A
rticle 7.1.B of the National Agreement establishes
the “supplemental work force,” which consists of ca-
sual employees. Since Article 1, Section 2 excludes
casual employees from the bargaining unit repre-
sented by NALC, casuals do not have the contrac-
tual protections enjoyed by career or transitional
bargaining-unit employees. Casual employees receive lower
pay than career or transitional carriers and they receive no
benefits. Sections 1 through 4 of Article 7.1.B contain specific
limitations on the hiring and use of casual employees who per-
form letter carrier work.
Over the years, the application of these casual provisions has
been the subject of many disputes and arbitrations at the na-
tional level. In fact, we are currently in the midst of separate ar-
bitration proceedings concerning the interpretation of two
sections of Article 7.B. One case concerns the Union’s position
that the Article 7.1.B.1 prohibition against employing casuals
“in lieu of full or part time employees” is an enforceable re-
striction. The second case raises the issue of when a casual is
considered to be “employed” in the carrier craft for the purposes
of enforcing the provisions of Article 7, Sections 1.B.3 and 4.
We anticipate arbitration awards in these cases early this year.
Fortunately, the interpretation and application of Article 7,
Section 1.B.2 is not in dispute. This section, which gives ca-
reer part-time flexible employees straight-time hours prior-
ity over casuals, is the casual provision local union
representatives are most frequently called upon to enforce.
It provides the following:
7.1.B.2 During the course of a service week, the Em-
ployer will make every effort to insure that qualified and
available part-time flexible employees are utilized at the
straight-time rate prior to assigning such work to casuals.
This section obligates management to give part-time flex-
ibles working at the straight-time rate a scheduling priority
over casual employees. This priority is not absolute. The em-
ployer’s obligation may be fulfilled over the course of a “ser-
vice week,” and the part-time flexible employees must be
“qualified and available.” (A “service week” begins at 12:01
a.m. Saturday and ends at 12:00 midnight the following Fri-
day. See Article 8.2.A.)
A successful grievance on this issue must show that man-
agement scheduled a casual for work which a PTF carrier
could have performed instead, and that the PTF carrier
worked less than 40 straight-time hours during the service
week. Because the contract language addresses the service
week rather than any specific day’s assignment, manage-
ment does not necessarily violate the contract by, for in-
stance, using a casual on a Monday while PTFs are
unscheduled. A violation occurs when that assignment causes
a PTF who could have performed the Monday work to lose
straight-time work hours during the service week. See Na-
tional Arbitrator Howard Gamser’s decision in AC-C-13148,
December 20, 1979 (C-00403).
Article 7.1.C.1.b establishes a similar rule giving part-time
flexibles working at the straight-time rate a scheduling priority
over transitional employees. It provides that:
7.1.C.1.b Transitional employees may be used to replace
part-time attrition. Over the course of a pay period, the Em-
ployer will make every effort to ensure that qualified and
available part-time flexible employees are utilized at the
straight-time rate prior to assigning such work to transi-
tional employees working in the same work location and
on the same tour, provided that the reporting guarantee for
transitional employees is met (emphasis added).
After some experience the parties realized that trying to
implement this provision over the course of a “pay period,”
rather than over the course of a “service week” as in the case
of casuals, was administratively difficult. The parties remedied
this problem by agreeing to the following in the Step 4 Set-
tlement M-01241.
The issue in these grievances involves the scheduling pri-
ority to be given part-time flexible employees over tran-
sitional employees. During our discussion, we mutually
agreed as follows: During the course of a service week, the
Employer will make every effort to ensure that qualified
and available part-time flexible employees are utilized at
the straight-time rate prior to assigning such work to tran-
sitional employees working in the same work location and
on the same tour, provided that the reporting guarantee
for the transitional employee is met (emphasis added).
Note the other slight difference between the casual rule
in Article 7.1.B.2. and the transitional employee rule
in Article 7.1.C.1.b. Unlike casual employees, who have no
guarantees, Article 8, Section 8.D guarantees transitional
employees four hours work or pay if they are scheduled to
work and report to work.
Casuals
JANUARY 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 25
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
rticle 15, Section 1 of the National Agreement sets
forth the following definition of a grievance:
A grievance is defined as a dispute, difference, dis-
agreement or complaint between the parties related
to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. A
grievance shall include, but is not limited to, the complaint
of an employee or of the Union which involves the interpre-
tation, application of, or compliance with the provisions of this
Agreement or any local Memorandum of Understanding not
in conflict with this Agreement.
This broad grievance clause means that most work-related dis-
putes may be pursued through the grievance/arbitration proce-
dure. The language recognizes that most grievances will involve
violations of the National Agreement or a Local Memorandum of
Understanding. Other types of disputes that may be handled
within the grievance procedure may include:
Violations of postal regulations: Article 19 provides that those
postal handbook and manual provisions directly relating to wages,
hours or working conditions are enforceable through the griev-
ance/arbitration procedure as though they were part of the National
Agreement. Locally developed policies or procedures may not
vary from nationally established handbook or manual provisions.
Violations of other enforceable agreements between NALC and
the Postal Service, such as Building Our Future by Working
Together, the Article 16.9 Memorandum ( M-00830) and the
Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the Workplace
(M-01242). In his August 16, 1996 award in national case C-
15697, Arbitrator Snow found that the Joint Statement constitutes
a contractually enforceable agreement between the parties and
that the union has access to the grievance procedure to resolve
disputes arising under it. Additionally, in his discussion of the case,
Snow writes that arbitrators have the flexibility in formulating
remedies to consider, if a violation is found, removing a super-
visor from his or her “administrative duties.”
