 18

1.5.5 Fifth Period - 1999 – date Democratic System – “Fourth Republic”............................. 18

1.6 Scope of the Study ................................................................................................................ 18

1.7 Limitation .............................................................................................................................. 19

1.8 Motivation ............................................................................................................................. 19

1.9 Justification ........................................................................................................................... 20

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework .............................................................. 22

2.0 Introduction of Chapter ........................................................................................................ 22

2.1 Foreign Policy Expectations and Practicality ......................................................................... 22

2.1.1 Decision-Makers, Agency and Actors in Foreign Affairs ............................................... 23

2.1.2 Personality, Regime Type and Foreign Policy ............................................................... 24

2.1.3 Does Nigeria’s Foreign Aid Make Her A Hegemon? ...................................................... 24

2.1.4 Image and Foreign Policy .............................................................................................. 24

2.1.5 Reciprocity and Nigeria’s Foreign Aid Initiative ............................................................ 25

2.2 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................... 27

Chapter Three: Research Findings Presentation................................................................................... 30

3.0 Introductions ......................................................................................................................... 30

3.1 First Republic – 1957 - 1966 .................................................................................................. 30

3.1.1 Government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 1957 – 1966 .......................................... 30

3.1.2 Second Period 1966-1979 Military Regimes ................................................................. 33

3.1.3 General Yakubu Gowon, August 1

1966 – July 1975 ................................................... 34

3.1.4 The Government of General Muritala Mohammed 1975 - 1976 ................................. 36

3.1.5 General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo - 1976 – 1979 ....................................................... 38

3.2 Third Period-1979 - 1984 Second Republic - Democratic Government ................................ 40

3.2.1 The Administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari ................................................................. 40

3.3 Fourth Period – 1983-1999 ................................................................................................... 42

3.3.1 The Administration of Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon ................................ 42

3.3.2 The Government of General Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida ....................................... 44

3.3.3 The Government of General Sani Abacha ..................................................................... 48

3.3.4 The Administration of Abdulsalami Abubakar .............................................................. 51

3.4 The Fifth Period 1999 Democratic System – “Fourth Republic” ........................................... 52

3.4.0 The period covers four presidents and for the first time, a change of power from the ruling

party to the opposition. ................................................................................................................ 52

3.4.1 Retired General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo ................................................................. 52

3.4.2 The Administration of Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua ................................................................ 56

3.4.3 The Administration of Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan ............................................ 57

3.4.4 The Administration of Retired General Muhammadu Buhari ...................................... 60

Chapter 4: Discussion of Findings ......................................................................................................... 62

4.0 Introduction of Chapter ........................................................................................................ 62

4.1. First Period 1953 – 1966 - First Republic (Civilian Rule) ............................................................ 62

4.2 Second Period 1966 – 1979 (Military Government) ................................................................... 62

4.3 Third Period 1979 -1983 Second Republic (Democratic Government)....................................... 64

4.4 Fourth Period 1984 – 1998 (Military Regimes) ........................................................................... 65

4.5 Fifth Period 1999-2018 - Fourth Republic (Democratic Government) ....................................... 67

5. Chapter Five Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 70

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 74

Annex………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………95

Abbreviations

AU African Union

ANC African National Congress

ICJ International Court of Justice

NACAP National Action Committee Against Apartheid

OAU Organization of African Unity

PAC Pan-African Congress

SARF South Africa Relief Fund

UNCAA United Nations Anti- Apartheid Committee

UNO United Nations Organization

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Afrocentric A pan-African ideology that focuses on the history, culture and life of

black Africans

Chapter One:

Nigeria’s Africa, Africa’s Nigeria

“So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think we are

not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested

in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this

organisation, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects

our immediate neighbours. On the question of colonialism and racial discrimination,

I am afraid that we in Nigeria will never compromise”

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first Prime Minister of Nigeria first address the UN 1960

(in Nwanuole and Iwoha, 2012:76).

1.0 Background of the Study

In every region of the world, pivotal powers take the lead. Such powers possess the geo-

strategic advantage to determine the direction of events and actions and shape

arrangements regionally, continentally, etc. They adopt different strategies, from diplomacy-

economic and public (Sevin, 2015), security, economy, aid and assistance, grants, etc. in

their relationships and interactions and also have critical say on issues relating to

development and peace of the region. Such powers played critical roles in establishing

important organizations like NATO, European Union-EU, the United Nations Organization-

UN, etc. (Dokubo and Oluwwadare, 2011). Such was Nigeria’s role after independence from

British control in October 1960.

Located in the Gulf of Guinea West Africa, Nigeria is the tenth largest country in Africa, with

a landmass of 924,000 square kilometres (African Economic Outlook, 2003, Country Reports

2017), 853km long coastline. Prior to 1914, present-day Nigeria was simply regions and later

Protectorates, of Southern and Northern Nigeria, including the Colony of Lagos. It was

amalgamated in 1914 by the British government and later granted independence in what can

be described as a negotiated self-rule (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Apart from oil, Nigeria has

about thirty-three other varieties of solid minerals that when fully utilized will make Nigeria

the leading economy in Africa. There are 371 ethnic nations spread across six geopolitical

zones in Nigeria (Vanguard Newspaper, 2017). Nigeria’s population stands at 185.989.640

million, accounting for 47% of West African population. In 2015, Nigeria had the largest GDP

in SSA at $521.8 billion. In 2016, it reduced to $USD404.653 ((Didia et al, 2015:234; World

Bank, 2018).

Nigeria was an agrarian monolithic society until 1970s. 75% of her revenue came from

resources like cocoa, palm-fruits, maize, etc. (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016::28). Oil was first

discovered in Oloibiri, in Bayelsa State in 1956 making Nigeria the first oil-producer in Africa

and a critical member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries-OPEC. The Yom

Kippur war led to increased global oil price and revenue from 1971. By 1980s, Nigeria relied

on oil (crude) for 92% of her foreign earnings. Between 1979 and 1985, oil earnings stood at

$104.06 billion, making Nigeria a wealthy nation (Aboje, et al, 2016; Mbachu, 1992 in

Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28). Nigeria is estimated to have 37 billion barrels of oil with

production capacity of 1427.3 barrels per day and crude oil exports (1000 b/d) 1,738.0

(OPEC, 2018). Her proven natural gas reserves is 120 trillion cubic feet, with recoverable

gas reserves of 45 tcf, making her the 9

largest resources in the world, with reserve-

production ratio at 125 years for gas. Today, about 77-80% of Nigeria’s revenue comes from

oil amounting to USD 55.45 billion (Adi and Friday, 2017; Malden, 2017:2).

Nigeria has an army of 200,000, the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank,

2018) according to 2016 estimates. Nigeria also has an estimated 50% of the potential for

manufacturing production in West Africa, with Lagos as the engine-room for the region. The

combination of human and natural resources, ethno-politics, the diplomatic and military

engagement of successive regimes in the continent’s affairs makes her a power in the

continent (Bach, 2007:302). These factors, especially oil and population were deciding

factors in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation. Owing to the critical role played in the

continent, Nigeria became a central locus in Africa. Whatever happens in Nigeria impacts

Sub-Sahara Africa positively or negatively according to Gambari (2008). Henkel (in Ali, 2012)

refers to Nigeria as a “regional hegemon,” committed to integration through peace and

security. Wright (1998) calls Nigeria a “Champion” which the Western powers would listen to,

and that could champion causes that other nations were too weak to stand up to.

Between 1950’s to early 1990’s, black African nations were embroiled in liberation struggles.

In March, 21

, 1960, about sixty-nine unarmed South Africans, protesting against the

carriage of Pass to designated areas in South Africa were killed. This ‘Sharpeville Massacre’

aroused African consciousness and brought to limelight the atrocities of the apartheid policy

(Abegunrin, 2008:13). Other black nations under severe colonial subjugation achieved

independence through blood and heavy clampdown. Countries like Mozambique, Namibia,

Zambia and Zimbabwe were not liberated until the 1980’s. South Africa followed

subsequently upon Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in February 12

1990. Identified

expertise and resource gaps impeded many independent states from advancing.

Conversely, Nigeria’s journey to independence was smooth in comparison, with less

confrontation.

Despite a smooth independence, Nigeria was left with a weak and dependent economy

given the many years of colonial domination and exploitation, and without real legacy for

economic development or technological take-off (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016). Nations

across the world adopted modernization concept of development to achieve social and

economic changes in postcolonial world and World War II. Developed States adopted the

theory to push developing states and former colonies to economic growth (Jiafeng, 2009:73).

This was not the case in Africa as many of the colonial powers adopted different exit strategy

from colonies. It was in this weak state that Sir Abubakar Balewa declared that “

Nigeria’s

Africa, Africa’s Nigeria

”, meaning that Nigeria is taking responsibility to support Africa,

making African liberation and unity the centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy and development

initiatives. Nigeria possessed the needed resources which placed her in position to fill the

identified gaps in other black states.

The foreign policy objectives were enshrined in the 1979 Constitution and upheld in Chapter

2, Section 19 of the 1999 operational Constitution (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). Four

objectives were designed to facilitate Nigeria’s leadership role while the first focused on the

internal (Appendix). The promise to tackle issues peculiar to Africa, where the forces of

apartheid and colonialism were still prominent (Ajayi, 2005) shows that Nigeria placed

liberation of other African nations above internal affairs. Foreign policy dictates how a State

relates with other countries, socially, politically, economically and in a military sense.

Nigeria’s foreign policy covering aid, assistance, propaganda, grants, concessional loans,

etc. dictated her relationship.

Indirectly, Nigeria took up the crucial leadership role as a continental hegemon, to fight

colonialism, racism, apartheid (Emenike, 2007; Ezeolisa, 2015), combat conflict and assist

weak African nations to build stronger institutions and promote African unity. Nigeria’s

foreign policy was therefore interpreted along these lines, under different governments. In 58

years of independence, 27 years were under different military leaders with three intermittent

attempts at democratization. Nigeria committed resources to financially weak African,

Caribbean and Pacific nations.

Nigeria initiated the Economic Community of West African States-ECOWAS along with Togo

and Ghana (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011). Nigeria is the sixth largest contributor to the

Commonwealth Secretariat budget (Akinrinade, 1997; Scotland and Morland, 2017).

Nigerian Trust Fund, Technical Development Cooperation Fund and Technical Aid Corps

have served many black nations in the last 30 years. Apart from the force of globalization

which later replaced modernization, Nigeria’s journey from independence, spanning 58 years

is enough for the institutions responsible for external affairs to mature and gain practical

experience (Effiong, 2012; Jiafeng, 2009), firm up strategies and become very relevant in

international development cooperation platforms like Organization for Economic Cooperation

And Development-OECD. Rather, the different approaches to external affairs by the 14

Leaders led to positive and negative impacts on Nigeria’s position and aspirations as a

continental power. It has therefore become imperative to navigate the political, economic and

social landscape of Nigeria over the years to comprehend the nature and content of her

external affairs (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016).

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Nigerian has contributed significantly to African development. Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust

from 1960 earned her the names “

Frontline State

” and “

Giant of Africa

” (Ezeolisa, 2015;

Ojakorotu and Adeleke, 2017). Events and literature reveals that the different foreign policy

approaches adopted by different leaders over the years created problems that impacted

negatively on her foreign policy. Many have also identified the weak and struggling economy,

personality and character of leadership and their perception of how to handle the economy,

including ethno-religious diversity as contributory factors to Nigeria’s fading influence

(Rosemary, 2005; Soremeku, 2003). Pine (2011) opines that the Afrocentric concept “Africa,

the Centrepiece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” is a problem as it lacks deep and profound

philosophical reflection and some elements of reciprocity.

In an era of increased cooperation, when many countries are positioning themselves as part

of global decision making architecture, Nigeria’s assertive role in the continent has declined

and has lost her admiration and esteem (Aiden and Schoeman, 2013; Fagbayibo, 2014).

This study therefore identifies this declining role and loss of prestige as the problem and

seeks to establish which governments’-military or civilian actions, domestic challenges or

changing international scene contributed to Nigeria’s declined influence in the continent and

her inability to make the necessary impact despite her potentials.

1.2 Objective of Thesis

1.2.1 Main Thesis Objective: To evaluate Nigeria’s foreign policy from the period leading up

to independence in 1960 to the present global era - 2018.

1.2.2 Specific Objectives: pursuant to this main objective, the derived objectives are;

 To evaluate side-by-side how military regimes and democratic civil rule handled

Nigeria’s foreign relations and how it shaped her influence in the continent;

 To understand the role aid played in Nigeria’s foreign policy, its components and how

it became essential instruments of the foreign policy;

 To identify how each government within a specified period in Nigerian history

designed its foreign policy thrust and ascertain the differences in each government.

This is crucial because Nigeria as an independent nation has been characterised by

only two phases of either authoritarian (dictatorship) military rule or democratic

transitional civilian rule. This will help to ascertain inherent differences in the foreign

policy in relation to regime type;

 To determine the origin and factors that influenced each government’s approach, the

challenges and priorities. This is important to understand how and why the

governments adopted different thrusts and how it impacted on her image. This will

cover the political, economic and social climate within each period and how it shaped

the adoption of the policy thrust.

1.3 Methodology – Research Design

The study employs qualitative research to discover, trace, gather information and establish

new facts regarding Nigeria’s external relations (Durrheim, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000;

Hiatt 1986, cited in Harwell, 2011). Case study as a methodology is adopted because ”

investigates a phenomenon in-depth and within a real-life context…it copes with technically

distinctive situations in which there will be more variables of interests than data points

” (Yin,

2009:18). Case study methodology provides the framework to investigate this phenomenon

in-depth. Method of analysis is purposive, explanatory, evaluative and comparative. The

“how,” “why” and “what” questions capture complex issues and allows for comparison of the

different governments in the established periods (1953-2018) in order to identify factors that

caused the power decline.

1.3.1 Research Questions

 What is the component of Nigeria’s foreign policy?

 How was Nigeria’s foreign policy articulated during military regimes and democratic

administrations?

 How did the systems, military regimes or civilian democratic governments aid Nigeria in

asserting her influence locally and globally?

 How has regime change impacted on implementation of her foreign policy over the

years?

 Why has her foreign policy not impacted on her role as a continental hegemon or

superpower?

1.3.2 Variables

Dependent variable is decline of Nigeria’s influence in Africa as influenced by the regime

changes. Independent variable is the decline of Nigeria’s influence in Africa as influenced by

character or leadership style.

1.4 Data Source: Inclusion and Exclusions

Data source are primary and secondary and medium of analysis is the Palacky University

Electronic Portal. Online Archival Analysis was utilized for select information from

government records. The study also obtained directly from other academic sites e.g. Jstor,

Scribd, Liste, and Academia. For vital information not available on the School Portal but were

crucial to the study, non-academic sources were explored and included. Resources include

academic research articles, books, book chapters, peer reviewed-dissertations and theses,

evaluation reports, book reviews, newspapers, academic citations and relevant professional

accredited websites, licensed websites and internationally-recognized stakeholders and

organizations whose thematic areas cover foreign policy and international development

assistance initiative.

The non-academic sources and websites are authenticated and their primary aim, agenda

and motivation is to educate. The characteristics of the websites and resources bordered the

relationship to the topics, use of English language, credibility of the writers, authors and

administrators, quality and depth of analysis, reliability and relevance to the topic. Examples

of key words used in the search are “Nigeria’s foreign policy in military era, “General

Obasanjo’s foreign policy,” “Economic Diplomacy,” Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy, Foreign

Aid and Foreign Policy, etc. “Scholarly articles on” were added at the beginning of some

searches which were not available on Palacky Information Resources. While references and

bibliographic articles are majorly from the year 2000, special consideration is given to prior

select works that are very critical to the study.

It was difficult to establish the page numbers or columns of some online sources. The

bibliography represents the research population, collection of objects and individuals with

similar binding features. Ideally, the study covered from 1953 till March 1

2018 which should

give an estimated sixty-four (64) years and four (4) months, including leap years. Since data

was mostly generated online, it is impossible to follow this process to conduct a thorough

archival search of activities from 1953 till March 2018. The study is therefore authentic to

work within the 64 years. Html links were followed and websites were directly accessed and

examined to establish its suitability for the study. The study was also peer reviewed where

the opinions of colleagues with backgrounds in law, international relations and development

studies and similar competence were sought.

1.5 Approach

The study follows a chronological pattern of analysis from 1953 till 2018. It is divided into five

periods starting 1953-1960 to 2018. The timeframes are important and awards opportunity

for the reader to determine the regime types, changes, priorities, challenges and continuities

of the policy (Effiong, 2012).

1.5.1 First Period - 1953 Independence in 1966 (First Republic)

Preparations for Nigeria’s independence commence in 1953 with establishment of

Office of

the Cabinet for External Affairs

. Election into the Federal House was held in 1957. Members

of the House represented the different (371) ethnic groups and regions in Nigeria. The last

British colonial Governor-General, Sir James Robertson handed over officially to Sir

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Fulani Muslim from Northern Nigeria on October 1

1960. By

1963 when Nigeria officially joined the Commonwealth of Nations, the first president, Dr

Nnamdi Azikiwe from Southern Igbo group replaced the Queen and Nigeria became a

Republic. This period in post-colonial Nigeria is referred to as the “First Republic 1960 –

January 1966.

1.5.2 Second Period – 1966-1979 Military Regimes

Four military coups and a civil war (Nigerian-Biafran War 1967-1970) characterised this

period. General Aguiyi Ironsi from Igbo ethnic group Southeast Nigeria took over in January

, 1966 following the assassination of the Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa and other

Northern leaders. As a nation of many ethnicities, fears of marginalization began to seep in.

General Ironsi was assassinated in a second military coup by a group of northern army

officers six months later on July 12

(Ujumadu, 2016). General Yakubu Gowon, Christian

from Northcentral Nigeria became Head of State on August 1

1966.

In July 29

, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in a third military coup which brought to

power General Muritala Mohammed, a Hausa Muslim from the north. Muritala was later

assassinated in a fourth military coup in February 13

, 1976 and his deputy; a Southwestern

Yoruba, General Olusegun Obasanjo became military leader. In 1979, General Obasanjo

handed over to a democratically elected government. The distinctive aspect of this period is

the Kippur Yom war which led to oil windfall that assisted Nigeria in exercising her leadership

role. Until 1970, 75% of Nigeria’s revenue came from agricultural products, cotton, palm oil,

groundnut, etc. As at 1960, oil accounted for 2.6% of export earnings. In 1971, oil production

climaxed one million barrels per day, thus crude oil replaced agricultural products as main

driver of the economy. Agricultural revenue fell from 75 percent to 55 percent by 1971 and

further to 45 percent in 1974. By 1980, it was less than 20 percent and contributed only 7.5

percent revenue. The oil revenue which stood at 20 percent in 1966 rose to 36 percent in

1970, 55 percent by 1974 and by 1980; it stood at 80 – 98.6 percent (Alkali, 1997:65-66;

Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28; Ahmed, 1990 in Ojieh, 2014).