Violations of past practices. Article 5 prohibits management
taking any unilateral action inconsistent with the terms of the ex-
isting agreement or with its obligations under law. Section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from
making unilateral changes in wages, hours or working condi-
tions during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, management may not make unilateral changes affect-
ing wages hours or working conditions by arbitrarily changing
or breaching established precedent regarding a customary prac-
tice not inconsistent with the national agreement—even if the
practice is not formalized in writing.
Violations of law. Article 5 also makes violations of law by the
Postal Service grievable matters. In C-06858, March 11, 1987, National
Arbitrator Bernstein wrote the following concerning Article 5:
The only purpose the Article can serve is to incorporate all the
Service’s “obligations under law” into the Agreement, so as to
give the Service’s legal obligations the additional status of con-
tractual obligations as well. This incorporation has significance
primarily in terms of enforcement mechanism—it enables the
signatory unions to utilize the contractual vehicle of arbitra-
tion to enforce all of the Service’s legal obligations. Moreover,
the specific reference to the National Labor Relations Act is per-
suasive evidence that the parties were especially interested in
utilizing the grievance and arbitration procedure spelled out
in Article 15 to enforce the Service’s NLRB commitments.
However, only disputes concerning violations of law by the
Postal Service are grievable under the National Agreement—not
violations by other government agencies. Thus disputes con-
cerning eligibility determinations by OWCP are not grievable.
On the other hand, procedural violations of OWCP or ELM reg-
ulations by the Postal Service are grievable. (See the Contract
Talk column in the November 2000 Postal Record.)
Some disputes are not grievable matters. For example,
Article 12,
Section 1 gives the Postal Service a right to separate probation-
ary employees at any time during their probationary period with-
out establishing “just cause.” Employees separated during their
probationary period are contractually barred from filing a griev-
ance concerning the separation. Furthermore, arbitrators will hold
that a grievance concerning the separation of probationary em-
ployee under the provisions of Article 12, Section 1 is not arbitrable.
Thus, unless there is a dispute concerning whether such a sep-
aration was effectively completed within the 90-day probationary
period, there would be no reason to pursue such cases. However,
employees serving their probationary period are members of the
bargaining unit and do have access to the grievance procedure
on all matters pertaining to their employment except separa-
tion. Similarly, casual employees do not have access to the griev-
ance procedure for any reason since Article 1, Section 2 specifically
excludes them from the bargaining unit represented by NALC.
The grievance procedure is a powerful tool negotiated to as-
sist letter carriers in resolving a wide range of work- related dis-
putes. If you believe your rights have been violated, see your shop
steward.
What is a grievance?
FEBRUARY 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 33
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
A
F
ull-time regular letter carriers
have fixed schedules and
starting times. The July
2000 Postal Record “Contract
Talk” column discussed man-
agement-initiated temporary sched-
ule changes to a full-time carrier’s
regularly scheduled workday or
workweek. That column covered
the out-of -schedule pay provisions
in Section 434.6 of the Employee
and Labor Relations Manual (ELM)
that are applicable when manage-
ment initiates schedule changes.
There may also be situations in
which full-time letter carriers
wish to have their regular sched-
ules temporarily changed for
their own convenience. This is
possible, but in such cases man-
agement need not pay out-of-
schedule premium. In order to
qualify for a voluntary schedule
change, the request must meet all
three of the following criteria:
1. The requested schedule change must be for the personal
convenience of the employee—not for the convenience of man-
agement. Two national-level arbitration awards have ad-
dressed this issue. National Arbitrator Gamser held in case
C-00161 that management could not be relieved of the oblig-
ation to pay out-of-schedule premium by informing employ-
ees who volunteered for higher-level assignments that such
assignments would be considered to be “at the request of the
employee.” National Arbitrator Mittenthal held in case C-
00580 that acting supervisors (204Bs), or the “employee-su-
pervisors” in the grievances before him were “entitled to
the out-of-schedule premium during their details as tempo-
rary supervisors.”
2. The employee must sign a Form 3189, Request for
Temporary Schedule Change for Personal Convenience.
3. Management and the union’s representative (normally
the certified steward in the employee’s work location) must
agree to the change and both must sign the Form 3189.
Managers questioning this requirement should be directed
to Section 232.23 of the Time and Attendance Handbook F-21
which provides that:
“This form [3189] is used by employees to request a tempo-
rary schedule change for their personal convenience. By sub-
mitting a properly approved form to his (sic) supervisor, the
employee agrees (if the request is approved by the supervisor)
to forfeit any out-of-schedule premium to which he would oth-
erwise be entitled during the period requested. The union stew-
ard (or certified union representative in smaller offices) must
agree to the temporary change before the change is presented
to the supervisor.”
Union stewards should take this responsibility seriously. Of
course, most such requests can be routinely approved. How-
ever, care must be taken that the proposed schedule change
does not adversely affect the rights of other members of the
bargaining unit. Stewards should also be sure that employ-
ees requesting a change in schedule are not seeking to waive
the eight-hour scheduling guarantee for full-time employees
(see M-00879). All requests must be considered strictly on
their merits, without regard to personal feelings or union mem-
bership. When in doubt, shop stewards should seek the ad-
vice of a branch officer.