1.5.3 Third Period – 1979-1984 Democratic Governmenta (Second Republic)

Alhaji Shehu Shagari was democratically elected the president in 1979, with Sir Alex

Ekwueme as Deputy. Shagari completed the first term of four years of democratic

government in October 1983. The oil shocks of late 1970s led to economy turndown during

this period and the government was faced with severe economic crisis and resorted to

external borrowing. Shagari’s government was overthrown in another military coup three

months into the second term in December 31

1983.

1.5.4 Fourth Period - 1984 – 1999 Military Regimes (2 successful and 3 aborted coups)

The coup of December 31

1983 brought to power General Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde

Idiagbon. The military regime was in place until August 27

1985 when it was toppled by the

third high-ranking member of the Supreme Military Council, General, Ibrahim Babangida.

According to domestic and international observers, Alhaji Moshood Kashimawo Abiola had

the highest votes in the presidential election held on June 12

, 1993 following a successful

Gubernatorial, Federal and State Houses of Assembly elections. This was to mark the

“Nigeria’s Third Republic.” However, the election was declared “nulled and void.” An Interim

Government was setup with Ernest Shonekan (not a contestant) as the Interim Head of

Government.

In November 17

1993, General Sani Abacha replaced Shonekan as Head of State.

Between 1993 and 1998, the winner of the acclaimed elections, Moshood Abiola was

incarcerated and died in July 1998, weeks after Abacha. This period is known as “The Dark

Days” in Nigerian history. General Abdulsalami Abubakar became Head of State in July 8

1998 following Abacha’s demise. He laid the groundwork for democratic government. A

retired General Obasanjo won the election and became president from May 29

, 1999.

1.5.5 Fifth Period - 1999 – date Democratic System – “Fourth Republic”

Between May 1999 and date, four presidents have been sworn in. Obasanjo handed over to

Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua, a passive president due to his health condition. Yar’Adua passed on

in May 5

2009. His deputy, Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in to complete the tenure and

subsequently won the 2011 election. Retired General Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015

elections, this time as civilian president of Nigeria. The study therefore analyses, evaluates

and explained how Nigeria’s foreign policy initiatives and frameworks were designed and

articulated within these five periods.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The research was feasible despite the anticipated challenges. There are enough academic

materials on the topic; the Palacky Electronic Information Portal provides rich information

resources. The research design and methodology are well-understood. Many used the term

foreign policy, foreign assistance, foreign aid, diplomacy, etc. interchangeably. Foreign

policy as already stated is about the strategies and actions that guide states at international

field using aid or development assistance as its tool. Since a greater part of Nigeria’s

assistance to African states was financial aid, these thesis uses the term “foreign policy and

foreign aid” to analyse the impact of the assistance.

The study covers five periods and four republics from 1953 to March 2018. Additionally, the

study concentrates on Black Nations in Africa and to an extent blacks in the Caribbean and

Pacific regions, excluding blacks in Europe and the United States because Nigeria’s focus

was black Nations in disadvantaged situations. No interviews are conducted. Primary and

secondary sources are used. The terms “she” and “her” are used in the study to describe or

represent Nigeria, a former British territory, under Her Royal Majesty, the Queen of England.

Queen Elizabeth II was the Head of State until 1963, when Nigeria became a Republic.

Thus, the feminine words “she” and “her” are officially used to represent Nigeria.

1.7 Limitation

Time constrain and financial resources to travel to Nigeria for in-depth interviews and Focus

Group Discussions with critical stakeholders. By delimitation, the researcher is unable to do

quantitative and qualitative research at same time but some aspects of quantitative methods

are integrated in the study.

1.8 Motivation

The motivation for this topic is derived from different sources. Nigeria’s absence as a key

player in international affairs, unlike in the past which was widely recognized; the negative

perception of Nigerians within and outside Africa; my experience as a Nigerian with other

Africans here in Czech Republic and in Europe; the misinformation and misconception about

Nigeria’s role in Africa; the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, targeting mostly Nigerians;

the absence of a literature that explains the role Nigeria played in African integration in post-

colonial and post-apartheid Africa in Palacky University Library; the quest for justice for the

lives of Nigerians lost to these attacks and the need to speak about it more; the need to

contribute to a comprehensive text that focuses on what Nigeria’s relationships with the rest

of the world entailed and to situate it within other contexts in development field.

I was also inspired by the lectures in MRS/International Development Studies, my recent

encounter and association with the Group -

Young Professionals in Foreign Policy

, following

my internship in Brussels. And because this is a field I recently developed interest in, it could

inform my future work in the field or further study at PhD level. The study also added value

and improved my research skills. And while it may serve as recommendation to appropriate

authorities, it also provides the department and Palacky University with a resource and

reference point for those seeking further knowledge and information in the field and about

Nigeria.

My focus on Nigeria’s external support stems from the need to understand how the two

systems-military dictatorships and democratic transitional governments articulated the

foreign policy. I have also examined the issues emanating from the meetings I have attended

within development circles in Europe, examine how other countries tackled external issues

while Nigeria’s sacrifices to African unity is rarely mentioned or acknowledged. Many are

only aware of the corruption cases and influx of Nigerian migrants to other countries while

the leadership role Nigeria played in the continent is downplayed. Xenophobic attacks target

Nigerians in almost all parts of the world, including in places where Nigeria committed

enormous resources. It is my deepest interest to understand what led to Nigeria’s current

backseat position and to share the findings.

1.9 Justification

To establish the regime type in Nigeria and the foreign policy thrust that positively impacted

on the international system. It equally seeks to understand the component of the policy.

While studies have been conducted on various aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy, this topic

is far from being exhausted as a research field. Study shows that Nigeria still stands in

position to dominate the entire continent given many factors, including her population,

natural endowments, economy-potential and her manufacturing and production capacity

which stands at 50% in West Africa (Bach, 2007:301; Williams, 1991). This, achievable

through positive foreign policy interpretations, is far from reality as Nigeria’s influence over

the years continue to wane.

Most importantly, this study seeks to strike a link between development aid and foreign

policy because apart from propaganda, financial aid was the major foreign policy tool used

by different governments in Nigeria. Aid was a Second World War development strategy and

was instrumental in realizing the modernization theory of development. At a period aid was

used as a weapon of diplomacy and to build alliances, Nigeria’s external affairs bordered on

financial and technical assistance to liberation movements in Africa and to promote African

unity. However, this support is yet to translate into meaningful impact or benefit to Nigeria as

her influence continues to decline. In 1973, Hans Morgenthau (in Ajayi, 2005:61), asserted

that no nation can have true guides on what to do in foreign policy without accepting national

interest as guide. The Adedeji Commission Report of 1976 endeavoured to interpret the

foreign policy objectives as:

 The defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;

 The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest

of the world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial

integrity of all African countries while at the same time foster national self-reliance

and rapid economic development;

 The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity especially the

dignity of the black race;

 The defence and promotion of world peace.

Nevertheless, what constitute National Interest is still unclear except Point.1. The objectives

failed to spell out how it should be implemented to benefit Nigeria and Nigerians. Different

governments endeavoured to premise what they considered to be Nigeria’s interest within

prevailing circumstances. Support from Nigeria is sufficient to meet Official Development

Assistance standard and place her on the OECD list of Donor Countries. Her assistance to

Africa and her power and influence could be perfected as an influential tool to garner support

and be relevant at international circles. However, the reverse is the case as decision makers

settled for good neighbourliness in place of economic benefits and strategic partnership

(Pine, 2011). This study has therefore become imperative to unravel the factors behind this

backwardness.

In terms of significance, this study helps to examine and build appreciation for Nigeria’s role

and how her best practices can be adapted to meet today’s needs. This study reawakens our

consciousness to her role in liberating the continent from the claws of apartheid, racism and

colonialism. It serves as lessons learned document, reference point for further research and

debate on the topic. It will contribute to the discourse that may inspire the redefinition of

Nigeria’s foreign policy initiative to better respond to today’s needs. Additionally, the in-depth

knowledge contributed to the researcher’s development-career aspirations and her chances

of succeeding in the field.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction of Chapter

The chapter examines existing academic literature and scholarly articles on the topic, to

bring to the fore what has been done within this topic. Due to diverse opinions that surround

debate on this topic, it was important to go beyond academic works to relevant sources to

enrich this section. The chapter also covers the theoretical frameworks which the study is

structured on.

2.1 Foreign Policy Expectations and Practicality

According to Hill (2003: p-43-45), Foreign Policy is expected to protect citizens who pursue

life or work abroad, from prison sentences for possessing drugs to labour exploitation and a

country’s identity abroad through cultural activities, language acquisition, maintain territorial

integrity and social peace against external aggression. Ajayi (2005) sees foreign policy as a

transaction among states entailing high diplomacy aimed at achieving certain national

objectives. To Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011:103), it entails strategies that guide actions of

governments in spelling out these objectives in international system. Rolenc (2013) sees it

as the positioning of the state towards its surrounding, hence towards other players in

international system. Matt (2015) calls it issues on “internationalist” agenda while Petric

(2013) sees it as activities with which a state fulfils its interests within the international arena.

For Celenk (2015), foreign policy enables states to identify certain political, economic and

military interests of concern and pursue them through different channels. Chibundu (2003)

says it’s a State’s external action which can be friendly or aggressive, casual, intense or

complex. To Hill (2003), it is about mediating a two way flow between internal and external

dynamics and cannot be detached from the domestic where it springs from. Ayam (2004),

Dokubo and Oluwadare (2010), Alao (2011) also attest to this relationship between internal

and external dynamics.

Foreign policy could be based on economics, politics, military, morality, culture or

establishment of relationships and cooperation with the rest of the world. While Kisangani

and Pickering, (2015), Preble (2010) attests to this military approach/intervention, Bernie

Sanders (2017) in his address at Westminster College affirms that foreign policy is not just

tied to military but directly connects with economics, taking into account the outrageous

income and wealth inequality that exists today, global peace and security and should be

employed to prevent an oligarchic form of society where a few exert influence over the

economic and political life of our world.

This study defines foreign policy as a set of goals and course of actions a state wishes to

pursue in its external relations, either to build goodwill and appreciation for itself as a

responsible member of the society or promote international development. It entails financial

aid, technical support, scholarships, development programs, diplomacy, etc. These

understandings and definitions demonstrate a general consensus on the role and aims of

foreign policy. It generally presents foreign policy as a governance tool that could be used to

question the extent to which societies are obligated to one another and decide the principles

of international order (Hill, 2003). This consensus rightly establishes the linkage between

foreign policy, foreign aid and domestic dynamics that impacts on foreign aid positively or

negatively.

2.1.1 Decision-Makers, Agency and Actors in Foreign Affairs

Decision-making, the starting point in foreign policy rests within the agency. In foreign policy,

this agency is the State and those responsible for making decisions are bureaucrats and

politicians. Titles and locations may vary according to the type of system or international

actor represented (Guerlain, 2014). Foreign policy sums up official external relations

conducted by an ‘independent actor’ in international relations (Hill, 2003). Actions taken by

transnational, international organizations, International Non-Governmental Organizations-

INGOs are counted as foreign policy initiatives, depending on the issues at stake. Support

for single currency project of the European or African Union or opposition to nuclear testing

by Greenpeace, CONCORD Europe can impact on foreign policy. This makes NGOs and

lobby groups critical foreign policy actors (Abelson, 2014; Hafsa, 2014; Snider, 2003).

Financiers like George Soros (Soros Foundation), Bill Gates (Bill and Melinda Gates

Foundation) and multinationals like Shell Petroleum; ExxonMobil may not be fully involved

but also share vulnerability in cases of unpleasant incidents. The conflict over oil exploration,

between Royal Dutch/Shell, Nigerian Government and Host Communities in the Niger Delta

especially the Ogoniland serve as example. The execution of the Ogoni 9, including Ken

Saro Wiwa, a playwright and environmental activist impacted negatively on Royal

Dutch/Shell activities. Shell has faced many legal actions following these incidents and

ceased operating in Ogoniland since the executions in 1997. The publicity following the

incidents demonstrates the critical role of the Press in foreign policy (Hennchen, 2015;

Obayiuwana, 2001; Schutz, 2017; Ugwu and Moko, 2014:151).

Authority for implementation of external policy lies with the ministry of foreign affairs under

supervision of a minister, or Secretary of State like the United States. Some ministers are

believed not to have full powers and often refer to heads of Governments. Conversely, some

heads of Governments serve as Ministers while some are often sucked into the roles, for

instance, the Presidents of United States of America and France (Fuchs and Richert, 2016;

Slovak Academy Press, 2010). In Nigeria, the Minister and Nigerian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs is statutorily established to reinforce Nigeria’s external dealings (Mimiko and Mbada,

2014:147-148).

2.1.2 Personality, Regime Type and Foreign Policy

At every point in a nation’s history, wielders of powers determine the nature, character and

direction of the nations’ relations in the international system (Magbadelo, in Akintenwa,

2010). Personalities of leaders, leadership style, institutional designs, etc. are critical to

foreign policy (Mimiko and Mbada, 2014, Brommessen and Ekengren, 2012). The issue of

personality and political regime type has been greatly discussed in academic and

policymaking circles as it is believed to be one of the fundamental issues in the field.

Historical analysis shows that a country’s foreign policy is tantamount to the personality of

those at the helm (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Additionally, domestic, external and

psychological factors such as the mental process of decision-makers and the rationale

behind the decisions have been identified as the foundation on which the foreign policy of a

country is hinged on (Ogwu, 2005).

2.1.3 Does Nigeria’s Foreign Aid Make Her A Hegemon?

Due to nature of the international system, States seek power to maintain their sovereignty

and security through economic diplomacy and safeguarded by military superiority

(Fiammnghi, 2011; Fukuyama, 2004; Mearsheimer, 2010; Muller, 2008; Papadimitriou and

Pistikou, 2013). Some states take further steps to maintain this sovereignty by exerting

hegemonic influence and taking up leadership role. Nigeria played crucial roles at regional

and continental level which was fully recognized within and outside the continent (Bach,

2010; Henkel, in Ali, 2012; Wright; 1998). Although Ogunnubi and Okeke-Ofodile (2016)

through application of hegemonic stability theoretical lens affirmed that through her

interactions, Nigeria’s foreign policy initiative displayed few signs of continental hegemonic

disposition, Nigeria was never an expansionist, blackmail or coerced other weaker nations to

accept her views and policies but was guided by legal equality, non-alignment, non-

interference principles (Olusanya and Akindele; 1986:4 in Obi, 2008).

2.1.4 Image and Foreign Policy

Image is an individual’s perception of what is good or bad and the meaning people ascribe to

or from it (Hosti 1996). The perception of any nation by members of the international

community and how it pursues its relations with others, including the citizens’ behaviour all

determine the country’s image (Zimako, 2009). For a state to be successful and secure its

national interests depends on her image, international credibility, reputation of the states,

including her military, economic and political powers (Celenk, 2015). Image has therefore

become a fundamental part of a nation’s foreign policy and forms a critical element in a

country’s strategy for foreign policy formulation and implementation. It requires a well-

focused purpose to create and reinforce favourable images to the external world (Adeniyi,

2012; Alimi, 2005). The study agrees that a nation’s attempt to meaningfully impact on and

influence the world is guided by her foreign policy objective and national interests and how

effectively it is communicated to the world. The advantages flowing from good image

internationally are inestimable and often stem from the opinion people have of its citizens

(Federal Ministry of Information Nigerian, 2012:345).

2.1.5 Reciprocity and Nigeria’s Foreign Aid Initiative

Development cooperation aims to support national or international development priorities. It

is not profit-driven but based on cooperative relationships ranging from financial (in-kind)

transfer, capacity support, emergency aid to policy change (Alonso and Glennie, 2015).

Development assistance can be traced to the period the

Organization for European and

Economic Cooperation

now

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

was

established officially, to complement the US Government Marshall Plan at the end of the

Second World War. The success of the Marshall Plan motivated many countries to provide

aid to least developed states. Today it is called “

Official Development Assistance-ODA

”,

employed to promote economic and social development in developing countries (Todaro and

Smith, 2009; Riddell, 2007), through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Developing

countries are targeted because their financial institutions are weak, infrastructures

underdeveloped and market failures endemic (Sengupta, 2002).

McGillivray and White (1993:2) therefore posits that

“aid is an instrument of foreign policy serving to promote political and diplomatic

relations with developing countries; enhance stability within countries of strategic

importance; expand export markets, procure strategic imports and gain kudos in

international fora by being seen as responsible, caring member of the international

community helping countries in need and seeking to promote international

development.”

Official foreign aid and assistance are therefore vehicles of a country’s foreign policy (Sogge,

2002:194), encompassing concessional public resource transfer from one government to

another with at least 25% grant element, with one purpose of furthering development in a

poor country (Lancaster in Picard et al. 2008:39). During the Cold War, aid was a political

instrument of rivalry between the Eastern and Western Bloc. The success of the Marshall

Plan changed attitude of donors and was a motivation to assist disadvantaged countries

(Fuhrer, 1994). Foreign aid has therefore become an important aspect of international

system, a blend of political, economic or military motive. Aid, in this study is therefore taken

as an instrument of statecraft, like propaganda, diplomacy or military action (Picard et.al,

2008).

It recognises foreign aid and foreign policy as part of development assistance initiatives. Due

to domestic politics in aid-giving countries, foreign aid is used in foreign policy for variety of

purposes ranging from domestic politics to international pressures (Lancaster, 2007). In

foreign aid sometimes, there is a lack of mutual exchange or reciprocity (Picard et.al, 2008)

like the case of Nigeria’s foreign aid. Reciprocity has been studied in terms of the levels of

cooperation and conflict (Stern and Druckman, 2000). It is an optional principle of

international law that has the capacity to build mutual trust and confidence as well as

strengthen bond amongst states (Blaut, 1987, in Palmer et al, 2002). Unlike what obtains in

official development assistance circle, Nigeria’s aid was untied and unconditional with no

mutual exchange (Pincin, 2013; Round and Odedokun 2004; Sung-Kee and Young-Ham,

2016). The dictates of global system frowns at this absence of reciprocity as many countries

do not know how to pay back (Bassey, 2004; Saliu, 2006a; Ubi and Akinkuotu, 2014).

In the area of cooperation, virtually every nation and regions of the world belong to some

cooperation and organization that promotes economic or monetary integration, free trade or

security (Anushiem et.al, 2017). Nigeria has collaborative and bilateral relationships across

the world Africa (Meyer et. al, 2010) and is a member of many international organizations

(DTAC, 2018). However, at time of alliance building and influential network coordination like

BRICS with increased impact on international political and economic governance, Nigeria’s

presence is unfelt within these arrangements which provide enormous potential for

development. Developing countries are reshaping global investment architecture while

South-South Cooperation is a key element in global economic development (Ewelukwa,

2011; Elkamann and Ruppel, 2015; Udombana, 2002).