Voluntary schedule changes
MARCH 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 15
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
L
inear Measurement, DUVRS, Reference Volume,
Demonstrated Performance, POST, DOIS, etc. Over
the years experienced letter carriers have heard all
these terms. All these programs are variants of the
same basic idea— management tools to assess letter
carriers’ daily workload. Of course, management does have
a right to develop whatever tools it wants for its own purposes.
However, none of these tools has any contractual signifi-
cance since there are no daily standards for evaluating letter
carrier performance. None of these programs may be used
as a basis for discipline or as a shortcut to avoid
using the established M-39 procedures for eval-
uating and adjusting routes.
Some managers seem to have the mistaken no-
tion that the rules have changed since the POST
and DOIS programs are “computerized,” more
“modern,” more “accurate,” or whatever. We all
know that the quantitative data in the DOIS and
POST programs is often wildly inaccurate and fails
to take into account many of the most significant
factors affecting office and street times. But usu-
ally this argument is pointless and unnecessary
since, in fact, the rules have not changed. Perhaps
some supervisors need to be reminded.
The so-called office standards of 18 per minute
for letters and eight per minute for flats have one
purpose only. They are two of the many factors
that the M-39 requires management to use in order to calculate
“standard office time” during a route inspection. The office
time allowance for a route is established as the lesser of the
carrier’s average office time during the inspection period, or
the average standard office time.
Standard office time is based on the totality of a letter carrier’s
office performance. It may not be broken down into sub-
components—for example, by determining only how long it
takes a letter carrier to case a known number of letters. Even
when conducting a special one-day mail count under the pro-
visions of M-39 Section 141.2, management must use and fully
complete a Form 1838-C.
Simple failure to meet office standards is never just cause
for discipline. Under the terms of a September 3, 1976 Mem-
orandum of Understanding, the M-39 Handbook was modi-
fied to underscore this point. Section 242.332 now provides
that:
No carrier shall be disciplined for failure to meet stan-
dards, except in cases of unsatisfactory effort which
must be based on documented, unacceptable conduct
that led to the carrier’s failure to meet standards.
This principle was further reinforced in the July 11, 1977
Step 4 Settlement M-00386 which states:
Management may not charge or impose discipline upon
a carrier merely for failing to meet the 18 and 8 casing
standards. Any such charge is insufficient. Under the
Memorandum of Understanding of September 3, 1976
[now M-39 § 242.332] the only proper charge for disci-
plining a carrier is “unsatisfactory effort.” Such a charge
must be based on documented, unacceptable conduct
which led to the carrier’s failure to meet the 18 and 8 cri-
teria. In such circumstances, management has the bur-
den of proving that the carrier was making an
“unsatisfactory effort” to establish just cause for any
discipline imposed (emphasis added).
In summary, do what letter carriers have always done. Give
your best effort every day, follow the rules and do not engage
in “unacceptable conduct.” As long as you remember these
simple guidelines, you shouldn’t have to worry about being
disciplined for failure to make casing standards.
Standards
APRIL 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 17
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
RONALD G. BROWN,VICE PRESIDENT
JANE E. BROENDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-TREASURER
GARY H. MULLINS, DIRECTOR OF CITY DELIVERY
ALAN C. FERRANTO, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY AND HEALTH
THOMAS H.YOUNG JR., DIRECTOR, HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN
“No carrier shall be disciplined
for failure to meet standards,
except in cases of unsatisfactory
effort which must be based on
documented, unacceptable
conduct that led to the carrier’s
failure to meet office standards.”
T
he Department of Labor (DOL) is clear on the eligibility
requirements for taking leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)—or is it? The FMLA al-
lows “eligible” employees to take job-protected paid
or unpaid leave up to a total of twelve workweeks in
a leave year. An employee can use FMLA because of the
birth of a child, placement of a child for foster care and/or
adoption, to care for family member with a serious health con-
dition, or because the employee’s own serious health condi-
tion makes the employee unable to perform the functions of
his or her own job. An “eligible” employee is one who has been
employed by the employer for at least 12 months and has
worked 1,250 hours during the 12-month period immedi-
ately preceding the commencement of the leave. The DOL
regulations provide that whether an employee has worked the
minimum 1,250 hours of service is determined according to
the principles established under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).
The April 3, 2001 pre-arbitration settlement M-01436 re-
solved a dispute concerning the meaning of “worked the
minimum 1,250 hours:”
When an employee is awarded back pay, the hours an em-
ployee would have worked if not for the action which resulted
in the back pay period, are counted as work hours for the
1250 work hour eligibility under the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA).
If an employee substitutes annual or sick leave for any part
of the back pay period that they were not ready, willing and
able to perform their postal job, the leave is not counted as
hours for the 1250 work hour eligibility requirement under
the FMLA.
If a remedy modifies an action, resulting in a period of sus-
pension or leave without pay, that time is not counted as
work hours for the 1250 hours eligibility requirement
under the FMLA.
Publication 71 (Pub 71), Notice for Employees Requesting
Leave for Conditions Covered by the Family and Medical Leave
Act, is a Postal Service publication which informs postal em-
ployees of their rights under the Family and Medical Leave
Act. If an employee requests leave and the supervisor believes
the reason the employee needs the leave is due to a “serious
health condition,” the employer is required to give the em-
ployee a copy of Pub 71.
Recently NALC was notified of changes to Pub 71 under
the provisions of Article 19. It is NALC’s position that the
changes to Pub 71 are inconsistent with the Code of Federal
Regulations. On February 8, 2001 the NALC appealed the
changes to Pub 71 to national-level arbitration. The revised
Pub 71 requires documentation to return to work after using
protected leave that is inconsistent with the provisions of
the EL-311 and ELM 865. Furthermore, the new requirements
are more onerous for bargaining-unit employees than for
supervisory employees. Additionally, the revised Pub 71 con-
tains examples of specific information that may be required
before returning to work. The Postal Service has admitted that
there is no contractual or legal basis for these examples and
argued that they are only “guidance” and not “mandatory.”
Imagine trying to explain this distinction to your supervisor.
Another significant pre-arbitration settlement, M-01437,
April 09, 2001, overturned an abusive local management pol-
icy. The settlement, which quotes Article 13.4.F in its en-
tirety, says it all:
The issue in this grievance is whether a local “blanket pol-
icy” requiring an update of medical information every 30
days to continue in a light-duty assignment is a violation
of Article 13 of the National Agreement.
The parties agree that the local practice of requiring an au-
tomatic update of medical information every 30 days is con
-
trary to the intent of Article 13 and, therefore, will be
discontinued. Consistent with the provisions of Article
13.4.F of the National Agreement, an installation head may
request an employee on light-duty to submit to a medical
review at any time: The installation head shall review each
light duty reassignment at least once each year, or at any
time the installation head has reason to believe the in-
cumbent is able to perform satisfactorily in other than the
light duty assignment the employee occupies. This review
is to determine the need for continuation of the employee
in the light duty assignment. Such employee may be re-
quested to submit to a medical review by a physician des-
ignated by the installation head if the installation head
believes such examination to be necessary (emphasis
added).
FMLA update
MAY 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 15
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
JUNE 2001 |
POSTAL RECORD 25
L
ast month’s column highlighted recent national level pre-
arbitration settlements of FMLA-related issues. This
article provides an update of various other contract is-
sues recently resolved at the national level. Although
each of these settlements concerns a specific nar-
row issue, we are pleased with the large number of such dis-
putes that we have recently been able to resolve. Actual
copies of these and other recent settlements can be found in
the CAU section of NALC’s web site.
The March 17, 2001 national level prearbitration settle-
ment in case M-01442 put an end to a novel “flexibility” strat-
egy some area Postal Service officials have been trying to
implement. PTF letter carriers were told that as a condition
of employment they had to agree to be assigned to more than
one installation. When hired, their Form 50s were completed
to reflect more than one installation as a duty station. They
were then required to work for different postmasters in dif-
ferent towns on a day-to-day basis. Needless to say, this
arrangement was a contractual nightmare. Where did they
accrue seniority? Where could they opt? Where did they
sign up for leave? When converted to full-time, where would
they finally end up? The settlement provides that:
An employee’s official Form 50 may reflect only one duty
station. A Form 50 which reflects more than one duty sta-
tion will be amended to reflect one duty station.
If any NALC branches are aware of other situations where
PTFs are assigned to more than on installation, they should
contact their national business agent.
The prearbitration settlement M-01438 resolves a long standing
dispute concerning the Handbook EL-505, Injury Compen-
sation. NALC had appealed the EL-505 to arbitration under
the provisions of Article 19 because of the Postal Service’s po-
sition that injured letter carriers could be required to take
“functional capacity tests.” These tests are typically whole body
tests that consist of a series of procedures to determine an em-
ployee’s physical demand level. They are designed to measure
the employee’s pain or fatigue level. NALC has always insisted
that such tests should not be made mandatory because of their
demonstrated potential to cause or aggravate injuries. The set-
tlement states that:
In applying the language of the EL-505, it is mutually un-
derstood that an employee will not be required to take a func-
tional capacity test if the employee’s treating physician
recommends against it for medical reasons.
Injured letter carriers should always consult with their
treating physician if they have questions or reservations con-
cerning any tests or procedures the Postal Service seeks to
have performed.
Article 27 sets forth the rules for “employee claims” for lost
or damaged personal property. It specifically excludes “pri-
vately owned motor vehicles and the contents thereof.” Over
the years, most regional arbitrators have incorrectly held
that it excludes bicycles as well. For example, one regional
arbitrator reasoned as follows:
Means of transportation to and from the employee’s place
of employment cannot be held a compensable loss under the
terms of Article 27. While the word “bicycle” does not ap-
pear in the Article, the word “automobile” must be construed
as embracing all means of transportation.
The April 19, 2001 prearbitration settlement M-01440 ac-
knowledges that these regional arbitrators have been wrong
and clarifies the application of Article 27.
The issue in this grievance is whether Article 27, Em-
ployee Claims, is the proper procedure to file a claim for
the loss or damage to bicycles, or is a bicycle considered a
“motor vehicle” and therefore subject to the procedures of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The parties agreed that Ar-
ticle 27 does not apply to privately owned motor vehicles
and the contents thereof. However, we agree that non-mo-
torized bicycles are not considered “privately owned motor
vehicles,” such as those excluded from the Article 27 pro-
cedures. Therefore, a claim for loss or damage to non-mo-
torized bicycles can be made and decided in accordance with
the provisions of Article 27.