The literature review for this study summarily reveals that the method of gathering evidence

was detailed and reliable. Nearly all the researched papers chronologically analysed

Nigeria’s foreign policy from 1960 till date. In terms of limitation, Effiong (2012) and other

similar studies did focus on the policy thrust of each government but with no in-depth

analysis of the successes, impact and failures of each government’s foreign policy. This

study sees that as a gap to bridge. Some of the works have highlighted corruption and fading

image while others have endeavoured to highlight the political culture and history of Nigeria

which impacts on her governance arrangements over the years.

Additionally, many of the academic works were structured within decision-making,

globalization, bureaucratic politics model, with only one focus on Marxist’s political economy.

None of the analysed works adopted triangulation with Marxist, realism or liberalism theories

which make my work unique. Furthermore, the literatures all focused on foreign policy

without finding the link between foreign policy and foreign or development aid. This study

therefore locates these differences and similarities and establishes the linkages.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Given the competing frameworks of foreign policy, theoretical triangulation is adopted by this

study to interpret Nigeria’s foreign policy and assistance over the years. This includes role

theory, realism, liberalism, elite theory, liberal realism, globalization, decision-making theory.

However, it is mainly structured on Marxism and realism which bothers on hard power and

hegemony as exhibited by the military regimes and liberalism which deals with the economy

and soft power diplomacy. The triangulation enhances our knowledge of the power and

nature of Nigerian State, origin and direction of Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years and

how the military and civilian leaders with different ideological and political orientations

interpreted the policy.

Role theory distinguishes individual and group’s perception and behaviours in social

settings. It is a key component to understand the relationships that exists at different levels of

society (Folarin, 2010:93, also in Fayomi, 2015; Turner, 2001) and examines the linkages

between organizations, culture and human performance in the course of interaction (Martin

and Janelle, in Ritzer, 2005). Social structures and class division were propagated in Africa

through colonialism, apartheid and racism. In the late 1980’s to 2003, West Africa was

spontaneously overwhelmed by conflict which threatened the region’s foundations and

aspirations. These conditions called for concerted efforts which Nigeria was obliged to

respond (Banton, 1965; Turner, 2001:234). Nigeria subsequently assumed a leadership role

where the elite class, bureaucrats and institutions responsible for external relations and the

populace contributed. The decision-making represents their ideological, political orientations

and behaviours and the harmony and dissonance that shaped the conception, formulation

and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy overtime (Fayomi, 2015).

Realism, considered too focuses on the role of the state, security and importance of power,

character of states’ populations, egoism, brutality and the unsociable (Heywood, 2011).

Morgenthau (1985; 37; 1946:193) opines that the desire for power as the distinctive element

of international politics constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action. The underlying

motives of foreign policy allows a State or select groups in a State to use state apparatus for

their needs, to protect, enforce class structure and exercise power (Buse, 2012; Hill, 2003).

Apartheid South Africa was brutish in seeking class division (Abegunrin, 2009).

Marxist’s theory, also considered sees the state as operating in the interest of the capitalists;

an authoritative structure representing the dominant minority with power to establish laws

and enforce them on members of the society, jail, execute or initiate war. Marxist’s insists

that a State is an instrument for creation of class and hierarchies, domination, for oppression

and exploitation of those economically weak who lack the power to make decision. It is a tool

for establishment and maintenance of the hegemonic influence of the minority rich and

powerful over the indigenous majority poor in society. This concentrates wealth in a few

hands, in some cases through exclusionary polices and legislations like apartheid which

blocks the majority from gaining access (Chua, 2004; Lenin, in Johari, 2005: 72) and Decree

No 2 by the Buhari government (1984-1985) in Nigeria.

Liberalism in this study is associated with soft power diplomacy. Through interaction, States

recognize differences and resolve them through bargaining, negotiations and peace treaties

to achieve systematic improvement in conditions (Heywood, 2011). Liberation focuses on

different actors and their influence over the formulation of policies and emphasizes on

measurement of power through economy, free markets, legitimacy, and cooperation. It

spreads democratic and economic principles to bring forth the upshots of globalization,

economic integration and interdependence. It downplays use of force and coercion in human

affairs (Kaufman, 2004). Liberalism thus aims to maximize individual freedom for all and

rejects colonialism and imperialism (van de Haar, 2009). Nye (2004) sees it as the ability to

shape the preferences of others through intangible assets like attractive personality, culture,

political values and institutions as well as policies that are legitimate.

Elite theory (Weber, 2005/1922 in Lopez 2013) is based on minority ruling class in society in

control of power sources and authorises the entrance of new elites to a scene through

different mechanism, like military coups in Nigeria where new elite class takeover. Elite

theory explains elite behaviour, interaction, transformation and connections (Lopez, 2013),

just like Marxist’s. It affirms that those who exercise major influence or controls the

formulation and implementation of political, economic and social decisions are the elites

(Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Decision-making theory (Snyder and Sapin, 1962; Rosenau,

1969 in Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013:37) conversely analyses the political systems, processes,

behaviours (Gauba, 2003). It looks into the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make

that affects a nation on the international stage (Mints and DeRouen, 2010). Decision lies

within the interest and power of those at the helm of affairs and are made based on

worldview, circumstances, perception and motivations, reflecting ego, ambition and

experiences of those in control.

Liberal realism talks about a society of States with common norms and interests that

promote order and stability. It points to Nigeria as a nation with capacity to influence Africa

but failed to develop strategies that combine her military might with soft power like the

financial aid. Liberal realism requires understanding and moving with secular diffusion of

global power (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 2004). Another relevant theory is globalization, a new

paradigm within global politics and economic relations which links democracy and

capitalism. In modern society, globalization has tilted and shifted economic power of States

to the hands of institutions like European Union, World Trade Organizations-WTO,

International Monetary Fund-IMF, United Nations Organization, NATO and the African Union

which brings new constrains and conditions for effective international governance. It

removes decision making from the hands of governments, mandating States to adjust in

conducting international business, managing national politics and adapting them to

pressures from transnational forces (Ley, 2001).

Chapter Three: Research Findings Presentation

3.0 Introductions

This chapter covers the main findings of this study. The presentation of findings form the

basis for comparison of the two governments- military and civilian democratic governments

from 1960 and their foreign policy approach.

3.1 First Republic – 1957 - 1966

3.1.1 Government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 1957 – 1966

Nigeria, under British arrangement started preparation for independence in 1953. Personnel,

groom for the foreign affairs department were granted some level of authority over foreign

policy affairs (Adoba, 2014). In 1957, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became first Prime

Minister and started to exercise some powers. The department was transferred from the

Office of the Chief Secretary to Prime Minister’ Office as the Department of Cabinet Office.

Sir Balewa was sworn in as the first Prime Minister on October 1

1960 under a presidential

form of government. Nigeria officially joined the Commonwealth of Nations in 1963 (Ashiru,

2011 in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014; Effiong, 2012) when Nigeria became a Republic and Dr

Nnamdi Azikiwe replaced Queen Elizabeth as President.

As the first government for an independent Nigeria, the Balewa government had the privilege

of shaping the foreign policy decision-making structures and processes. The period was

characterised by anti-colonial struggles and crisis of collective racial identity of the colonized.

Balewa’s foreign policy took a conciliatory approach to the racial issue in Southern Africa in

connection to the nature and structure of world systems, including the vocabulary of politics

of that time (Abegunrin, 2009; Adebayo, 2003; Jinadu, 2005). Idang as far back as 1973

(Abegunrin, 2008) described Sir Balewa as having a calm and placating attitude which

enabled him to pursue a conciliatory but firm foreign policy.

In April 5

, 1960, a Private Member Bill was passed at the Lower House of the Federal

Parliament urging the Federal Government to take actions to ban the importation of South

African goods to Nigeria. Secondly, Nigeria organized the All Nigerian Peoples’ Conference

in 1961 which provided a “

picture of foreign policy attitudes, views, perceptions and opinions

by a national cross section of Nigeria intelligentsia”

. This provided the Prime Minister’s Office

with broad based of public opinion to guide in foreign policy formulation (Idang, 1973:92 also

in Mimiko and Mbada, 2014). Nigerian government established the National Committee

Against Apartheid (NACAP) to educate Nigerians about apartheid. Mass education from

primary schools to universities, in public squares, offices and markets squares, through

posters and billboard messages (Inamete, 2001), with support of Nigerian Press. In his first

speech as the 99

member of the United Nations, Sir Abubakar Balewa stated that, Nigeria

is naturally concerned first with what affects her immediate neighbourhood (Balewa, United

Nations October 8

, 1960). The statement specified that Nigeria’s focus is Africa, her

immediate neighbour.

At the Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly-UNGA 1961,

Nigeria spearheaded the international campaign against apartheid and discrimination in

South Africa, and canvassed for the imposition of mandatory sanctions against the regime.

The international reputation and contribution of many Nigerians also fits into this role. Dr

Taslim Olawale Elias, Nigeria’s Attorney General and Minister for Justice won significant

roles for Nigeria in international affairs. The United Nations nominated Taslim as Chairman

of the United Nations Committee of Experts that drafted the first Constitution of Congo-1961-

1962 and Africans also nominated him to chair the committee that drafted the Constitution of

the Organization of African Unity and its Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

(Aluko, 1986:89; West Africa, 1992:1486, in Inamete, 2001). Elias was elected by the

General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations to the ICJ and became the first

African jurist to be elected as President of the Court in 1982 and later to the Permanent

Member, Court of Arbitration at The Hague (Bello, 1992).

Nigeria at the International Labour Organization- ILO, Geneva Meeting moved a motion for

expulsion of South Africa which received 163 to nil with 89 abstentions. When this was not

acknowledged, Nigeria along with other African delegates walked out of the ILO meeting in

1963 (Idang, 1973:123, in Inamete, 2001). Nigerian government also persuaded,

unsuccessfully, other nations to expel South Africa from Commonwealth of Nations and the

UN because of its apartheid policies (Ogunbanjo, 2002:7). Foreign Minister, Nwachukwu

(November 1961, cited in Abegunrin, 2009:13) affirms that:

It was our suggestion at the United Nations that the Security Council applied the

provisions of Article 6 of the United Nations Charter, which says that when a member

continues to disobey or infringe the Charter of the Organization, then the possibility of

such member’s expulsion must be considered under Article 6 of the Charter. We, in

conjunction with other African states, brought this resolution to the political Committee

and it was passed. Now we want the Security Council to consider the possibility of

expelling South Africa from the UN under Article 6”

Nigeria’s success in creating a spirit of revulsion against apartheid at international forums

became a mass movement of the people, spearheaded by the people, especially in Nigeria

(Egedo, 1987). A year after Nigeria entered into an Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact with Britain

in 1961; it was terminated as a result of the pressure mounted by Nigerian students and

interest groups (Inamete, 2001) due to Britain’s continued relationship with South Africa.

Balewa recommended economic integration within regions which became the bedrock of

African integration program and a prelude to the formation of Organization of African Unity

(OAU) which he played key roles. Nigeria was instrumental in negotiating a peace settlement

between factions in Congo Zaire Civil War, known then as Congo Leopoldville, later as

Congo Kinshasa and now Democratic Republic of Congo. Apart from participating in the UN

Advisory Committee on the Congo, serving on the Secretary-General’s Congo Club and

providing the Chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission, Nigeria contributed 1,796

soldiers and policemen to the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) and ensured

Belgian paratroopers withdrew peacefully from Congo, 1960-1964 (Akinwunmi, 2000:55;

Lawrence 1996:192). By invitation of Julius Nyerere, Nigeria sent troops to end the mutiny

within the Tanzanian armed forces (Peter and Aminu, 1986:93-94, in Inamete, 2001:29).

As a result of Nigeria’s leading role in the continent, Chief Jerome Udorji, a Nigerian

administrator was commissioned to restructure Ugandan Civil Service. Chief Egbert Udo

Udoma was also commissioned to reorganize Ugandan legal system. Sir Udo Udoma was

one of the first black Africans to earn a PhD in Law in 1944 from Oxford University. He

served as Nigerian High Court Judge in Nigeria before his secondment to Uganda as the first

African to serve in the capacity. He was thereafter appointed Chief Justice of Uganda from

1963 to 1969. Recently, Nkemdilim Izuako was Judge of the High Court of Solomon Islands.

It is also on record that a team of Nigerian health professionals set up one of the most

prestigious private medical schools, the Kampala International University School of Medicine

in Ishaka, Uganda in Eastern Africa (Ezeala, 2008; Whiteman, 1998).

The first post-independent Development Plan was dependent on capital flow from the West.

As a newly independent state, Balewa constantly consulted Britain to keep the economic

space of the country flowing with needed resources (Aluko, 1983:82-84; Imobighe, 1981:10-

17 in Adoba, 2014). British Secretary to the Cabinet, Mr. Peter Stalland was still at the

background providing support and autocratic but informal control of the country’s external

affairs (Aluko, 1981:24, in Effiong, 2012:34). This dependence affected the execution of

revolutionary foreign policy as Balewa sort Britain advice on many issues, including the

Bizerte crisis where Tunisian government imposed blockade on French naval base (Laskier,

1994).

Balewa’s government evaded the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-

Soviet bloc until December 1961. The Soviet embassy at establishment in Lagos in 1961

was limited to ten diplomatic staff whereas no such restriction was placed on diplomatic

missions of Western European countries or the United States of America. The Soviet

embassy was allocated five diplomatic car plates whereas British and United State of

America were entitled to one hundred each. In 1961, Nigeria broke diplomatic ties with

France due to France’s atomic test in the Sahara Desert and renewed the relationship in

1965 (African Concord 10, 1991 in Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016; Army Institute of Education,

1977).

While it supported the liberation struggle, Balewa’s government refused to train armed militia

for Angolan fighters waging war against Portuguese colonialists and other freedom fighters

(Ezirim, 2011). With Nigeria’s population, many were of the belief that Nigeria will emerge as

the leader/Secretary-General of OAU or the Headquarters would be in Lagos (Alli, 1986).

Balewa’s government did not grant audience to Henry Nkumbula, leader of Rhodesia

National Congress in Lagos in 1961. Francisco Xavier Ndego, leader of the Popular Idea of

Equatorial Spanish Guinea Party who found his way to Nigeria to see the Prime Minister

without valid papers was jailed for two months and thereafter deported.

However, the government mandated Mazi Mbazulike, the Aviation Minister to host Nelson

Mandela in his home, where he spent six months. Mandela voluntarily returned to South

Africa where he was arrested and imprisoned (Ujumadu, 2016). When the opposition party,

the Action Group in the House of Assembly initiated a motion to debate on the assassination

of Patrice Lumumba of Congo in 1961, the ruling party, Northern People’s Congress (NPC)

rejected the debate that it was a foreign affair on the exclusive list of the Federal

Government but went ahead with the South African issue (Ojieh, 2014). The first military

coup led to assassination of Sir Tafawa Balewa in 1966. It ended the first civilian government

in Nigeria and the only government in the First Republic.

3.1.2 Second Period 1966-1979 Military Regimes

The second period starts from January 1966 to October 1979 covering four military Heads of

Governments. Four military coups, Nigerian Civil War, Yom Kippur War, oil windfall, oil

shocks and intense liberation struggles in Africa were recorded within this period.

3.1.3 General Aguiyi Ironsi January 16

, 1966 – July 12

1966

General Aguiyi Ironsi, the first military Head of State emphasized the importance of the

Africa-centred policy and vowed to honour all treaty obligations and financial agreements in

respect to external relations The government barred Portuguese and white South Africans

from entering Nigeria and denied them the use of Nigerian airspace and seaport facilities

because of their status as colonialists (Abegunrin, 2009; Effiong, 2012). The Ambassadors’

Conference was held in June 1966 in Lagos to re-examine the premises and directions of the

country’s foreign policy (Adedeji, 1976; Wogu et al, 2015). As a result of the ethnic

differences following the first coup, a second military coup took place on July 12th 1966 and

General Ironsi was assassinated.

General Yakubu Gowon, August 1

1966 – July 1975

Nigeria was enmeshed in a three-year civil war, (Nigerian – Biafran War, May 30

1967-

January 1970) under General Gown’s government. 1-2 million people were estimated to

have died in this war (Igbogwe, 1995:15 in Iwuagwu, 2012:283). The foreign policy under this

period was war diplomacy, geared towards countering secession by the Biafra from

southeast and preventing other countries from recognizing Biafra (Ajigbola, 1978:42-57, in

Effiong, 2012:36). Britain’s refusal to supply arms for the war motivated Gowon’s government

to solicit for support from the Eastern bloc. When it was realised that the Soviet Union was

willing to support Nigeria, Britain supported Nigeria in the war. However, Nigeria still forged

ahead with her affairs with the East. Soviet ideas, previously deemed subversive were

allowed in Nigeria. Soviet literature and films were distributed which led to increased interest

in communist world. Nigeria’s military trainings and supplies, which were exclusively handled

by the West, were altered to favour the Soviet Union (Ashaver, 2014; Dauda, 2006; Ezirin,

2011).

Support came in terms of logistics, military and propaganda for Biafra from South Africa who

saw it as a way to get back at Nigeria. Many countries, including Israel, France, Portugal,

Belgium, Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania and Zambia supported Biafra. Nigeria’s intelligent sources

reveal Tanzania and Zambia diverted arms meant for the liberation struggles to Biafra

(Wilmont, 1989:4). At the end of the civil war, Nigerian government renewed her struggles

against the apartheid regime. At the 7th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity-

OAU, Summit of Heads of States and Ministerial Conference of the OAU Gowon and the

External Affairs Minister, Okoi Arikpo reiterated Nigeria’s position to proscribe South Africa

as an unfit member of the international community due to its racist policy (Abegunrin,

2009:14; Omotosho, 2004:41).

Nigeria provided material and financial assistance to the Coordinating Committee of the

Organization of African Unity-OAU for the Liberation of Africa and the Nationalist Liberation

Movement of South Africa, African National Congress and Pan-African Congress

(Abegunrin, 2009). Nigeria led a boycott of the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany in

protest against apartheid regime. At the regional level, Nigeria’s first peacekeeping force was

dispatched in 1971 to Guinea to repulse invasion from Guinea Bissau and later to Chad

(Dumbuya, 2015). In 1972, Justice Akintola Aguda was seconded to serve as Botswana,

Swaziland and Lesotho Chief Justice (Agbede, 1986/2000).