Letter carriers seeking to make claims involving a pri-
vately owned motor vehicle should check with a steward or
branch officer, since such claims must be made under the pro-
cedures of the Federal Tort Claims Act rather than Article 27
procedures.
Recent settlements
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
T
he Contract Administration Unit has been receiving
disturbing reports of widespread violations of the con-
tractual overtime limits in some Postal Service Areas.
Once again it has become necessary to review these
provisions so that all letter carriers are aware of
their rights. There are two separate restrictions on the max-
imum number of hours a letter carrier craft employee may be
required to work. One is found in Article 8, Section 5.G and
the other in Section 432.32 of the Employee and Labor Rela-
tions Manual (ELM)
Article 8, Section 5.G applies to full-time regular and full-time
flexible employees only. Excluding December, it limits them
to no more than twelve hours of work in a day and no more
than sixty hours of work in a service week. National Arbitrator
Mittenthal ruled in C-06238 that the 12- and 60-hour limits are
absolutes. Excluding December, a full-time employee may nei-
ther volunteer nor be required to work beyond those limits.
In C-07323 Arbitrator Mittenthal ruled that when a full-time
employee reaches sixty hours in a service week, management
is required to send the employee home—even in the middle
of a scheduled day. He further held that in such cases the em-
ployee is entitles to be paid the applicable eight hour guarantee
for the remainder of his or her scheduled day.
On October 19, 1988 the national parties signed the fol-
lowing Memorandum of Understanding (M-00859) to im-
plement the Mittenthal awards.
The parties agree that with the exception of December, full-
time employees are prohibited from working more than 12
hours in a single work day or 60 hours within a service
week. In those limited instances where this provision is or
has been violated and a timely grievance filed, full-time em-
ployees will be compensated at an additional premium of
50 percent of the base hourly straight time rate for those
hours worked beyond the 12 or 60 hour limitation. The em-
ployment of this remedy shall not be construed as an agree-
ment by the parties that the Employer may exceed the 12
and 60 hour limitation with impunity. As a means of fa-
cilitating the foregoing, the parties agree that excluding De-
cember, once a full-time employee reaches 20 hours of
overtime within a service week, the employee is no longer
available for any additional overtime work. Furthermore,
the employee’s tour of duty shall be terminated once he or
she reaches the 60th hour of work, in accordance with Ar-
bitrator Mittenthal’s National Level Arbitration Award on
this issue, dated September 11, 1987, in case numbers H4N-
NA-C 21 (3rd issue) and H4N-NA-C 27.
Arbitrator Snow ruled in C-18926 that the Memorandum
of Understanding M-00859 limits the remedy for any violations
of the Article 8.5.G to an additional premium of 50 percent of
the base hourly straight-time rate.
ELM Section 432.32 provides the following rule that applies
to all employees, including casuals and transitional employ-
ees (C-15699, National Arbitrator Snow).
Except as designated in labor agreements for bargaining
unit employees or in emergency situations as determined
by the PMG (or designee), employees may not be required
to work more than 12 hours in 1 service day. In addition,
the total hours of daily service, including scheduled work
hours, overtime, and mealtime
, may not be extended over
a period longer than 12 consecutive hours. Postmasters,
Postal Inspectors, and exempt employees are excluded from
these provisions. (Emphasis added)
Because this ELM provision limits total daily service hours,
including work and mealtime, to 12 hours, an employee is ef-
fectively limited to 11 ½ hours per day of work plus a ½ hour
meal. However, the ELM also permits the collective bar-
gaining agreement to create exceptions to this general rule.
The only exception to this rule is for full-time regular em-
ployees on the overtime desired list who, in accordance with
Article 8.5.G, “may be required to work up to twelve (12) hours
in a day.” Since “work,” within the meaning of Article 8.5.G
does not include mealtime, the “total hours of daily service”
for carriers on the overtime desired list may extend over a pe-
riod of 12 ½ consecutive hours. Additionally, Ar ticle 8.5.G pro-
vides that the limits do not apply during December when
full-time employees on the overtime desired list may be re-
quired to work more than twelve hours. These exceptions do
not apply to casuals, transitional employees, part-time em-
ployees or full-time employees who are not on the overtime
desired list, all of whom are effectively limited to 11 ½ hours
of work per day, even during December. It is NALC’s position
that the Snow decision in C-18926 limiting the remedies to an
additional premium of 50 percent of the base hourly straight
time rate only applies to violations of the Article 8.5.G. It
does not limit remedies for repeated or deliberate violations
of ELM 432.32.
Overtime limits
JULY 2001
|
POSTAL RECORD
27
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H. Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
Q. Are the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and Sick Leave for De-
pendent Care (SLDC) one and the same?
A. No. FMLA is a 1993 federal law which entitles eligible employ-
ees to take up to a total of 12 workweeks of unpaid leave during a
12 month period for the birth of a child and to care for such child,
for the placement of a child for adoption or foster care, to care for
a spouse or an immediate family member with a serious health
condition, or when he or she is unable to work because of a serous
health condition.
SLDC is a contractual right which enables a letter carrier to use
paid sick leave - up to 80 hours per leave year to care for an ailing
family member.
Q. How are the two similar?
A. Just to name a few significant similarities:
Both were developed to balance the demands of the work-
place with the needs of the families.
The definition of family member is the same (see ELM 515.2).
Neither FMLA nor SLDC entitle an employee to any leave in
addition to what the employee currently earns, rather both
FMLA and SLDC allow the employee the right to use leave for
a new reason—to care for a family member.
If the employee needs time off to care for a family member with
a serious health condition the employer cannot take disciplinary
action against the employee for unscheduled absences.
If the family member has a serious health condition and the car-
rier takes SLDC, the time off will count towards both the 80 hour
SDLC and 12 week FMLA entitlement.
As stated in Ron Brown’s Postal Record column this month, those
who are fortunate enough to have a healthy family and thus, who
have no need to take leave under either FMLA or SLDC, can-
not carry their unused right to FMLA leave or SLDC leave over
to following years.
The entitlement to both FMLA leave and SLDC leave begin with
the first day of the postal leave year.
Q. What is a serious health condition?
A. There is no laundry list of what qualifies as a serious health con-
dition but if an illness or injury meets one or more of the criteria listed
below then it would be considered a serious health condition.
An overnight stay in a hospital, hospice or residential medical
care facility, including any period of incapacity or subsequent
treatment for such care.
A period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar
days - including any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity
relating to the same condition that also includes treatment
two or more times by a member of the health care profession
or treatment by the health care professional on at least one oc-
casion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment.
Pregnancy—any period of incapacity due to pregnancy or for
prenatal care, including morning sickness or doctor visits.
Chronic conditions—conditions which occur repeatedly and re-
quire treatment. Some examples of a chronic condition are di-
abetes, epilepsy or asthma.
Permanent long-term conditions requiring supervision due to
a condition for which treatment may be effective or a cure im-
minent. Some examples include Alzheimer’s, multiple sclero-
sis or terminal cancer.
Non-chronic conditions which necessitate the need for multi-
ple treatments such as kidney dialysis or physical therapy after
an accident.
Q. How are FMLA and SLDC different?
A. Some significant differences are:
Unless the illness, injury or other condition is a serious health
condition the employee can be disciplined for unscheduled
absences when using SLDC whereas when using FMLA the
leave is protected and employee cannot be disciplined. FMLA
allows the employee 12 workweeks of protected leave (com-
bination of annual, sick or leave without pay depending on the
reason for the leave) while SLDC only allows the employee to
use 80 hours of earned sick leave.
The employee can take up to 80 hours of sick leave to attend
to a family member with a minor or serious illness, injury or
other condition, while FMLA must be taken to attend to a fam-
ily member with a serious illness, injury or other condition.
FMLA is a federal law and unless the law is appealed it will con-
tinue until an Act of Congress changes it. SLDC is a contrac-
tual right which must be renegotiated at the end of the 1998-2001
National Agreement.
Q. How do I know what my rights are under FMLA and what my rights
are under SLDC?
A. An employee’s rights under FMLA are outlined in the Employee
and Labor Relations Manual (ELM), Section 515. The Department
of Labor’s Poster 1420 which gives a brief summary of employee
rights, by law, must be displayed in every postal facility. If the em-
ployer suspects the employee’s leave is FMLA related the employer
is required to supply the employee with a copy of Publication 71, No-
tice for Employees Requesting Leave for Conditions Covered by the
Family and Medical Leave Act.
The Memorandum of Understanding on SLDC can be found
in the 1998-2001 National Agreement between the NALC and
the USPS.
Family and Medical Leave Act vs.
Sick Leave for Dependent Care
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H. Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
AUGUST 2001
|
POSTAL RECORD
13
SEPTEMBER 2001
|
POSTAL RECORD 17
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
T
he July 30, 2001 pre-arbitration settlement M-01444,
reprinted on the facing page, resolved the long-
standing national level disputes concerning the Piece
Count Recording System (PCRS), Projected Office
Street Time (POST), and Delivery Operations In-
formation System (DOIS) programs. A copy of the settlement
in PDF format is also available from the NALC web site at
www.nalc.org. The settlement was the culmination of ex-
tended discussions and sustains NALC’s position on all sub-
stantive areas of disagreement.
The settlement unequivocally states that the POST, DOIS
and PCRS data will not constitute the sole basis for discipline.
The settlement also reaffirms the principle, spelled out in Sec-
tion 242.332 of the M-39, that “No carrier shall be disciplined
for failure to meet standards, except in cases of unsatisfactory
effort which must be based on documented, unacceptable con-
duct that led to the carrier’s failure to meet office standards.”
Computer or volume data, standing alone, is never sufficient
to establish just cause for discipline. The settlement also re-
states the principle from the 1985 pre-arbitration M-00304 that
“there is no set pace at which a carrier must walk and no street
standard for walking.”
The settlement allows both parties to use the information
from these programs to support or refute any performance
related discipline. Thus any information from these pro-
grams necessary to investigate or process a grievance must
be made available to the Union under the provisions of Arti-
cles 17 and 31.
The settlement makes clear that all route adjustments must
be performed in accordance with Subchapter 141 and Chap-
ter 2 of the M-39 Handbook. If DOIS data relating to the route
inspection and adjustment process is used, it must be in strict
compliance with these handbook provisions. Nothing has
changed. DOIS, like any other software, is no better than the
data entered. If mistakes are made, the results printed out will
be wrong and subject to challenge. It’s just that simple.