With the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, “

the oil boom provided Nigeria a

new impetus to practice her non-aligned stances and position of neutrality in international

events

” (Egbo, 2003:65). It awarded the chance to focus on a policy that involved economic

expansion and eventual establishment of ECOWAS in June 1975 (Institute of Army

Education, 1977:11-13), the Niger Basin Authority and Chad Basin Commission (Adebayo,

2003:80). ECOWAS was established to foster integration of the region in line with Nigeria’s

foreign policy objective and Balewa’s recommendation for regional economic integration to

actualise African development and unity. The pioneering initiative was spearheaded by

Nigerian president General Gowon. Together with Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, the

presidents toured West African States to study the challenges and opportunities and brought

the integration idea to life (Akinterinwa, 2017; ECOWAS, 2016). Nigeria provided land for

ECOWAS Secretariat and regularly pays its annual contribution of 32.5% of the Community’s

budget (Ajayi, 2005:53; Folarin, 2013). Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, the pioneer Secretary-

General of United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA (1975-1993) took the

lead in bringing ECOWAS to life. Adedeji was instrumental in creating other regional

groupings in Africa (Adedeji, 2002; News Agency of Nigeria, 2018)

The government provided crude oil to African countries at concessionary rates (Adoba

(2014). The anti-apartheid struggle earned Nigeria the Chairmanship of the United Nations

Anti-Apartheid Committee in 1972-1975 and from 1976-1994; a strategic position to launch

vehement global campaign to stir up international moral indignation against the apartheid

system. The government commenced contribution to the voluntary UN Educational and

Training Programme in 1973 which enabled black South Africans to attend higher education

in other countries (Abegunrin, 2009).

Between 1973 and 1975, Nigerian government provided financial support of N3, 377.895 to

African states to assist in addressing drought and other natural disasters. Guinea Bissau,

Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe received N1, 297,400 as gift at

independence. N644, 000 was given to Niger, N500, 000 to Zambia, N400, 000 to Sudan

and N124, 000 to Sao Tome and Principe (Ogunsanwo, 1978:40-41; Ojieh, 2014:106).

Papua and New Guinea received funds for development as small countries inhabited by

blacks. Grenada and Guyana were assisted in payment of civil servants salaries and to settle

the balance of their recurrent budgets following their near bankruptcy in May 1975 (Aluko,

1981:201, Aduke-Abiola, 1999:89; Garba, 1991:26 in Ojie, 2014). Nigeria also assisted

Great Britain with her financial obligations of N20 million to Jamaica (Aligbe, 1988:12 in

Ojieh, 2014) and some neighbouring states. At this point, exchange rate was N1-US$1.65

(Meierding, 2010:7).

Internally, Gowon’s government established an Indigenization Policy in 1972 to create

economically independent Nigeria with improved opportunities for indigenous businesses

The oil boom provided more impetus to shift the economy from Western-dependent towards

nationalism and the government expanded protection for import-substituting industries,

enlarged role of State-owned enterprises and increased protectionism (Anyanwu,1997:95;

Eliagwu, 1976. Ogbuabu, 1983:250 in Fuady, 2015; Lewis, 2007:137). When the United

States’ Ambassador to Nigeria demanded an explanation on why the Soviet Embassy had

increased the number of staff from 10-13, Nigerian government’s response that the number

of diplomats allowed into Nigeria were entirely her responsibility (Ashaver, 2014) stemmed

from Nigeria’s less dependence on the West.

With her unrepentant attitude towards dialogue with apartheid South Africa, it is established

that Gowon’s government kick-started the process of building up Nigeria’s prestige and

power in the black world and spearheaded the aggressive and vigorous foreign policy which

provided platforms for successive governments to further the objectives, build alliance and

broadened Nigeria’s contact (Dauda, 2006:23; Sotunmbi, 1981, in Ojieh, 2014:106). In July

29th, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in a third military coup (Wilmot, 1989).

3.1.3 The Government of General Muritala Mohammed 1975 - 1976

Murtala Mohammed government established a Commission with membership drawn from

the academia, mass media and the military to assess the policy system, substance and

apparatus. Headed by Adebayo Adedeji, Chair of United Nations Economic Commission for

Africa, the outcome was the

Adedeji Commission Report

which although did not change the

policy objectives and principles, provided a blueprint for Nigeria to tackle her Afro-centric

policy in a radical and aggressive manner (Obiazor, 1992 in Adoba, 2014). Muritala’ speech

at the OAU, 11 January 1976, “

Africa has come of age; it is no longer in the orbit of any

continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country however powerful…the

fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar

…” situated apartheid as part of imperialist

strategy in Africa (Akomolafe, 2015; Wilmot, 1989).

British-owned Barclays Bank was nationalized in Nigeria, renamed Union Bank and barred

from buying South African government bonds. These were weighty decisions, capable of

attracting political, economic and social reprisals but Nigeria valued the welfare of blacks in

South Africa. Murtala’s government also refused to sell oil to South Africa in protest and lost

an estimated $41 to 45 billion between 1970 and 1983 (Akinyemi, in Ojieh, 2014:116;

Koutinin in Ifijeh, 2017). Other African countries came to agree that it was only Nigeria that

could take actions needed to decolonize Africa and therefore looked up to Nigeria for support

(Aluko, 1981:50-52 and Aligbe, 1988:13 Moyela, 1999; in Ojieh 2014; Banwo and Ighodalo,

2011; Effiong, 2012).

Angola was a Portuguese colony. Three groups, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) - MPLA, National Front for

Liberation of Angola-FNLA, National Union for Total Independence of Angola-UNITA were

involved in independence struggles (Effiong, 2012). A government of national unity was

initially proposed which Nigerian government and most African States supported. When

African leaders realised US CIA and Portuguese PIDE controlled of FNLA and UNITA

respectively and apartheid South African troop invaded Angola, Murtala’s government

recognised the MPLA in November 25

1975 as the representative of Angolan people

against American endorsement. The United States government wanted Nigeria to remain

neutral or continue support for national government (Ojieh, 2014; Wilmot, 1989). The Murtala

administration provided $20million/N13.5 million, including military assistance to the MPLA.

The international community was startled on how Nigeria can take a stance on global issues

and mobilize other African states (Akinyemi, 1980:112, Olusanya and Akindele, 1986:5,

Sotunmi, 1981:27 in Ojie, 2014:106,108; Kolawole, 2004:81; Onyeisi, 2011:226).

In the heat of the conflict, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger persuaded Angolan

government to place oil royalties from Gulf Oil into an escrow account, pending the outcome

of war. Gulf Oil, which also operated in the Niger Delta was later asked to pull out of Angola.

Nigerian government put pressure on the oil company to reopen its Angolan operation and

pay $100 million to the government (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1976; Harding, 2016;

Ojieh, 2014; Wilmot, 1989:6). The government also barred the annual meeting of the

International Press in Lagos in 1975 because of white South African delegates (Ashaver,

2014). Angolan, Namibian and other Movements were encouraged by the government to set

up diplomatic missions in Nigeria which allowed them to mobilize external resources to fight

the racist administrations (Garba, 1987). One was the South African Revolutionary Youth

Council (SAYRCO) led by Khotso Seatholo. Some of the youths were enrolled in Nigerian

higher institutions (Abegunrin, 2009; Ojieh, 2014). The leader of the Soweto Students

Representative Council, Tsei Machimini also took up permanent residence in Nigeria (Ibok,

1983 in Dauda, 2006:27-27).

Shortly after approving the sum of two (2) million dollars and $500,000 to African National

Congress and Namibia’s SWAPO (Wogu et al, 2015:142) respectively and issuing a press

statement in response to the Letter from President Gerald Ford of United States on the

Angolan crises, General Muritala was assassinated in a military coup in February 13th, 1976.

Ford had disclaimed knowledge of or responsibility for South African’s actions and urges for

more negotiation to block the Soviet or Cuban intervention which Murtala found offensive

and patronizing. General Murtala made public the message, describing it as interference and

an affront on Africans (Ashaver, 2014:291; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1976; Ojieh, 2014).

Nigeria accused Britain of complicity in his assassination as the coup leader Major Suka

Dimka had proceeded straight to the British High Commission in Lagos to contact Gowon,

Murtala’s predecessor who was in exile in London. Some youths and student descended on

the embassies of US and Britain in protest against Murtala’s death. The British High

Commissioner expressed disappointment at the attacks and proclaimed that Her Majesty’s

government reserve the right to claim full compensation for the damage. Nigeria’s External

Affairs Minister demanded for a recall of the Commissioner given his timing and language,

which was granted. Nigeria also requested for extradition of Gowon which was not granted,

due to non-availability of Extradition Treaty with Nigeria and no guarantee for fair trial.

Nigeria broke diplomatic ties with Britain (Ashevar, 2014; Effiong 2012).

3.1.4 General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo - 1976 – 1979

General Muritala’s Deputy forged ahead with the Soviet/Communist bloc and Nigeria’s

foreign policy was widely accepted and respected within critical decision-making circles in

the East and West (Ezirin, 2011). At the height of the struggle and when the ANC went

underground, Nigeria was approached for humanitarian support by the guerrilla wing which

was gladly provided. The NACAP’s mission had gained ground in Nigeria and Obasanjo’s

government established the South African Relief Fund (SARF) in 1976, to pooled money

from different sources within Nigeria to assist black South Africans. With a strong

educational system and civil service at that period, all civil servants and public officers were

encouraged to make voluntary contribution of 2% of their monthly salary to the Fund.

Secondary schools and university students offered to skip their lunch in school to save

money. The Obasanjo administration contributed $37 million. Obasanjo made a personal

donation of $3000. Each member of his cabinet made personal donation of $1,500 to the

fund referred to as “

Mandela Tax

.” The Soweto Massacre was around this period where over

700 protesting students were killed by the apartheid government (Abedunrin, 2008:18)

during rally.

86 South African students travelled to Nigeria to further their education with support from the

Fund. About 300 passports were also provided by Nigerian government South African youths

who choose to study abroad but were denied passports and documents by the apartheid

regime. Apart from providing training ground at the Kaduna First Mechanised Army Division

and material support to ANC guerrilla forces, Nigeria also provided $5million aid annually to

ANC and PAC, excluding the special financial allocation for OAU Liberation Committee and

other expenses borne by NACAP and SARF (Abegunrin, 2009:18,20; Ogunbanjo, 2002:7).

As noted by Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert Sobekwu, “

Nigeria’s support in Angola

and Mozambique had encouraged the blacks in South Africa to fight for the total liberation of

the country, from white dominance

.” (Abegunrin, 2009:20). Mugabe also pointed out that the

African continent without Nigeria is hollow (Akinterinwa, 2017). Oliver Tambo (1981)

encouraged other countries to emulate Nigeria’s mood and actions towards the racist policy.

In 1976, Nigeria’s bilateral relationship with the US became strained to the point that Nigeria

denied the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger a State Visit during his African tour. In

August, 22-26, same year, Nigeria hosted a World Conference for Action Against Apartheid,

calling on the world to take positive actions to end apartheid (Ashaver, 2014; Scott-

Emuakpor, 1980 in Ojieh, 2014:108). The Conference outcomes led to the Security Council

Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa (Gambari, 1984:2). In 1978, Nigeria

participated in drafting the UN Resolution 435, which included the UN Plan for independence

of Namibia to draw more attention to the racist policy. Nigeria’s Permanent Representative at

the UN, Leslie Harriman suggested that the Council should stop all investments and loans to

South Africa (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1978).

Nigeria’s campaign led to withdrawal of several African countries from the 1976 Summer

Olympics in Montreal, Canada as a result of New Zealand’s rugby tour of South Africa and

the Olympics International Committee’s refusal to sanction New Zealand. 20 of the 26

countries were already in Montreal but returned without participating. Again in 1978, Nigeria

led a boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Alberta in continued protest

against New Zealand’s participation and sporting contacts with South Africa. At the

Commonwealth Heads of States’ Conference in London, 1977, Nigeria succeeded in

pressuring the Conference to adopt the

Gleneagles Agreement

which mandated all

Commonwealth Governments to discontinue sporting links with apartheid South Africa

(Abegunrin, 2008:17; BBC News, 1976; Otubanjo, 1989 in Ashaver. 2014; Tambo, 1981).

The government nationalized British Petroleum (BP) for supplying oil to the regime and

recognizing Muzorewa Tendekayi’s regime in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia just to add momentum to

the struggle (Genova, 2010). From August 1

, 1979, it barred British firms from tendering for

contracts in Nigeria (Aluko, 1990:112-123, in Effiong, 2012:38). From 1977, Thabo Mbeki

was a guest of Nigerian government and resided in Lagos, Nigeria to evade the oppressive

regime until 1984 when he moved into the ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia (Abedunrin,

2008).

In 1976, Nigerian government set up the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), in agreement with

African Development Bank as a soft window of the Bank and to assist the development

efforts of fragile and low-income regional member states whose economic and social

conditions and prospects require concessional financing. Its initial capital was US$80million

and stood at $253 million in 2012. The terms of loans provided was jointly established by

World Bank and IMF (4% with maturity up to 25 years, with 5 year grace period) (ADB, 2018;

ADB 1976 Annual Report 31, 1977; Barnes, 1984:169). The NTF contributed 12.64% share

of the total cost of the Abidjan-Accra Highway, 29.92% of the Liptako-Gourma

Telecommunications project and 36.46% share of the Diama Dam project which enhanced

communication, regional transactional flows and inter-territorial links (The African

Development Bank Annual Report (1977, 1978 and 1979).

Nigeria led Peace-making efforts between warring factions in Chad in 1978 and formed a

Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) although the exercise was shortlived

(Kessings Contemporary Archives, 1980, Rikye, 1984:161 in Olanisokin, 1997; Sansani,

2000:32 in Adoba, 2014). At domestic level, the government restructured the workforce

which led to decline in bureaucracy in Nigeria. The oil windfall led to improved revenue and

surplus on balance of payments and growing foreign reserves, stimulating higher

consumption. Second Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture-FESTAC’77 organized

had 17,000 artists from 57 countries from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific who met to re-enact

their cultures in Nigeria (Kuna, 2012:48; Monroe, 1977:34). However, due to the Energy

Crisis 1979 (Macalister, 2011) which affected oil revenues, the economy sharply contrasted

and performed badly. The government turned to external borrowing. Foreign debts

increased, currency was overvalued and investment low due to monetary control and

indigenization program. Nigeria’s GDP dropped from $119bn in 1977 to 112bn in 1978

(Fuady, 2015:1354).

3.2 Third Period-1979 - 1984 Second Republic - Democratic Government

The third period and second republic cover one administration. It was Nigeria’s second

democratic experience. Nigeria relied solely on oil as major revenue source which accounted

for 92 percent of her foreign earnings by 1983 (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28). Progress

was also marred by oil shocks and debts crisis. Agriculture which brought in 75% of revenue

in the 1960s contributed only 7.5% of revenue by 1979-1980. Between 1979 and 1985, oil

earnings stood at $104.06 billion, making Nigeria a wealthy nation (Alkali, 1997:65-66;

Ahmed, 1990; Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:28; Ojieh, 2014).

3.2.1 The Administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari

October 1

1989 – December 31

1984

In his first address at the Joint Session of National Assembly1980, Shagari asserted:

“Africa remains the cornerstone of the Nigeria’s foreign policy. My

administration is committed to the causes of that total liberation of Africa as

the absolution of racism in all its ramifications. We shall neither relax nor

relent until all Africans and black men are free”

(Effiong, 2012:40).

Shagari’s government foreign policy thrust was non-radical. The Bakassi conflict between

Nigeria and Cameroon over land and maritime boundary, including the Bakassi Peninsula

first broke out in 1981. Public opinion expected a military approach but Shagari adopted a

diplomatic option and peaceful resolution with reparation to bereaved persons (Baye, 2010;

Effiong, 2012; Eshiet, 2008). Shagari’s government provided $5 million for Zimbabwe’s

independence, regarding Mugabe’s victory during the elections in 1982 as victory for the

Third World. Nigeria again joined the OAU Peacekeeping Force in the Chad conflict

(Operation Harmony 11). For a number of reasons-logistics, poor communication strategy,

vast Chadian terrain, the peace support operation failed. Nigeria made efforts to cushion the

impact of the logistics gap and wrote off about eighty-two ($82) billion dollars of the OAU

debt (Akinwunmi, 2000:45; Adebayo, 1984:100-101 in Olonisakin, 1997; Kuna, 2012;

Sansani, 2000:32 in Adoba, 2014).

Nigeria’s Vice-President, Alex Ekwueme reiterated Nigeria’s displeasure at Britain for its

continued sports link with South Africa, in repudiation of

the Gleneagles Agreement

in his

address at the Main Plenary Session at Anti-Apartheid Conference in London and at the

United Nations/Organization of African Unity Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa

in Paris, May 20, 1981 (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1982; Tambo, 1981). Nigeria also led

the Lancaster House negotiations on Zimbabwe’s transitional process (Ogwu in Ojieh,

2014:109-110).

Expulsion Order issued in January 17, 1983 for illegal immigrants in Nigeria affected about 2

million people, mostly Ghanaians. This led to widespread condemnation from within and

outside Africa, including the UK House of Commons and Pope John Paul II, the Ghanaian

president, Lt. Jerry Rawlings and other ECOWAS Member States. Mathieu Kerekou,

President of Benin Republic and ECOWAS Chair was delegated to discuss the impact of the

expulsion order on ECOWAS with Nigerian government which yielded little result. Nigeria

financially compensated the affected ECOWAS States and sent delegations to many African

countries to explain her actions (Aluko, 1990:17 in Effiong, 2012:41).

The External Affairs Minister was not a member of the ruling party or the inner decision

making caucus. The Ministry could therefore not act as an authoritative point for external

relations. Propelled by increased oil revenue, non-career personnel were recruited into

Foreign Service and appointed ambassadors on the basis of political constituencies and

party affiliations. It led to over-expenditure on personnel and created friction in terms of

postings and promotions (Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999). Competition and rivalry among

parties led to economic mismanagement. A sudden fall in global oil prices left Nigeria in

severe economic crisis. Failure to diversify the economy led to worsening balance of

payment, inflation, rising unemployment, mounting external liabilities and looming food crisis

and external borrowing which accumulated from multilateral loans from International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development-IBRD, Suppliers’ Credit and Contractor Finance, etc.

(Olukoshi, 1990:39-52 in Effiong, 2012:42; Enwere, 1990:86-89).

The political system fared badly (Diamond, 1985) and by this time

“

the steam had gone out of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The momentum and zeal which

had characterized Nigeria’s foreign policy in the previous five years was replaced with

a lack of forthrightness and excessive caution in approaching issues. The regime

lacked definite focus and fundamental framework, lapsed into unenthusiastic

conceptualization and incoherent policy vacuum. The innovativeness and

assertiveness of the last two regimes was lost. Shagari’s foreign policy became a

flash-back to the conservatism and legalism of the Balewa’s era, such that while lots

of noises were made for good measure, the reality was one of incompetence and

impotence borne out of indifference, confusion and political foot-dragging”

Egbo

(2003:78, also cited in Ezirin, 2011:5)

According to Ihonvbere (1996:196), the three years of democracy bled Nigeria dry,

mismanaged oil rent doubled the foreign debt and destabilised production and manufacturing

base. At this point, the aggregate index for manufacturing sector fell by 20.7% in 1983 while

employment in construction fell by more than 62% between 1980 and 1983 (Forrest,

1986:18). After the first term, the identified lapses and corruption led to another military

takeover in December 31st 1983. This marked the end of Second Republic, the second

democratic experience and the beginning of the second phase of military rule in Nigeria.