Finally, the settlement makes clear that “no function per-
formed by POST or DOIS, now or in the future, may violate
the national agreement.” Shop stewards take note. The DOIS
program has an overtime tracking module. In principle it
usually can track overtime distribution in accordance with the
provisions of Article 8. However, the overtime tracking mod-
ule is so poorly conceived that it requires numerous time-con-
suming daily “adjustments” to work correctly. We expect
that, as a practical matter, supervisors will not bother so the
data will not be contractually correct in many sit-
uations. The settlement makes clear that in such
cases the provisions of Article 8, not the DOIS pro-
gram, are controlling.
It has been almost four years since management
first notified NALC that it was planning to test
the POST and DOIS programs. At that time NALC
was advised that the Postal Service believed these
new programs would greatly enhance its ability to
monitor each carrier’s daily performance and cap-
ture undertime. More recently, the Postal Ser-
vice decided to standardize upon DOIS as the
best program. The DOIS computer software uses
the piece-count information from PCRS to calcu-
late estimated daily route times, track overtime,
and even help make route adjustments. It sounded
too good to be true—and it was. It simply took four years for
the Postal Service to recognize the obvious.
Although this settlement agreement took an inordinate
amount of time to negotiate, the final result is a step in the right
direction. It recognizes that no computer program can abridge
letter carriers’ contractual rights. It also recognizes that
postal management can use the software as a tool to provide
supervisors with information to help make day-to-day deci-
sions. Of course, the debate over how much time it can take
to deliver mail has been an ongoing issue for many years.
Hopefully this national pre-arbitration decision will make life
a little easier on the workroom floor for everyone.
I have met with the Postal Service numerous times over the last
two months concerning the Managed Service Points (MSP)
program. We have made some headway on the key issue of the
times listed and approved by the local manager on the form
1564-A. Let’s hope that the Postal Service’s second step in the
right direction is just right around the corner.
POST and DOIS settlement
16 POSTAL RECORD
|
SEPTEMBER 2001
Director of City Delivery
|
Gary H. Mullins
“No carrier shall be disciplined for
failure to meet standards, except
in cases of unsatisfactory effort
which must be based on
documented, unacceptable
conduct that led to the carrier’s
failure to meet office standards.”
T
he right to a special route examinations under the provisions
of M-39, Section 271g was most recently addressed in
NALC Director of City Delivery, Gary Mullin’s column
in the January 2000 Postal Record. They are not a point-
less exercise. M-39, Section 242.122 requires that in-
spections result in routes being adjusted to “as nearly eight
hours daily work as possible.” Furthermore, M-39, Section 211.3
requires that if a special inspection demonstrates that a route is
overburdened, adjustments must be made within 52 days of the
completion of the mail count unless an exception is approved by
the District manager. This provision is the subject of the following
memorandum of understanding:
The United States Postal Service and the National Asso-
ciation of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, agree that it is in the
best interests of the Postal Service for letter carrier routes
to be in proper adjustment. Therefore, where the regular
carrier has requested a special mail count and inspection,
and the criteria set forth in Part 271g of the Methods
Handbook, M-39, have been met, such inspection must be
completed within four weeks of the request, and shall not
be delayed. If the results of the inspection indicate that the
route is to be adjusted, such adjustment must be placed
in effect within 52 calendar days of the completion of the
mail count in accordance with Section 211.3 of the M-39
Methods Handbook. Exceptions may be granted by a Di-
vision General Manager only when warranted by valid
operational circumstances, substantiated by a detailed
written statement, which shall be submitted to the local
union within seven days of the grant of the exception.The
union shall then have the right to appeal the granting of the
exception directly to Step 3 of the grievance procedure
within 14 days.
In the recent regional arbitration award C-21979, the arbi-
trator sustained the union’s grievance concerning a violation
of these provisions and awarded a substantial monetary award.
The full award is available at the CAU section of the NALC web-
site at www.nalc.org. Other arbitration awards granting mon-
etary awards for violation of these provisions include C-19464,
C-17006 and C-16848 and C-22242. Reprinted below are ex-
cerpts from the award:
By requiring this level of specificity in the application for
an extension, it is clear that the parties did not contemplate
that extensions would be granted for ordinary, foreseeable
circumstances of the average inspection. Rather, one can
infer that the national representatives intended the phrase
to refer to some event that could not be anticipated at the
start of an inspection. Other arbitrators are in agreement
that in general a “valid operational circumstance” is “an un-
foreseeable event(s) occurring subsequent to the route in-
spections which have a demonstrable and direct impact
upon daily operations of the Postal Service.”
Thus, an extension application must be based not only on
an unforeseeable event(s), but the event(s) must also
have a serious, immediate impact on Postal operations. The
events in that category include, but are not limited to: act
of God emergencies — floods, fires, earthquakes, blizzards,
tornadoes, hurricanes, plagues, riots, major equipment or
structural failures, or other situations of that gravity....
***
The Postal Service’s format makes unsupported assertions
of why it seeks an extension instead of the detailed state-
ment substantiating each ground as required by the §211.3.
The grounds of the extension were all administrative in na-
ture, and were all factors and circumstances relating to
problems totally within Postal Service control which could
have reasonably been anticipated and provided for when
the mail count and route inspection was undertaken. Fur-
ther, the grounds cited by the Postmaster benefitted only
the convenience of the Postal Service....
***
It is not the Carriers’ problem that the District over-sched-
uled itself. The instrumentality of mail counts and in-
spections is wholly in the hands of the Postal Service
which has either failed to provide adequate personnel to
handle the commitments it assigns itself, or has failed to
adequately document the difficulty it encountered in man-
aging so many inspections at the same time. In either
case, this ground alone will not support a request for an
extension because this ground is purely an administrative
convenience....