3.3 Fourth Period – 1983-1999

The fourth period starts from 1984 to 1999, covering three Military Regimes, 2 successful

and 3 aborted coups. Nigeria was involved in peace support operations in Bosnia

Herzegovina-UNIPROFOR-1992, Iran-Iraq-UNIMOG-1988-1991, Kuwait, Western Sahara-

MINURSO-1991, Mozambique-ONUMOZ-1992, Rwanda-UNAMIR-1992-1993, Somalia-

UNOSOM-1992-1993, and Cambodia-UNTAC-1992-1993. Nigerian troops served as military

observers during GAZA Strip-UNASO 1994 and Israel UNTSO 1995 (Dumbuya, 2015;

Ofoegbu, 1990:213)

3.3.1 The Administration of Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon

December 31

1984 – August 27

1985

The Buhari/Idiagbon administration suspended the 1979 Constitution and ruled by Decrees.

Because of their penchant to command and control, the foreign policy thrust was “

concentric

circle of interests

.” “…

at the epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security

interests of Nigeria which are inextricably tied up with the security, stability and

economic/social well-being of our immediate neighbours, … whom we share identical goals of

regional stability and peace

” (Ibrahim Gambari, 1989:3, 21).

The foreign policy terrain was monopolised by elite class and members of the Supreme

Military Council, the highest decision-making body. The Ministry and Minister of External

Affairs were instruments for implementation. Nigerian government under Buhari replaced the

combative South African policy with diplomacy and hosted a Conference on the Legal Status

of Apartheid Regime in South Africa to chart a way for the recognition of apartheid (Gambari,

1984; Garba, 1984 IN Ojieh, 2014). The economic situation had created fewer jobs and there

were increased smuggling activities. The Maitatsine Islamic extremism resurged and many

of its participants were foreign residents, especially illegal immigrants who identified with the

cause. Thus an estimated 700,000 were ordered in April 15

1985 to leave Nigeria by May

, 1985, despite signing of the Quadripartite Agreements between Benin, Ghana and

Togo. The government closed the borders and stationed military contingents along the

borders with Chad and Cameroon.

The government declared three Nigerian politicians who took refuge in England, including

Umaru Dikko, the Transport/Aviation Minister wanted. Umaru Dikko was kidnapped from his

Bays Water home in London 1984 and was found unconscious in a crate labelled “Diplomatic

Bag” at Stansted Airport in Essex, London. The UK government reacted by impounding the

Nigeria Airways Boeing Cargo Plane that was billed to load the crate, detained the aircrew,

including Nigerian officials and the two Israelis that were part of the arrangement. Two

diplomats, the Counsellor, Peter Oyedele and Edet Okon were asked to leave Britain.

Nigerian government retaliated by asking two British Diplomats, John Harrison, the Head of

Consul and Steward Evans (Attache) to leave Nigeria and recalled Nigerian High

Commissioner, Major General Hananiyya for consultation. Nigeria requested Britain to do

same with Sir Hamilton Whyte, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria. A British

Caledonian Jet enroute London with 221 passengers and 22crew was also detained by

Nigerian government for fifteen hours. However, the passengers were treated as “Guests of

Nigerian Government” with utmost courtesy (Effiong; 2012, 42-43; Fawole, 2003:18-19;

Mimiko and Mbada, 2014).

The inherited weak economy pushed the country to adjust its economic and political

relationships with major powers and negotiate with the IMF and international creditors

(Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016). The government opted for stringent “belt-tightening” measures

and state regulation as against free markets and refused to devalue the naira, adopt trade

liberalization and privatization or remove subsidies on petroleum which was a precondition

for a loan from the IMF. The government cut-down workers and devoted 44 percent of export

revenues to debt servicing. Shortage of consumer goods led to adoption of “Counter-Trade”

using commodities as medium of exchange with Brazil amounting to 40% of 2.5 billion. This

was hindered by the West and financial institutions (Gambari, 1984:149). Nigeria also

requested a loan from the Saudi Arabian government which was not secured due to same

pressure. The government was therefore forced to maintain the pre-existing import level

against the background of falling oil prices (Dauda, 2006:60).

Nigeria signed the Cultural and Educational Cooperation and Credit Line Agreements with

Bulgarian and reciprocal visits by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Grisha Filipov to Nigeria and

General Idiagbon Soviet Union took place. Idiagbon, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Military

Council was a strict, unyielding and disciplined general, solidly in charge of most foreign

policy issues like the expulsion order and border closure. Nigeria’s introduction of Death

Penalty and execution of those found guilty under the Decrees did not align with emerging

liberal democratic values. At the international level, the policies led to strained relationships

between Nigeria and the Paris Club, London Clubs, Bretton Woods Institutions (West Africa,

February 27, 1984(472), February 4, 1985 (237) in Inamete, 1990).

Conversely, Nigeria was at the forefront of the negotiations for the withdrawal of French and

Libyan troops and provided the Kano Airport as base for evacuation (Agbu, 2015; Adesoji,

2011; Ezirin, 2011; Isichei, 1987). Nigeria gave legitimacy to the Saharawi Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR) on November 11

, 1984, the eve of 20

OAU Summit to prevent Morocco

from taking ownership of the territory which it occupied since Spanish exit. Morocco left the

meeting and organization in protest (Agbu, 2015; Effiong, 2012). The military regime was

toppled by another military officer, General Babangida.

3.3.2 The Government of General Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida

August 25

, 1987 - 1993

General Babangida expounded that:

“Nigerian foreign policy in the last 20 months has been characterised by

inconsistency and incoherence. It lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood

on matters of international concern to enable other countries relate to us with

seriousness. Our role as Africa’s spokesman has diminished because we have been

unable to maintain the respect of African countries. The ousted military government

conducted our external relations by policy of retaliation, reaction. More so, vindictive

consideration must not be the basis of our diplomacy.

Africa’s problem and their solutions should constitute the premise of our foreign

policy. The realisation of the Organization of African Unity of the Lagos Plan of Action

for self-sufficiency and constructive cooperation in Africa shall be our primary pursuit.

The Economic Community of West African States must be reborn with the view to

achieving the objective of regional integration. The problems of drought-stricken

areas of Africa shall be given more attention and sympathy, our best efforts will be

made to assist in their rehabilitation within the limits of our resources …we hereby

make a renewed request to the non-aligned movement to regroup and re-immigrate

its determination to restructure the global economic system” (Ibrahim Babangida,

1985, in Effiong, 2014:44; Siollun, 2013).

The government’s repair efforts led to lifting of embargo on loans, grant-in-aid and other

programmable funds by Paris and London Clubs (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997). The government

opened up the IMF loan issue to national debate, including how to chart a new way for

Nigeria’s foreign policy. Foreign policy priority issues were abolition of apartheid in South

Africa and enhancement of Nigeria’s relations with major industrialised countries to increase

foreign investments and capital flow (Ojieh, 2014). Many States became independent but

lacked skilled workers and professionals in specialized fields. The Minister of External

Affairs, Professor Akinyemi introduced the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS) as Nigeria’s

foreign policy tool.

TAC was designed like the American Peace Corps to fill certain gaps in manpower needs of

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Those sent under the scheme, on basis of

assessed needs are young professionals, Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers, Pharmacists,

Nurses, Medical Lab Technologists, Radiology, Accountants, Insurance Experts, Sports,

Lecturing, Coaching, Artisans for a period of two years. Professor Omoriege, President of

Nigerians in Diaspora-Namibian chapter and Senior Lecturer-University of Namibia, while

addressing Nigeria’s 50

Anniversary festival in Windhoek noted that by 2010, more than 30

recipient countries have benefitted and over 2000 volunteers have participated in the

scheme (Jinadu, 2016; Salami, 2012; Umoru, 2010).

The administration also abrogated many Decrees, released detainees and lifted the ban on

political debates. It publicly rejected the IMF loan in line with public opinion but implemented

the IMF conditionalities, adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Its reflection

in the 1986 Federal Budget led to decline in naira exchange rate and reduced social

services. The removal of petroleum subsidy brought indescribable hardship on Nigerians and

deepened her dependence on international capital. As a result, Nigeria’s conduct and

initiatives in respect to her foreign policy was confined to this dependence (Enwere, 1990:

89). While it restored relationship with Israel severed in 1973 (Ambe-Uva and Adegboyega,

2007). Nigeria remained silent on US bomb attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986.

Professor Akinyemi embarked on economic shuttles to sell the SAP to key Western

stakeholders with the conviction that the goodwill of the West in matters like debt re-

scheduling and foreign investment will benefit the SAP. In 1988, the government of Ibrahim

Babangida adopted the Economic Diplomacy officially as her foreign policy thrust. It

incorporated the rescheduling of external debt burden, encouragement of financial flows and

foreign investment into the policy agenda (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016:29 Ogwu and

Olukoshi, 1991). General Ike Nwachukwu, who replaced Professor Akinyemi as the External

Affairs Minister emphasised on employing Nigeria’s foreign policy instruments to advance

the course of economy recovery (Mbakwe and Chukwu, 2016; Nwachukwu, 1988).

Adoption of economic diplomacy reflected Nigeria’s changing national circumstances and

adaptation to realities of rapidly changing international environment to foster great inflow of

foreign capital and expand foreign trade (Okolie, 2010:137). The debts crisis demanded new

tactics and strategies in foreign policy and abolition of absolutist sovereignty in order to link

the domestic with external (Alao, 2011; Ayam, 2004; Dokubo, 2010). It required a foreign

policy that leads to where there was technical assistance and nearness to global powers that

have historically shaped global diplomacy and to build alliances with emerging ones (Adeniji

in Alao, 2011:6). There was therefore a paradigm shift from the regional, continental, Afro-

centric to a globalized policy (Akintenriwa, 2004; Adeniji, 2003, cited in Fayomi, 2015:187).

The government sign bilateral agreements, encouraged joint ventures and partnerships with

interested investors, remove trade restrictions and introduce measures that promoted such

investments, e.g. time-bound tax holiday and removal of tariff on industrial raw materials and

equipment (Aligbe, 1988:8 in Ojie, 2014; Mbakwe and Chukwu; Nwachukwu, 1992).

The government was successful in getting Nigerians into two key positions in international

organizations. Chief Emeka Anyaoku became the third Secretary-General of the

Commonwealth of Nations from 1990-2000 and Major-General Joseph Garba (Rtd.) became

the President of the 44

Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 (Mbakwe

and Chukwu). Former President Olusegun Obasanjo was selected among the three

International Eminent Personalities to arbitrate in the South African political debacle by the

Commonwealth (Ezirin, 2011) and Nigeria also nominated Obasanjo for the UN Scribe

position which Koffi Annan eventually won.

In 1986, 32 of 59 Commonwealth countries in Africa, Asia, and Caribbean joined Nigeria to

boycott the XIII Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh due to British government attitude

towards South Africa. The Game was referred to as the “Boycott Games” with only 26

nations, 1,662 athletes and 461 officials in attendance (Newsquest, 2014). Prior to

emergence as OAU Chairman in 1991 (Abegunrin, 2003; Effiong, 2012), Nigeria provided

$20 million to South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1989 election, played

crucial roles in securing Namibia’s independence and sustained Angola during the war to

consolidate her independence (Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999 in Mimiko and Mbada,

2014:46).

The emergence of FW De Klerk as President ushered in a new environment in South Africa

which led to improved relations with many countries, including Nigeria (Abegunrin, 2003;

Effiong, 2012). Nigeria’s Vice President Justus Aikhomu insisted on scrapping of apartheid

and release of prisoners (Agbebaku, 1991:153; Ojieh, 2014:98). Nigeria was among the first

few countries Nelson Mandela visited after release in February 12

, 1990 (Abegunrin, 2009)

due to Nigeria’s contribution to the struggle. Nigeria thereafter relaxed her position and

began to parley with South Africa and FW de Klerk visited Nigeria in April 1992. A Nigerian

educational team also visited South Africa in September and in October 1992; both

countries’ football teams played a friendly football match in Lagos. Thus, Nigeria’s

engagement with the new government of De Klerk in South Africa was instrumental in the

further relax of apartheid system (Ojieh, 2014; Abegunrin, 2009).

At regional level, the several warring factions with changing boundaries in the Liberian War,

1989 led to largescale massacre with disregard for traditional rules of war. Cote D’Ivoire

opposed the idea of intervention when it was tabled at the United Nations Security Council

Meeting in 1990. The US position that the problem should be solved by Africans was shared

by the Council members (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994; Wippman, 1993). However, United States

and Nigeria endeavoured to support Samuel Doe’s government with weapons and military

advice in the early days of the war. Upon realisation that it was a well-planned military

rebellion, adding to delay in international response, the Organization of African Unity called

on Nigeria to take the lead. A Standing Mediation Committee-SMC consisting of Gambia,

Ghana, Mali, Togo and Nigeria was quickly put in place. The ECOWAS Chair, Ibrahim

Babangida, Nigerian Head of State called an emergency meeting of the Foreign Affairs

Ministers of the SMC to draw modalities for a cease-fire and deployment of peace force.

The ECOWAS Ceasefire (Peace) Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, consisting of 3000 troops

from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra-Leone and Nigeria was established. Nigeria

contributed 1,375 of the force while a Ghanaian served as first ECOMOG Force

Commander. The many warring factions with differing needs and expression made it difficult

for ECOMOG to operate. ECOMOG’s mandate changed to enforcement leading to first

cease-fire in November 1990 and later the Cotonou Accord, allowing the UN Observer

Mission in Liberia – UNOMIL to work with ECOMOG. The alternating between Peacekeeping

and enforcement drained ECOWAS and militarily weakened the force (Adibe, 2002; Khobe,

2000; Kuna, 2012; Olanisokin, 1994; Yoroms, 1993 in Odibe, 2002).

The specialization of the ECOMOG troops was challenging due to difference in training and

doctrines for each contingent. Ghanaian contingent were good at peacekeeping because

Jerry Rawlings engaged them in the field to keep them away from politics during his

presidency. Nigerian contingent is crack force for peace enforcement or outright battle due to

Nigerian-Biafran war experience. The Sierra-Leonean and Guinean contingent blend the two

extremes. For the Gambians who were trained by Nigeria, it was their first external operation.

Nigerian government established an Endowment Fund to support the operation which

received no contributions. When other contingents threatened to withdraw due to inadequate

resources to shoulder such responsibility, Nigeria provided substantial support (Azgaku,

2015).

Nigeria reviewed the ECOWAS annual dues from 32.5% to 40 % (Ajayi, 2005:53) provided

largest number of vehicles and equipment and field engineering services required for all

contingents to ECOMOG. Nigerian contingent’s workshop repaired and maintained the

vehicles and equipment of other contingents except Ghana until the United States came to

aid of the expanded ECOMOG Force (Adebayo, 2004:293). Two field hospitals established

by Nigeria at the ECOMOG base served as sanctuaries for injured soldiers and civilians

before Liberia became accessible to International Relief Organizations. Nigerian Airforce

provided Close Air Support (CAS) to ECOMOG ground forces while Nigerian-led Naval Task

Force vessels took relief materials to berths at seaports and discharge canoes which served

lives of Liberians and later Sierra Leoneans (Sule, 2013).

While Babangida’s government was providing resources for support to African development,

it did not match visibility at international scene with commensurate returns that benefit

domestic socio-economic development. Nigerians were groaning under the IMF Structural

Adjustment Programme (Atte, 1990:22-27). Although Nigerian movie industry-NOLLYWOOD

rose at this period (William, 2017), Nigerians agitated for a return to democracy and shifts in

election timetable led to nationwide protests which the government responded with clamp-

down and repression. Babangida’s administration repealed the Decrees that supported the

political program, e.g. Decree

13-Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provision

and

52-

Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme)

which automatically suspended the national

electoral body and cancelled the elections held in June 12

1993 (Okpokpo, 2000; Sesay

and Ukeje, 1997). Ernest Shonekan was appointed to head an Interim National Government.

Babangida retired from the Army in August 1993 (Ajayi, 2005). Three months (82 days) later,

Shonekan was relieved of his duties by General Sani Abacha.

3.3.3 The Government of General Sani Abacha

November 17

1993 - June 8

1998

In his maiden address, General Abacha advised the international community to suspend

judgement and give Nigeria the break to grapple with her task of nation building,

reconciliation and repairs. He added that the government was a child of necessity and

needed time to resolve the problems internally (Effiong, 2012:45).

During Abacha’s tenure, the restive issue in Niger Delta arose due to oil exploitation and

environment degradation; revenues which accrued only to the Federal Government with little

benefit to oil-producing communities. Ogoniland is among these many communities that

lacked basic facilities. The Ogoni people designed a Bill of Rights to address the injustices

which the government failed to honour. The Ogonis demanded royalties from the oil

Multinational Companies and embarked on protest activities that disrupted the operations of

the Multinationals. Many oil Multinational Host Communities joined in this agitations. The

dishonesty on the part of government and the Multinationals resulted in chaos. The case of

Ogoni involved killings which the government took steps to address through military tribunal.

Many were convicted and sentenced to prison but nine Ogoni indigenes, including Ken Saro

Wiwa, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People-MOSOP spokesman were sentenced

to death (Agbonifo, 2009; Ijomah, 2000; Imam, 1999).

In September 1995, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative arrived in Nigeria on a fact-

finding mission, following series of protests and reports of human rights abuses (Akinrinade,

1997; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 1995). Sani Abacha executed Kenule Saro

Wiwa and 8 other Ogonis (Abiodun, 1996; Demirel-Pegg and Pegg, 2015; Ikenga-Metuh,

2001:14-15; Isumonah, 2015) on November 10

, the eve of the 29th Commonwealth

Conference in New Zealand, despite the huge outcries from the international community. A

shaken Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s President described Sani Abacha as barbaric,

corrupt, irresponsible and arrogant leader who lacks legitimacy at home. Abacha replied that

Mandela was out of touch with reality because of his prolonged years in jail. Nelson Mandela

thus led the call for sanction against Nigeria, just as Nigeria led against apartheid South

Africa (Abiodun, 1996:69; Ajayi, 2005).

The World Bank was considering the financial details of Liquefied Natural Gas project; the

United States was exploring the possibilities of lifting previously-imposed restrictions on

Nigerian airports; a delegation of the FIFA led by FIFA President, Joao Havelenge was in

Nigeria to inspect sporting facilities (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997) in the light of the 1995 edition of

the World Youth Soccer Championship within this period. Nigeria was stripped of her right to

host (Effiong, 2012). The Ogonis barred Royal Dutch Shell from operating in Ogoniland

(Edighin nd Otoghile, N.D.; Ikenga-Metuh, 2001:14; Ugwu and Moko, 2014:151).

More than 25 countries, including allies like USA, Canada, Germany, Britain, all EU

ambassadors, South Africa, and Latin America, etc. withdrew their diplomatic

representations (Akintola, 2007). Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth on

November 11, 1995 and given a two-year deadline to democratize and improve human rights

records or stand to be expelled while the Commonwealth Action Group-CMAG

recommended 9 non-economic sanctions (Sesay and Ukeje, 1997).

The Canadian delegation was denied visas for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers

who were to accompany the Canadian delegation during the Commonwealth Team visit to

Nigeria. The Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister, Tom Ikimi accused Canada of encouraging

the overthrow of government by funding dissents group and trying to bring armed soldiers

into Nigeria under guise of diplomats. Canada drop from the mission (Potter, 1997). Nigeria

closed her embassy in Ottawa and requested Canadian workers to leave Nigeria. Nigeria

turn to Asia and South-South Cooperation like the D-8 comprising of Libya, India, Iraq,

Sudan, North Korea, Turkey and Syria. This drew criticism as the countries were mostly

Islamic bodies while Nigeria is a secular State. The visit of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi who

was facing UN sanctions further angered the international community as it defied the UNSC

Resolution. These further alienated Nigeria from dominant powers and impacted negatively

on the foreign policy objectives (Ashaver, 2014; Abiodun, 1996; Effiong, 2012).

Internally, external debt and inflation increased (Ezirin, 2011) while Moshood Abiola, the

acclaimed winner of June 12 1993 election was detained. The developments sparked

protests and series of strikes and rallies by the masses led by organized labour unions and

civil society groups (Nigeria Overview, 2017) which crippled the economy. Newspaper

houses were proscribed, many activists, journalists, students and Union leaders, including

Professor Wole Soyinka were hounded into self-exile while many including Gani

Fawhehinmi, Chima Ubani, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, Beko Ransome Kuti, Femi Falana, Shehu

Sani, including student and university union activists were detained. Wife of Abiola, the

acclaimed winner of the elections, Kudirat Abiola, was assassinated, along with Pa Alfred

Rewane, the financier of the coalitions (Fawole, 2003; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017).

The Abacha administration constituted a 50-member committee from every interest group,

traditional rulers leaving out career diplomats, intellectuals and experts of international

relations and foreign policy to direct him on his governance style. The Committee came up

with recommendations in two days to insist on the return to democracy and release of

prisoners. The government also set up a 13-man National Constitutional Conference

Commission to organize a Constitutional Conference. In June 1995, the Conference

produced a Draft Constitution which also recommended a Transitional Implementation

Committee to monitor the transition to democracy among others (Ijomah, 2000).

The coups of 1995 indicted former military Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo, his deputy,

retired General Shehu Yar’Adua, along with 38 others who were sentenced by the Military

Tribunals to varying jail terms while 13 were sentenced to death. The reported coups of 1997

indicted service Chiefs with other senior military officers and civilians. Some of the accused

were executed, some prematurely retired from service while the international community’s

plea for clemency led to commuting of some sentences to life imprisonments. The UN Fact-

Finding Mission’s visit and election monitoring request yielded little results as every aspirant

was either detained or cowed to relent for Abacha’s emergence as the only democratic

candidate for the five registered political parties (Beran, 1997; Effiong, 2012; Ijomah, 2000;

Ikenga-Metuh, 2001).

On the regional level, General Abacha took measures to sustain ECOMOG operation until

election in which Charles Taylor emerged the winner in Liberia. ECOMOG helped to train

and equip Sierra Leonean army to fight the Revolutionary United Front–RUF. Nigerian-led

ECOMOG troop stationed in Liberia reversed the coup staged by Major Jonny Koroma and

reinstated Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone, March 10

. General Maxwell Khobe, a

Nigerian was appointed to head the Sierra Leonean army (Effiong, 2012; Dumbuya,

2015:83). It is established that Nigeria provided 90% of funds in Liberia and Sierra Leone

(Adebayo, 2004:293; Ajayi, 2004b:207; Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999). Except the first

ECOMOG Force Commander, Lt. General A. Quainoo, a Ghanaian; the other ten military

commanders were Nigerian officers (Olofinmuagun, 2003:43). Tempo (1995, in Effiong,

2012) described Nigeria as importing what it has in excess and exporting what it lacks in his

success in Sierra Leone. General Abacha died in June 8 1998 (Beran, 1997; Ijomah, 2000;

Ikenga-Metuh, 2001).

3.3.4 The Administration of Abdulsalami Abubakar

June 8

1998– May 29

1999

General Abdulsalami Abubakar became Head of State and with Ignatius Olisaemeka, the

Foreign Affairs Minister embarked on diplomatic shuttles to major world powers to convince

them of the sincerity of the government. His foreign policy therefore bordered on rejuvenation

and redeeming Nigeria’s image, especially the human rights aspect (Akintola, 2007:463;

Effiong, 2012; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). General Abubakar reversed the harsh

decrees, released political prisoners and detainees including General Obasanjo and lured

Nigerians, Chief Anthony Enahoro exiled in Canada, Professors Wole Soyinka and Chinua

Achebe, etc. in self-exile back home.

On regional affairs, Abubakar adopted a hybrid system of military presence and a democratic

setting and allowed the domestic environment to guide his foreign policy approach. Through

his engagement with West African leaders, Abubakar endeavoured to channel resources for

maintenance of peace and stability in the region and through this approach salvage Nigeria’s

image and charted a path towards democracy and national reconciliation. The government

also re-establish links with traditional Western nations who agreed to resume diplomatic

relations and lift sanctions (Ashaver, 2014; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2003:383).

At the domestic level, critical stakeholders, including the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan

were invited to dialogue with Moshood Abiola to renounce his mandate in view of the events

over the years which he declined. Abiola died of cardiac arrest during the visit of American

delegation in July 19

1998 (Effiong, 2012). General Abubakar redesigned a timetable for a

democratically elected government and set up a Committee to review the Draft Constitution

initiated by Sani Abacha. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the operational constitution was

produced (Boma et.al, 2015; Ijomah, 2000; Welsh, 1998).

In the Constitution, Nigeria’s mandate for intervention in foreign conflict must be limited to

peacekeeping operations. Thus, General Abubakar attempted to withdraw Nigeria from the

intervention in Sierra Leone since it was launched by his predecessor prior to adoption of the

Constitution. The conflict was also costly financially and Nigeria was losing men. The

international community was alarmed given its potential threat to sub-regional security and

subsequently committed more funds and logistics to ECOMOG (Berman and Sams,

2000:124-126). In May 29

, 1999, retired General Obasanjo, who was imprisoned by the

Abacha government, became the first President of the Fourth Republic. This ‘Dark Days of

Military Dictatorship’ ended in Nigerian history (Badmus and Ogunmola, 2003; Ogunmola

and Badmus, 2006).

3.4 The Fifth Period 1999 Democratic System – “Fourth Republic”

3.4.0 The period covers four presidents and for the first time, a change of power from the

ruling party to the opposition.

3.4.1 Retired General Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo

May 29

1999 – May 29

2007

Obasanjo’s antecedents as military Head of State in 1979 earned him respect at

international arena (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). General Obasanjo in his inaugural

speech, he stated that:

“Nigeria once a well-respected and key player on the international community

became a pariah nation. We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly

relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the UN, OAU

and other international bodies. We shall honour existing agreements between Nigeria

and other countries. It is our firm resolve to restock Nigeria fully to the prestigious

position of eminence in the comity of nations”

(Obasanjo, Inaugural Speech 1999).

Olusegun Obasanjo prioritized a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In July

, 1999, ECOWAS leaders, UN officials and other critical stakeholders met with the warring

factions in Togo to sign the Lome Peace Accord which formed the basis for peace in Sierra

Leone. When Nigeria pulled out, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL’s advance

elements were Nigerian contingents. Already, the Chief of Defense Staff in Sierra Leone,

Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe was a Nigerian. UN Secretary General also appointed a

Nigerian diplomat, Olu Adeniji as Special Representative and UNAMSIL Head of Mission

(Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017:67).

The government adopted economic liberalization and shuttle diplomacy as his

administration’s foreign policy thrust. Obasanjo embarked on extensive shuttle diplomacy,

using his personality and moral stature to promote Nigeria’s image, multilateral and bilateral

relations and canvass for investment and re-integration of Nigeria into the world systems

(Ashaver, 2014; Folarin, 2013). Obasanjo with his Foreign Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido

travelled extensively, calling for foreign investments, debt forgiveness and return of stolen

monies. His domestic policy was a springboard for foreign policy (Effiong, 2012; Ogunmola

and Badmus, 2017).

Nigeria’s Finance Minister, a World Bank executive, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala used her good

office with assistance from the US Treasury Department to lobby the Paris Club to cancel

and reschedule Nigeria’s debt. Eighteen ($18) billion (60%) of about twenty-seven ($27.008)

billion external debt was written-off by the Paris Club (Chiejina, 2005:1, also cited in Ajayi,

2005:55; Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013:42-43; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). Cooperation and

bilateral relationships were signed and renewed with United States in 2000. Military

cooperation,

Military Professional Resources Initiative (MPRI)

empowered the United States

to send military support and assist Nigeria to procure military aid. Nigerian soldiers also went

on refresher programs for enhanced peacekeeping assignments (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013;

Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2016:4).

Nigeria-China relations deepened during the Obasanjo administrations. In 2001, both states

signed an agreement to establish Nigeria Trade Office in China and China Investment

Development and Trade Promotion in Nigeria (Gregory, 2009). The reciprocity in visits by the

President of Nigeria and China, including China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabo provided room

for strengthened relationships and an Intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum

was established in 2006 (Obioma, 2013 in Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013). Nigerian relationship

with Israel was strengthened with the exchange of technical and professional knowledge

between both countries (Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013).

Obasanjo administration’s National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy

(NEEDS), designed to overhaul the economy, boost productivity and roll back poverty

provided an enabling environment to implement her economic diplomacy, revamp the

national economy and attract investment. The banking, financial and capital market were

restructured for investors. The Ports Act of 1959 and 1999 were amended to enhance

proficiency at the ports (Muhammad-Zaki, 2011; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017). Foreign

policy therefore focused on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with establishment of Nigerian

Investment Promotion Commission-NIPC. Nigerians in Diaspora were also encouraged to

participate in national development. Nigeria once again, assumed leadership of

organizations like ECOWAS, African Union, G-77 and gained more international friends

(Abdul and Ibrahim, 2013; Ajayi, 2005).

Nigeria hosted International Summits-ECOWAS, Commonwealth Heads of States and

Governments-CHOGM-2004, New Partnership for African Development-2005, the Junior

FIFA World Cup-1999 and All African Games-2004, and the president chaired UNESCO

events. There was increased Development Financial Flows and Foreign Investments (Boma

et.al, 2015; Ikuomola, 2005:1, in Ajayi, 2005:55). It brought psychological relief to critical

stakeholders, including Nigeria citizens as foreign investors became regular visitors in

Nigeria and jobs were created. The impact of foreign interactions sank in (Ezirin, 2011).

As a follow up to Nigerian Trust Fund of 1976, Nigerian government established Nigerian

Technical Cooperation Fund (NTCF). The Fund, like the Nigerian Trust Fund is domiciled in

the African Development Bank (AFDB) and is jointly managed by the Bank and Nigeria’s

Directorate of Technical Cooperation (DTCA). It serves as a grant facility for regional

projects or programs that promote technological and socio-economic development, regional

cooperation and integration. The Fund’s initial $25 million grew to $28.9million; $24,7million

has been committed to 93 projects and activities across Africa (AFDB, 2013; African

Development Bank Group, 2017; Directorate for Technical Cooperation Aids, 2018).

When conflict broke out in Cote d’Ivoire in 2001, Nigeria played active role in establishing the

ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the signing of various ceasefire and

peace agreements by warring factions. Obasanjo as AU Chair and later as a member of the

AU-mandated International Working Group (IWG) remained at the forefront to aid

implementation of peace agreements (Badmus, 2015; Ogunmola, 2013). On the Second

Civil War in Liberia (1999-2003), Obasanjo worked in concert with ECOWAS, African Union

and the United Nations. By August 2003, Charles Taylor relinquished power in Liberia,

accepted a bargain that he would not be prosecuted with the International Contact Group

comprising British, US, French and took asylum in Nigeria (Aremu, 2015; Reno, 2007:79).

Nigeria took responsibilities in setting up ECOWAS Mission in Liberia-ECOMIL instantly with

backing of the US and UN. ECOMIL, commanded by a Nigerian, General Festus Okoye

preceded UNMIL-United Nations Mission in Liberia (Badmus, 2015; Cook, 2005; Ross, 2005

in Ogumola and Badmus, 2017).

When the Sudanese conflict broke out in February 2003, Nigeria as AU Chair became a

major force in finding solution. Supported by the Chadian president, Idris Derby, negotiation

for peace agreements led to the Inter-Sudanese Ceasefire Agreement on Darfur Conflict

(HCA) and adoption of Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance for Darfur.

On many occasions, Obasanjo personally went to Sudan to dialogue with the factions and

hosted a peace talks in Abuja-Nigeria. Nigeria was also the main troops contributing country

(TCC) to the AU-mandated African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor compliance

with the HCA which enabled the environment for humanitarian assistance (Badmus 2015).

Nigeria was the leading TCC to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

(UNAMID) which succeeded AMIS in 2007 and provided substantial financial and

humanitarian support. A Nigerian, General Martin-Luther Agwai headed the Mission

(Badmus, 2015; Oche in Miracle, N.D.).

When the International Court of Justice granted ownership of most of the disputed Bakassi

Peninsula and maritime rights to Cameroon, Obasanjo abided by the judgement and

commenced formal handing over in 2006 which lasted till August 14, 2008. Obasanjo

government withdrew Nigerian soldiers stationed in the region since 1980s despite internal

uproar, as Nigerians have been occupying the Peninsula since 1450 (Olukoya, 2012) and

regarded it as home. When the Green Tree agreement signed by both presidents was

breached by Cameroon, Nigerian government relocated Nigerians to prevent outbreak of

conflict. Nigeria was given a 10-year period but refused to appeal the judgement as at 2012

(Abdul and Ibrahim, 2015; Falana, 2012; Eshiet, 2009; Ojieh, 2010; Schneider, 2015).

When Faure Eyadema made efforts to take over as president following Gnassingbe

Eyadema, his father’s death, Nigeria as Chair of AU insisted on the legitimacy of the Togo

Constitution. A presidential election was held and Faure emerge the winner. Nigeria hosted

the AU Meeting in Abuja, with Faure and opposition leader to consolidate fragile peace and

promote reconciliation in Togo. In July 16, 2003, the President Fradique de Menzes of Sao

Tome e Principe was in Nigeria for the 6

Reverend Leon Sullivan Summit when a coup

ousted him. Obasanjo led the process along with other AU members and the international

community to reverse the coup and accompanied the reinstated president to his country

(Ashaver, 2014; Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017; Porto, 2003:34-35, also cited in Ogunmola

and Badmus, 2017:70).

With Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo reorganized the Organization of African Unity to

promote Africa’s development by addressing key socio-economic and political problems.

NEPAD- New Partnership for African Development was rooted in Pan-Africanism ideals and

set against the backdrop of globalisation and Millennium Development Goals, now

Sustainable Development Goals. The leaders of Algeria-Abdulazeez Bouteflika, Senegal-

Abdoulaye Wade, and Egypt-Hosni Mubarak were also part of this initiative in 2001. African

Peer Review Mechanism-APRM, the instrument through which the governance component

of NEPAD can be measured was also designed (Dokubo and Oluwadare, 2011; Ogunmola

and Badmius, 2017. Obasanjo chaired the NEPAD Implementation Committee of Heads of

States and hosted the 2005 Summit in Abuja. Nigeria provided the human and material

resources that were crucial in conceiving, implementing as well as promotion of the NEPAD.

Aliyu and Sharkdam (2017) asserted that Nigeria’s commitment to NEPAD was in alignment

with her long-standing Afro-centric foreign policy.

Majority of the time, Obasanjo acted alone, bypassing the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Minister,

including the National Parliament (Ogunmola and Badmus, 2017; Omojuwa and Hamman,

(2009), except on matters pertaining to peace interventions which the Legislature was

mandated to approve (Miracle, N.D.). The democratic spirit gave room for expressions and

his administration was hampered by pockets of conflicts across the country, including Jos-

Plateau conflict and Niger Delta youth restiveness which reduced oil production from 2.6

million barrels per day in 2005 to 1.3 million barrels per day in June 2009 (Obi, 2010:220).

This also impacted on oil revenues, global and national energy security (Ibaba, 2011)

Obasanjo’s attempt to modify the Constitution to enable him run for a third term in office

made him lose credibility (Ezirin, 2011). He also handpicked his successor, Musa Yar’Adua,

who was sickly with a very low style.

3.4.2 The Administration of Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua

May 29

2007 – June 2010

Yar’Adua’s Seven-Point Agenda for socio-economic and political transformation did not

accord Nigeria’s foreign policy any significant priority. Neither was his approach able to

actualize the Vision 20-20-20 for Nigeria to be among the 20 wealthiest nations by 2020

(Morgan, 2011; Nwakudu, n.d.; Nuhu-Koko, in Adoba, 2014). Yar’Adua administration

adopted citizens’ diplomacy as its foreign policy thrust. Many are of the belief that the policy

thrust was vacuous, lethargic, and opaque, lacking theoretical coherence. Nigeria’s voice

was barely heard in major events. The country initiated nothing spectacular, apart from few

bilateral agreements which were hardly followed up (Abba, 2009, in Ezirin, 2011; Ezirin,

2011; Nwakudu, N.D.).

Nigeria was conspicuously absent at global events that other governments prioritised and

the president missed many opportunities to address the UN General Assembly. In his place,

his Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, lacking finesse and diplomatic decorum

represented him. On one occasion, Yar’adua decided to honour the Saudi Arabian King’s

invitation in place of the UN General Assembly (Ezirin, 2011). Yar’Adua displayed preference

for economic relations with Russia in respect to the Gazprom project (Gazprom International;

2009) after expressing desire to partner with the United States on AFRICOM during his

official visit to the United States of America in 2007. Apart from addressing South African

Parliament in June 2008, Yar’Adua attended no further meetings. At a meeting by G-20 and

other countries in Washington DC following the economic meltdown in 2008, Nigeria was

conspicuously absent and received no invitation to the next G-20 Meeting (Nwakudu, N.D.).

The issue of the Niger Delta militancy was brought under control with the Presidential

Amnesty Program. There was relative peace in the region and oil production was boosted to

its maximum (Ajayi and Adesole, 2013). Beneficiaries of the program were rehabilitated and

enrolled in various entrepreneurship programs (Ibaba, 2011). Although these were great

feats, it was not enough to boost Nigeria’s image at the international level. Onyejekwe (2009,

in Ezirin, 2011) affirms that the little gains the country earned under Obasanjo was

threatened by Yar’Adua’s diplomatic indifference at a time the world was reinventing

stereotypes against Nigerians. Yar’Adua’s ill-health and evasive nature translated into a

standstill and he failed to hand over to his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan or disclose his state of

health. Musa Yar’Adua passed on the 5

of May 2010 and his Vice, Jonathan was sworn in

to complete his tenure (Business Monitor International, 2010; Nossiter, 2010).

3.4.3 The Administration of Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan

May 6

2009- May 29

2015

Jonathan embarked on a number of diplomatic shuttles following Yar’Adua’s demise to

reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment and position in the Comity of States. It was a hotly contested

polity for Jonathan to seek election, after completing Yar’Adua’s term. Jonathan reformed the

electoral process and won one of the fairest elections in Nigeria in 2011. Coben in Campbell

(2011) likens Jonathan to Harry Truman, who became the president of the United States

when his predecessor died in a natural death. He was uncharismatic, obscure but performed

well.

In the first 100 days of his election in 2011, Jonathan commissioned the Presidential

Advisory Council on International Relations to coordinate the reforming of Nigeria’s foreign

policy to be economic cooperation and investment-driven. He spent time with Nigerians in

diaspora and planned for

Nigerians in Diaspora Commission

to take charge of Nigerians

abroad as reservoirs and ensured effective use of their inputs in development agenda. The

government’s foreign policy focused on improved relationships with other military forces to

build peace, improved bilateral and multilateral trade relations, cooperation and assistance in

curbing health challenges as well as promotion of the welfare of Nigerians abroad to ensure

they are treated with respect and dignity (Boma et. al., 2015).

Dora Akunyili, the Information Minister in Yar’Adua and Jonathan governments introduced

the “Rebrand Nigeria” project to repair Nigeria’s battered image which according to Akunyili,

was important since Nigeria’s development is tied to it. At this point, the Department of

Homeland Security Special Screening of passengers on international flights to US targeted

Nigerians, following Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing of a US-bound plane

in 2009. Jonathan’s meeting with the American President led to delist of Nigeria from the list

(Aririesike, 2009 in Iyorza, 2014; Boma et.al, 2015; Obayiuwana, 2009; Stickings, 2010).

Jonathan signed the first Nigeria-United States Bi-National Commission, as a mechanism for

sustained bilateral, high-level dialogue to improve diplomatic, economic and security

cooperation. The domestic components covered good governance, transparency and anti-

corruption, investments, etc. This fed into the government’s foreign policy thrust,

the

Transformation Agenda

(Alao, 2011; Gyong, 2012) designed to tackle the deplorable living

conditions and attract investments to Nigeria. Jonathan opined that since the primary

responsibility of government is to ensure peace, progress and economic development,

foreign policy should be employed to support these initiatives and diversify the economy.

Foreign policy was subsequently repositioned to support internal programs and reduce

poverty (Ashiru in Ojeme, 2011).

Jonathan appointed experienced Nigerians into his cabinet. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former

World Bank Managing Director was the Finance Minister. Okonjo-Iweala was the Finance

Minister under the Obasanjo government of 1999-2007 and had resigned voluntarily when

she was reassigned to Foreign Affairs Ministry. In Jonathan’s administration, Okonjo-Iweala

served as the Coordinating Minister of the Economy (Alinyeji, 2011). Olusegun Aganga took

Trade and Investments while Oruma Otteh, a former Vice, African Development Bank

headed Nigerian Stock Exchange. The former director of Nigerian Food Drugs

Administration and Control, Dora Akunyili who recorded tremendous success in the fight

against fake drugs (Land, 2008; Larkin, 2006; Lemonick and Gilbert, 2005) retained her

position as the information Minister where she continued with the

Rebrand Nigeria Project

Akinwunmi’ success in the agricultural sector won him the Headship of African Development

Bank and Noble Prize for Agriculture 2017.

Jonathan’s administration also overhauled the Foreign Service and empowered the

diplomatic missions to act as operators of foreign policy and look for opportunities and

programs that will improve the situation in Nigeria. Jonathan’s administration involved the

Organized Private Sector: Nigerian Association of Chambers and Commerce, Industries

Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA), Nigerian Association of Small and Medium-Sized

Enterprises-NASME, Manufacturers Associations of Nigeria (MAN), Nigerian Association of

Small-Scale Industries (NASSI), etc. in trade and investment initiatives. The government also

mobilised Nigerians in Diaspora to support development and investment at home. He also

held meeting with the about 4000 Nigerians working in the United Nations and sought their

inputs in development affairs.

Jonathan’s administration renewed bilateral relationships with many countries, including

Czech Republic in 2011. The government relaxed visa rules and signed more Bi-National

Commissions-with Canada, Germany, Australia to further improve economic ties and

cooperation. Nigeria-China relationship was also boosted during his tenure as investment

worth $25 billion was agreed on and five bilateral agreements were signed (Ashiru in

Ajaebili, 2011; Abati, 2012; Akinterinwa, 2014: 268-269; Boma et.al, 2015; Jayi and

Ayotunde, 2016).

The administration adopted reciprocity in positive and negative form in her external relations

to an extent. In countries where Nigerians were not subjected to abuse in visa applications,

Nigeria provided same treatment. In places where visa applications by Nigerians were bound

by restrictions, delays and maltreatment, Nigeria applied same approach in her dealings.

When Muammar Gaddafi suggested that Nigeria should break up into Muslim north and

Christian south, Jonathan recalled Nigerian ambassador in protest and emphasis on

Nigeria’s unity (Boma et al, 2015).

Nigeria as ECOWAS leader managed the ouster of Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire when he

refused to relinquish power after losing election. Although the African Union opposed foreign

interventions in Libya, in 2011, Nigeria along with Gabon and South Africa and other

members of the Security Council voted in favour of the UNSC Resolution 1973 which was

the legal platform for NATO intervention in Libya and the eventual oust of Muammar al-

Ghaddafi. Again in August, Nigeria joined the Western powers to recognize the rebels in

Libya, but was alone as the AU and South Africa disapproved. In December 2014, Nigeria

under Jonathan also voted on the Palestinian statehood. The vote created an imbalance in

votes and shows to an extent that Nigeria was giving diplomatic room to Western nations

(Akomolafe, 2015).

The last few months of Jonathan’s government was marred by deadly attacks and bombings

by boko haram insurgents compounded by Chibok girls kidnapping. Efforts to purchase

weapon to tackle the insurgency was blocked by America while South Africa also seized the

available funds meant for purchase in South Africa which left the government with little hope

in defeating the insurgents (Boma et.al, 2015). In his address, Jonathan emphasized that his

ambition is not worth contesting the results of the 2015 elections despite evidence of

malpractices (Associated Press, 2015).

3.4.4 The Administration of Retired General Muhammadu Buhari

May 29

2015

Retired General Muhammadu Buhari’s election was the first transfer of power from ruling to

opposition party in Nigeria. His campaign cardinal agenda was hinged on fighting corruption,

insecurity and economy, job creation which reflected in his foreign policy. Buhari embarked

on extensive travels and engagement with the G-7 and other Western countries, including

China, the G-20 Meeting in Germany and African Union Summit in South Africa (Schneider,

2015). Buhari’s known personal integrity won him the trust of the West who helped him

recover about $230 million from the Swiss Bank (Onyeama, Foreign Affairs Minister 2016 in

Salau, 2016).

Buhari visited neighbouring countries that are affected by boko haram and renewed

commitment to the fight. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in place since 1998

yielded little result due to mistrust over small border issues dating back to 1980s. Intelligent

sharing was hindered making it easily overrun by the insurgents. The visit therefore

enhanced opportunities for firmed decisions on the alliance to fight boko haram (Schneider,

2015). Buhari’s government signed more Agreements with China and assured of a one-

China Policy by recognizing China, Taiwan and Mainland China as single State of China and

relocated the Taiwanese Embassy from Nigeria’s Federal Capital, Abuja to Lagos and

downgraded its activities (Yusuf, 2017, in Bello et.al, 2017; Mama, 2016).

Between May 29

2015 when he was sworn in and 2017, macroeconomic indicators had

revealed a double dip slowdown and later into recession. From the biggest economy in Africa

by its GDP which recorded growth of 2.57 percent by second quarter of 2015, it fell to historic

low of -0.36 percent its worst performance in 25 years. Inflation climbed to 13.72 percent by

April 2016 from 9 percent as at May 2015. The government’s Economic Recovery and

Growth Plan (ERGP) to improve productivity and economic growth by 7.8% by 2020, provide

jobs for more than 15 million Nigerians was designed (Chima, 2016; Parmar, 2017:59-59;

Country Profile, 2017). However, the Central Bank’s role in determining the exchange rate

instead of the market flow and the foreign exchange strategy leaves foreign investors with

little confidence in the current Central Bank leadership and foreign equity portfolio flows

(Bekkali, 2017).

The government has complied with international humanitarian law in conduct of its foreign

policy but the foreign policy space is fraught with political instability and inconsistency. Like

Jonathan, Buhari criticised the United States for not providing enough weapons to tackle

insurgency, therefore indirectly aiding and abetting boko haram (Akinterinwa, 2017;

Schneider, 2015). Buhari with Ghana objected to re-admittance of Morocco into ECOWAS

and commissioned another research to determine the gains and losses to ECOWAS.

Conversely, Buhari’s government renewed relationships with Morocco with the visit of

Moroccan King, His Majesty, Mohammed V1. An agreement to jointly develop regional gas

pipeline connecting both states was signed (Canada Newswire, 2016).

The government did not appoint diplomatic Heads on time upon removal of the Ambassadors

appointed by the last administration. Out of the about 112 Missions, the government

presented a list of 47 to the Legislative Arm of Government for screening as required by the

Constitution and the commissioning was in 2017. This did not speak well of Nigeria as

Missions like Russia, United States, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, including Czech

Republic were left without ambassadors while the respective countries had their substantive

Ambassadors in Abuja. Many of the Missions were facing challenges in terms of funds due to

lean budgets and some lacked quality personnel in terms of relevant skills and experience

since most appointments are based on political considerations rather than merit (Akwaya,

2016; Vanguard Newspaper, 2017)

The human rights violation under the Buhari’s government, nepotism and clannish approach

to governance, instead of Federal Character produced more threats to the nations’ unity like

embolden boko haram insurgents, the pastoral conflicts and Biafran-IPOB agitators. The

injustice and unfairness in dealing with IPOB agitators and Shiites, including the continued

detention of the leader, AL-Zak Zaky leaves many in doubt of the government’s capability to

manage a modern democratic society (Akinterinwa, 2018). The suspended Presidential

Amnesty Program led to renewed threats by Niger Delta militants who returned to the creeks

to disrupt oil activities, impacting on power supply, government oil exports and revenues.

There are now more IDP Camps in Nigeria, unlike in the past and large numbers of

Nigerians are refugees in many West African states and form part of the group migrating

through the Libyan border to Europe.

Chapter 4: Discussion of Findings

4.0 Introduction of Chapter

Features of Nigerian foreign policy have been discussed to the extent possible within the

specified periods in history in the preceding chapter. Chapter four identifies notable planks in

each period and establishes how civilian and military governments handled Nigeria’s foreign

policy.

4.1. First Period 1953 – 1966 - First Republic (Civilian Rule)

Sir Balewa was privileged to design a framework for foreign policy but he adopted

conciliatory approach to radical. In line with its principal objective to fight apartheid, notable

points include the NACAP as a platform to educate Nigerians on the situation of blacks in

Southern African countries and generated strong support from the grassroots. The first

motion for the suspension of South Africa at an international meeting (International Labour

Organization) took place with one-hundred and sixty-three (163) - nil and eighty-nine (89)

abstentions. Nigeria led a first walkout in next ILO meeting. Nigeria contributed troops to the

UN Peacekeeping Mission Support in Congo and also commanded the Mission; including

the India-Pakistani Mission under UNIPOM and Observer Mission under UNSF in New

Guinea. Nigeria’s reputation was also boosted by the crucial roles played by Udorji, Elias

and Udoma at international level.

Failure to emerge as OAU Chair at its formation and siting of the headquarters in Nigeria

was perceived as weak and failed to commensurate with Nigeria’s leadership potentials. It

was noted that Balewa had placating personality which in reference to Nye (2004) shaped

his foreign relations approach. Accommodating Mandela for six months in 1962 rang positive

bells but leaving out other liberation movement leaders who looked up to Nigeria was a

negative approach to his Africa-centred foreign policy. Another negative point is that while an

elected Parliament openly debated the apartheid South African case, the Northern Peoples’

Congress, Sir Balewa’s party vetoed the debate on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba

which was suggested by the Action Group in the Parliament. It was a negative point

compared to military approach in the second period.

4.2 Second Period 1966 – 1979 (Military Government)

Ironsi’s government was a shift from the Balewa conservative approach. The Ambassadors’

Conference ensured more commitment to African liberation. Portuguese and South Africans,

including their vessels were barred from entering Nigeria. Gowon adopted war diplomacy to

ensure a united Nigeria. Unlike the Balewa government, Gowon established friendship with

Soviet world to support the war and built awareness of the Communist ideals in Nigeria. The

financial assistance to the liberation movements, to smaller African and non-African nations

and to fight drought in some parts of Africa were positive signs. Commitment to the liberation

struggles which earned Nigeria the Chairmanship position of the United Nations Anti-

Apartheid Committee was also in line.

A second boycott of an international event, the Munich Olympic Games occurred in this

period. While Balewa made suggestions in respect to African economic cooperation,

Gowon’s government spearheaded the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, provided land for

its headquarters. Out of the eleven (11) members of the Union, Nigeria took responsibility to

pay thirty-two percent (32%) annual dues to sustain the regional mechanism. The

government also established Niger and Chad Basin Development Authorities respectively.

Two personalities Adedeji at UNECA and Akintola Aguda also boosted the international

reputation of Nigeria.

General Gowon’s government was very bureaucratic and personalised. Elements of

bureaucratic and decision-making theories came to play when Gowon spent money without

recourse to consultation and often bypass the ministry of external affairs. The Civil War

provided the basis to prioritize sovereignty over national economy with establishment of an

Indigenization Policy to boost an environment economically independent from the West

unlike Balewa. The oil boom provided more stimulus and expanded protection for import-

substituting industries. Elements of Marxist’s and realism were displayed in Gowon’s

retaliative foreign policy in post-war Nigeria which targeted countries that supported Biafra

during the war and revenues from oil which the government egotistically lavished on other

states. From the analysis, it can be established that Gowon drastically altered the terrain and

expanded Nigeria’s contact at international level.

General Murtala adopted the Balewa strategy for public participation in foreign policy-

making, unlike the Gowon government. The

Adedeji Commission Report

provided direction

in implementing a well-defined foreign policy. Outstanding moments include Murtala’s

statement at the OAU Summit that Africa is no longer in the orbit of any colonial powers

which situated apartheid as an imperialist structure, revealing the contents of US President

Ford’s letter in a Press Conference following the Angolan crisis, recognition of MPLA and the

financial support rings positive points for the government. Unlike the Balewa civilian

administration, Murtala and Obasanjo’s government provided space for liberation

movements to set up missions in Nigeria and mobilize external resources for the liberation

struggle. These fit into realism, the use of power and resources as political weapon to fight

apartheid and colonialism.

The South African Relief Fund-SARF-

Mandela Tax

supported by the masses and promotion

of South African youths welfare are remarkable moments. The World Conference for Actions

Against Apartheid in Nigeria in 1976 leading to the United Nations Security Council

Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa in 1978 are included. Like in Balewa and

Gowon era, Nigeria led a third and fourth boycott of Summer Olympics and Commonwealth

Games in Montreal and Alberta. The refusal to trade crude oil with South Africa and the

amount of money deliberately lost in line was a strong demonstration of Nigeria’s distaste for

apartheid while the nationalisation of British companies added more points to Nigeria’s

opposition to apartheid policy and respect for black Africans.

The festival for Arts and Culture allowed blacks in Caribbean and Pacific to meet together as

a single group on African soil and attracted over 500,000 spectators (Monroe, 1977). It also

projected Nigeria’s rich and diverse culture to the world. Nigerian Trust Fund is a “prime

mover”, which in addition to ECOWAS Compensation Fund serve as positive integrative

force in West Africa (Barnes, 1984:169-170). Many Nigerian musicians made the liberation

struggles a central theme of the music, e.g.

Sunny Okosuns

. The rotation of about seven

thousand (7,000) soldiers through nine (9) battalions In Lebanon under the UN Interim Force

in Lebanon UNIFIL-1978-1982 was in line with Nigeria’s foreign policy objective to promote

world peace (Azkagu, 2015:88-92). Unlike General Gowon’s government, the Obasanjo

administration restructured the workforce which led to decline in bureaucracy in Nigeria.

Nigeria experienced two oil windfalls and shocks within the period.

4.3 Third Period 1979 -1983 Second Republic (Democratic Government)

Liberalism can be gleaned from Alhaji Shagari’s peaceful handling of the Bakassi conflict

which downplayed the use of force preferred by the majority in Nigeria. The financial support

to Robert Mugabe 1982 in Zimbabwe celebrated the victory of Africans in spite of the colonial

struggle. The open condemnation of Britain for continued links with South Africa against the

Gleneagles Agreement and at the Lancaster Negotiation were positive points in protest

against racism. While the Shagari government provided funds to cushion the challenges

experienced in the first and unsuccessful OAU Peacekeeping Mission to Chad, the

government demonstrated a double standard through expulsion of immigrants in Nigeria.

External Affairs Ministry and the Minister faced exclusion on most foreign policy issues due

to party affiliations. Career diplomats were often excluded as employment was based on

party affiliations instead of merit (Anifowoshe and Emenuo, 1999). The over-expenditure,

rivalry among parties, corruption (Diamond, 1985) mismanaged oil rent, external debt,

destabilised the economy (Ihonvbere, 1996:196). Decision-making and Marxist’s theory are

visible with the class imbalance and concentration of wealth in a few hands while the State

was in debt.

4.4 Fourth Period 1984 – 1998 (Military Regimes)

Buhari’s government adopted concentric circles as foreign policy thrust, making national

economic, and security interests of immediate priority before the regional. The elite

monopolized the foreign policy making terrain and critical issues were directly under the

supervision of General Tunde Idiagbon and members of the Supreme Military Council. The

government authorised the second expulsion due to Maitatsine extremism and closed

Nigerian borders with Cameroon and Chad which were negative points. The Conference on

Legal Status of Apartheid, organized to chart a new way for people to accept apartheid as a

legal system was a departure from the assertive Southern African policy of previous

governments. The positive aspect of the government was the recognition of Saharawi Arab

Republic SADR in protest against Morocco’s occupation of the region, just like the liberation

struggles.

Conversely, the government adopted a reactive approach in opposition to the West and its

efforts at tackling corruption created friction and soured external relationship. The belt-

tightening measures aimed to neutralise the impact of oil-shocks and manage the economy

created more friction at the international credit market and more hardships internally.

General Idiagbon’s unbending posture also created a background that hindered diplomacy

and relationship building. His personality and the expulsion order were not in line with the

Concentric Circles. Foreign policy was top-down without citizens’ engagement unlike in

Balewa (1960-1966) and Murtala/Obasanjo’s governments (1975-1979).

Internally, introduction of death penalty and execution, imprisonment and the belt-tightening

feeds the Marxist and Realist’s theory of State, whereby the regime adopted hegemonic

stance to exercise power and influence over the population. The suspension of the

Constitution translated into more hardships as the Decrees led to gross violation of

fundamental human rights whereby convicted criminals and drug smugglers were jailed and

prosecuted under Decree Two. Babangida’s government economic diplomacy led to new

relationships, bilateral agreements and increased capital flow. Notable aspects include

opening up of the IMF recommendations for public participation like the Balewa and

Murtala’s governments; the fifth and last boycott of an international event – the XIII

Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in 1986 which was thereafter referred to as ‘

the Boycott

Game

’ and securing two (2) prominent international roles at the Commonwealth of Nations

and the United Nations for Nigeria to boost Nigeria’s reputation. Nigerian students regularly

embarked on demonstrations in support of the liberation struggles. Awareness in schools

was also strong within this period as textbooks and billboards depicting the struggles donned

many school environments.

Another landmark achievement is the ECOWAS Peace Ceasefire Monitoring Group-

ECOMOG, including an Endowment Fund to support the war and an increased in Nigeria’s

Annual Dues from thirty-two percent (32%) to forty percent (40%) to assist the peacekeeping

effort. Nigeria filled logistic gaps in the contingents from other countries (Ajayi, 2005:53). Like

Nigerian Trust Fund established by Military government in the second period, the Technical

Aid Corp-TAC assisted many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations from inception in

1986 till date. The mechanism projects Nigeria as a facilitator of effective cooperation. The

project is recognised as the only service of its kind operated by an African country and

challenges the notion that Africa is only a recipient of aid. Nigerian Government pays the

allowances and fringe benefits for volunteers while the recipient country provides

accommodation and other basic services needed on ground.

Although a military regime, the initial phase of Babandiga’s administration fits the liberalist’s

theory as it measured power through economy, free markets and cooperation, economic

integration and interdependence. The established ECOMOG and friendship with South

Africa under De Klerk were positive signs. The football game by Nigeria and South Africa

shows sports as a unifying force and a conflict resolution and peacebuilding tool. However,

the adoption of economic diplomacy, under this consideration marked a shift from the Afro-

centric foreign policy of Nigeria which had won her respect internationally, to a more country-

centred policy to remain relevant in international arena according to Nikiton (1983), Mbakwe

and Chukwu (2016). In this case, it supported Papadimitrou and Pistikou, (2014) that

economic diplomacy can contribute to national security as a secondary factor, since the

armed forces are major players.

Replacement of Akinyemi with a military external relations minister facilitated the elite

takeover of the foreign policy space. New entrants to the bureaucratic and elitist class of

foreign policy decision-makers are in line with elite theory. Since the government operated in

the interest of the capitalist world, it also reflects Marxist’s and realist’s theory of state. Unlike

the second period when military administrations like Gowon, Murtala and Obasanjo

condemned actions taken by the West especially with respect to African nations, the social

climate and expected economic assistance from the West required less radical approach to

external affairs. Nigeria remained silent on many issues in the activities of the West to avoid

alienation. The charged political climate and scuttled electoral process placed Babangida’s

government in negative light.

Abacha’s government sustained the Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia until Charles Taylor

emerged as president and reversed the coup in Sierra Leone which reinstated Tejah

Kabbah. However, Abacha’s continued incarceration of the presidential candidate Moshood

Abiola was not approved by Nigerians and the international community. Many Diplomatic

Missions in Nigeria were shut down and sanctions imposed by major Western powers, led by

the Commonwealth of Nations following the execution of Ogoni 9 including Ken Saro Wiwa

in Ogoniland, in Niger Delta and targeted assassinations.

Liberal realism talks about a society of States with common norms and interests that

promote order and stability which Abacha found in the D-8 Group. Conversely, Abacha’s

term as Nigerian Head of State came at a time the liberation struggles in Africa had ended.

The focus on liberation struggles as a major component of the Afro-centred foreign policy

became obsolete. The force of globalization was also taking roots and human rights became

defining principles of modern society. Liberal realism requires understanding and moving

with secular diffusion of global power (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 2004). Abacha failed to

redirect the foreign policy in line. Instead, Nigerian foreign policy machinery stumbled from

one negative action to another. There was a general mismanagement of the Ogoni and

Commonwealth of Nations crisis. The External Affairs Minister Tom Ikimi attacked Nigeria’s

suspension and recommended a review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy objectives. Other senior

members of the cabinet made combative statements which was interpreted as a threat to the

international community and poor understanding of the workings of the international system

(Akinrinade, 1997).

Although he based his policy on the afro-centric framework, Abacha’s government foreign

policy therefore was “reactive and isolationist” in total disregard for diplomatic norms and

lacked finesse which stunned the world (Akintola, 2007:462-463; Ezirin, 2011:7-8). The

Abacha tenure demonstrates realists,’ Marxist’s and elite theories through exploitation of the

minority in Niger Delta, exclusionary decisions, enforcement of class structure and

concentration of wealth in a few hands. Dach (2007) observed that Nigeria, viewed as an

emerging power in 1983 belonged to a group of least developed countries by 1999. General

Abubakar made efforts to reverse the oppressive structures set up by Abacha and released

prisoners. His shuttle diplomacy and attendance of international events and election

timetable assured the international community of his motivations which was opposite of

Abacha.

4.5 Fifth Period 1999-2018 - Fourth Republic (Democratic Government)

Through economic liberalization and shuttle diplomacy, Obasanjo won back friends who

deserted Nigeria. Unlike Babangida (1985-1993), Obasanjo succeeded in getting a reduction

in external debts and created enabling environment for foreign investment and job creation.

Obasanjo played crucial roles in resolving the Sierra Leonean, Liberian and the Sudanese

War. Obasanjo led in establishment of ECOWAS Mission in Liberia-ECOMIL and ECOMICI

during conflict in Cote D’Ivoire, including AMIS in Sudan. Nigerian army later formed the

advance force for United Nations Mission in Liberia-UNIMIL and Hybrid UN/AU Operations in

Darfur. Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund assists Western Africa with some projects that

contribute to actualizing the Sustainable Development Goals. Nigeria under Obasanjo

relinquished hold on the disputed territories with Cameroon following the ICJ Judgment and

relocated her citizens to prevent reprisal attacks and full-blown conflict. Nigeria offered

asylum to Charles Taylor and together with Thabo Mbeki restructured the Organization of

African Unity to African Union. These fit into liberalism.

Obasanjo’s tenure as democratic president was highly personalised, unlike in the past and

often bypass the Ministry. The democratic environment also gave room for grievances and

his government was marred by pockets of conflicts across Nigeria. Obasanjo’s efforts were

dashed when he attempted to modify the Constitution to enable him run for a third term in

office which led to loss of standing at many circles. Apart from visiting the White House and

attending the African Union Summit in 2007, Yaradua attended no international event and

Nigeria was not invited to events, including the G-8 Meeting where Heads of Governments

deliberated on the global economic meltdown of 2008. His foreign policy thrust, citizens’

diplomacy did not make any tangible impact locally and internationally.

The Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations guided Jonathan’s government in

pursuing an economic and investment-driven foreign policy. The Transformation Agenda

was hinged on promoting investment and job creation internally and welfare of Nigerians

abroad and he charted a way for Nigerians in Diaspora to participate in nation building.

Jonathan’s visit and discussion with the Obama administration led to delist of Nigeria from

the Special Screening List of passengers to the US following Abdulfatai Mutallab’s attempted

bombing of the US-bound plane in 2009. Jonathan’s government signed many Bi-National

agreements, opened more diplomatic missions to endear Nigeria to many countries, reinvent

Nigeria’s image like Obasanjo and encourage investment in Nigeria. By commissioning the

Heads of Missions to promote the country and attract investment to Nigeria, Jonathan’s

government earned more points in his external relations which feeds into liberalism.

The adoption of reciprocity in dealings with other countries was mandated by the widespread

maltreatment of Nigerians in many countries. To promote democratic freedom in West Africa,

Jonathan’s government condemned in strong terms and led other ECOWAS states in

removing President Gbagbo of Cote D’Ivoire when Gbagbo failed to relinquish power after

losing election. While Nigeria voted with Gabon and South Africa for UNSCR 1975 for

NATO’s intervention in Libya, Nigeria was alone in voting for recognition of the Libyan rebels

which led to ouster of Muammar Gadhafi and receive less approval from African states in his

vote against Palestinian statehood which was in support of US position.

An impediment to a robust implementation of foreign policy was the boko haram insurgency

which badly affected Nigeria’s leadership role. Perception of incompetence and corruption in

diplomatic circles hampered investment and economic growth. The response to the Chibok

Girls kidnapping was also a negative score-point. The insurgency still persists in the Buhari

administration, in addition to mismanaged economy, recession and low confidence by

foreign investors. The confirmation by President Buhari that Nigerians hold criminal records

in many countries rings negative point. While many Missions were closed, the late appointed

of Ambassadors to a number of Missions did not speak well of Nigeria in diplomatic circles.

Insecurity has become endemic under the Buhari government.

5. Chapter Five Conclusion

The aim of the study was to evaluate Nigeria’s external affairs from the period leading up to

independence in 1960 to the present – 2018. It was equally aimed at comparing how civilian

and democratic governments interpreted the outlined foreign policy objectives and how it

contributed to Nigeria’s rising and fading power and influence:

 Promotion and protection of national interest.

 Promotion of the total liberation and support of Africa unity

 Promotion of international cooperation for mutual respect among all nations and

elimination of racial discrimination in all its manifestations;

 Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of

settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration

and adjudication;

 Promotion of a just world economic order (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Nigeria)

The study was guided by following questions;

(1) What are the components of Nigeria’s foreign policy?

(2) How was Nigeria’s foreign policy articulated by the military regimes and democratic

administrations?

(3) How did the systems, military regimes or civilian democratic governments aid Nigeria in

asserting her influence locally and globally?

(4) How has regime change impacted on implementation of her foreign policy over the

years?

(5) Why has her foreign policy not impacted on her role as a continental hegemon or

superpower?

Findings reveal that for question one; components of Nigeria’s foreign policy include soft and

hard power tools. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others by attracting

and persuading others to adopt/support one’s goals. In Nigerian case, it includes financial

aid, festivals/culture- FESTAC 77, Nollywood-Nigerian Movie Industry, educational grants,

reputation and institutional support, lobbying and campaign, soft concessional loans through

ADB, agreements, trade and economy. Hard power, the ability to use carrots and sticks of

military and economic might to make others follow your will includes international pressure,

propaganda, war diplomacy, technical support, Southern African policy, technical

cooperation, military intervention and peace support missions.

For question (2), findings reveal that the military and civilian administrations adopted both

soft and hard power tools to express the foreign policy objectives. However, the difference

lies in extent and severity of use of these tools. The civilian government in first period was

not radical or revolutionary but firm and conciliatory in his approach. The only hard power-

military activity in the period was UN Peace Support Mission and taking the lead in boycott of

international event. The government’s policy actions was backed and guided by the masses’

decision. The military governments in second period used economic might and oil revenue to

launch Southern African policy. The first period government believed in peaceful approach to

independence of African States while military governments in second period believed in

revolutionary approach. The same soft power tools were therefore articulated in an assertive

and revolutionary manner.

While Gowon’s government (1966-1975) incorporated some elements of brusqueness in

relationship with the West and the use of war diplomacy to protect Nigeria’s sovereignty, the

government expanded Nigeria’s international contacts and was the only government that

provided grants to the Caribbean and Pacific black nations. The bureaucracy and

personalising did not allow for participation unlike the Balewa (1960-1966) and government

of Murtala and Obasanjo (1975-1979). The Murtala government was assertive in its Southern

African policy. Its use of antagonistic speeches, actions, open call for sanctions and rejection

of Western interference in African issues was different from the civilian approach. The

manner of lobbying and campaign in military regimes was demanding; the lead role in

boycotts of international events was felt at international level and earned Nigeria critical

positions which were only sustained in the civilian governments.

Apart from the Balewa administration when Nigerians were nominated to vital positions

within and outside Africa and Nigeria led the first boycott of an international event, no other

Nigerian was recognized during civilian administrations because of their less radical

expression of the policy objectives except in contribution of troops to Peace Interventions.

There was one boycott in civilian government while there were four boycotts in military

regimes. The FESTAC’77, Nollywood and hosting of international events are great avenues

to express Nigeria’s cultural heritage and the professional support and institutional building in

other states built Nigeria’s reputation as a foreign policy tool. The education initiatives and

soft loans were softer uniting and integrative forces which were expressed during Military

administrations. However, the financial aid was sustained by the civilian administration in

1979-1983, with strong criticism of countries supporting apartheid at international events

while only one government in fourth period continued with the Southern Africa policy but did

not condemn the Western activities in other parts of Africa as a result of the economic

diplomacy and debt crisis.

It can be said that oil played a major role in how each government articulated the policy

objectives. The oil boom during military regimes in second period led to increased revenue

while oil shocks and poor state of the economy left the fourth period in debts. To manage the

economy, two of three military regimes in fourth period adopted retaliative and reactive

policies that soured relationships and isolated Nigeria from the rest of the world while one of

the regimes (1985-1993) adopted economic diplomacy to manage the economy which

opened it to the world. The government also established the Technical Aid Corps to promote

South-South Cooperation and Nigeria’s reputation. While it did not condemn Western

interference in Africa like the second period, it led the last boycott of international event and

took a firm position to Southern African affairs. The established ECOMOG and military

intervention was strongest expression of hard power which is widely recognized and

appreciated.

The first government in the fifth period of civilian administration employed another tool,

Nigerian Technical Cooperation Fund to articulate Nigeria’s foreign policy following the ‘Dark

Days of 1993-1998. Obasanjo’s personality, personal commitment and lead role in

peacebuilding initiatives in Africa and the transformation of OAU to African Union expressed

Nigeria’s foreign policy. His achievement stem from his experience as military Head in 1976-

1979 when his foreign policy thrust was widely recognised and accepted. The civilian

administrations in fifth period have endeavoured to articulate the policy through peace

support operations in Africa.

Findings in question three (3) reveal that both the civilian and military governments assisted

Nigeria in asserting her influence differently. While both governments worked within the

stipulated foreign policy objective framework, the different thrusts adopted led to different

interpretations of the objectives, based on the understanding and prevailing circumstances.

The second period (military) was radical and aggressive in a positive way as it contributed to

the welfare of blacks and exposed the ills of apartheid to the world. However, the momentum

was sustained in public statements and condemnation of attitudes of the international

community towards the plight of Southern Africans like in the second period. The oil revenue

provided more impetus for assertion and to support the liberation struggles and other weaker

nations financially while ECOWAS and ECOMOG promoted regional integration in line with

Nigerian policy and promoted her military might.

For the findings on the fourth question; regime changes in Nigerian history led to adoption of

different foreign policy thrusts and implementation strategies. While the first government was

conservative, the regime change in 1966 led to radical implementation of the foreign policy

objectives, expanded Nigeria’s contact and won international support on the anti-apartheid

policy while the change to civilian government in 1979-1983 led a to less radical approach,

except for the peace support operations. One civilian administration and one military

government displayed double standard in its implementation strategy by expelling Africans

living in Nigeria.

The economic diplomacy by military government (1985-1993) led to less aggressive

approach due to the expected investment, debt relief and rescheduling. The government was

saddled in-between two regimes that adopted reactive and retaliative actions. The regime

change in 1985 and 1993 therefore resulted in poor implementation strategy and a reversal

of achievements of the second government and left Nigeria in a pariah state. A change from

the government in 1998 allowed hybrid actions of military and democratic ideas to win back

friends who deserted Nigeria during the ‘Dark Days.’ Conversely, a change to civilian regime

in 1999 allowed for implementation of the objectives through Technical Cooperation Fund in

partnership with the African Development Bank and alignment with the UN and AU on

peacekeeping initiatives, foreign direct investments, etc.

Findings for question five reveal that Nigerian foreign policy since 1960 has witnessed

success and failures like many countries of the world. Many believe it should have been

premised on strong domestic environment for support. But the dynamic nature of the

international environment demands the actors to change their interests in line with the

changes. The 1990’s was a defining moment in global politics. Nigeria, a nation with capacity

to influence Africa failed to develop strategies that combine her military might with soft power

like the financial aid to flow with the current.

The leaders misunderstood the concept of power in foreign policy. With release of Nelson

Mandela, Nigeria failed to build alliances with potential powers or shift its foreign policy

approach. The fifth period endeavour to bridge the gap with the Nigerian Technical

Cooperation Fund, peace support initiatives. The insurgency requires cooperation with

neighbouring states who depended on Nigeria in the past while many Nigerians take refuge

in camps in those countries due to the insurgency. These interpretations impact differently

on Nigeria’s role as a superpower. In response to the hypothesis, while Nigeria’s foreign

policy objectives have remained unchanged from 1960 till the present, the absence of a

unified foreign policy approach has led to different interpretations, strategies and

implementation by the fourteen military and civilian governments. Therefore, regime

changes, both civilian democratic and military as well as leadership style are major factors

that have contributed to Nigeria’s power decline in this global era.

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Appendix

Structure of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In 1953 under British colonial arrangement, Nigeria began to groom personnel for the foreign

affairs department and was also granted some level of authority (Adoba, 2014). In 1957,

when Sir Abubakar Tawafa Balewa was appointed the Prime Minister prior to independence,

Nigeria started to exercise that power. The department was therefore transferred from the

Office of the Chief Secretary to Prime Minister’ Office as the Department of Cabinet Office.

At independence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was

established to handle external affairs while the Cabinet remained the policy formulation body

of the government, including foreign policy (Ashiru, 2011, also cited in Mimiko and Mbada,

2014; Effiong, 2012; Inamete, 2001). The names were later changed to Ministry of External

Affairs and now Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry operates at different levels from Headquarters, Missions, Home Services,

International Organizations and other Institutions. At the helm is the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, the political head who works closely with the Minister of State 1 & 2, the Permanent

Secretary, the Administrative Head of Foreign Service, Four Under-Secretaries who oversee

groups of Departments, while Directors supervise affairs of various departments and

Divisions at the Ministry. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives, as enshrined in the extant

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, under Fundamental Objectives and Directive

Principles of State Policy, Chapter 2, Subsection 19, 1999 establishes the role of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs as already defined.

Agencies of the Ministry include

• The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs-NIIA

• Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies-IPCS

• Directorate for Technical Aids Corp-DTAC

• Directorate for Technical Cooperation in Africa-DTCA

• Foreign Service Academy (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).