***
Although the Carriers would have difficulty establishing
exact dollar losses, it does not mean they have suffered no
harm. This is an atypical case because of the serious
abuse of the extension exception. This may not be the same
result in a less egregious case, that is why the national par-
ties have set a case-by-case standard of review. The harms
cited: prolonged anxiety, the stress of enduring overbur-
dened routes, the frustration of childcare, family, recre-
ational, and bad faith violations of Section 211.3, and the
Postal Service’s breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
Route adjustments
OCTOBER 2001
|
POSTAL RECORD 19
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
T
he September 20, 2001 Step 4 Settlement M-01446
resolved a national level grievance concerning the
scope of ELM Section 437 which establishes pro-
cedures for requesting a waiver of a claim made by
the USPS against a current or former employee for
the recovery of pay which was erroneously paid. The ELM
provides in subsection 437.6 that the Postal Service will grant
a waiver request if all of the of the following conditions are met:
a. The overpayment occurred through administration
error of the USPS. Excluded from consideration for waiver
of collection are overpayments resulting from errors in
timekeeping, keypunching, machine processing of time
cards or time credit, coding, and any typographical errors
that are adjusted routinely in the process of current oper-
ations.
b. Everyone having an interest in obtaining a waiver
acted reasonably under the circumstances, without any in-
dication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good
faith.
c. Collection of the claim would be against equity and
good conscience and would not be in the best interest of the
USPS.
The Postal Service had taken the position that, since with-
held insurance premiums are not pay, the ELM 437 waiver
provisions do not apply to employer claims resulting from a
failure to make proper deduction for insurance premiums. The
grievance was resolved as follows:
The issue in this case is whether Section 437 of the Employee
and Labor Relations Manual allows employees to request
a waiver where the employer erroneously failed to withhold
employee insurance premiums. The parties agree that
nothing contained in Section 437 of the ELM precludes an
employee from requesting a waiver where the employer er-
roneously failed to withhold employee insurance premiums
The October 9, 2001 Step 4 Settlement M-01447 resolved a
dispute concerning the authority of arbitrators. The case
arose when a regional arbitrator denied a request by the
Postal Service advocate to hear only arbitrability arguments
during the first day of hearings and postpone a hearing on the
merits of the case until all the procedural issues were resolved.
After the arbitrator refused to “bifurcate” the hearing as re-
quested, the Postal Service appealed the case to Step 4. The
grievance was resolved as follows:
The issue in this case is whether an arbitrator may approve
or deny a request by one of the parties to bifurcate an ar-
bitration proceeding, hear only procedural issues on the first
day of hearing and postpone a hearing on the merits until
the procedural issues are decided.
During our discussion we mutually agreed that an arbi-
trator has discretion to approve or deny such a request to
bifurcate the hearing of a case.
The September 6, 2001 National Level Prearbitration Settle-
ment M-01445 resolved a dispute concerning the remedy in
cases where there are multiple violations during the same ser-
vice week of the 12 and 60 work hour limits in Article 8, Sec-
tion 5.G. In the settlement the parties agreed that the remedy
of 50% of the base hourly straight time rate provided in the
Memorandum M-00859 applies for each hour worked in ex-
cess of twelve on a service day (excluding December) by a
full-time employee. The remedy of 50% of the base hourly
straight time rate also applies for each hour worked by a full-
time employee in excess of the sixty during the same service
week (excluding December) in which the full-time employee
has exceeded twelve hours in a service day. For example, if
during the same service week a full-time employee worked
14 hours on Monday and 62 hours on Friday, four hours
would have been worked in violation of the Article 8.5.G re-
strictions. The appropriate remedy in this example would be
four hours of pay at 50% of the base hourly straight time
rate——two for Monday and two for Friday. In this example,
management should have instructed the carrier to “clock off”
and go home on Friday when sixtieth hour was reached.
The employee would then be paid whatever guarantee applied
for the remainder of the service day.
In those circumstances where the same work hours of a
full-time employee simultaneously violate both the twelve
hour and sixty hour limits, only a single remedy of 50% of the
base hourly straight time rate is applied. For example if a full-
time employee worked 14 hours on Friday, resulting in a 62
hour workweek, only two hours would have been worked in
violation of the Article 8.5.G restrictions. The appropriate
remedy in this example would be two hours of pay at 50% of
the base hourly straight time rate.
A signed copy of these and other recent settlements can be
found in the Contract Administration Unit section of the
NALC website at www.nalc.org.
Recent settlements
NOVEMBER 2001
|
POSTAL RECORD 25
Contract Administration Unit
|
Contract Talk
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan
24 POSTAL RECORD
|
DECEMBER 2001
Contract Talk
|
Contract Administration Unit
I
n the October 25, 2001 award C-22652, National Arbitrator
Dennis Nolan sustained NALC’s position concerning the
back pay provisions of Article 16, Section 6.C. The griev-
ance concerned the back pay entitlement of an employee
who was removed after having been in an indefinite sus-
pension status for almost two years and was subsequently re-
instated by the decision of a Dispute Resolution Team. The
contract provisions in dispute provide the following:
Article 16 Section 6. Indefinite Suspensions—Crime Situation
A. The Employer may indefinitely suspend an employee in
those cases where the Employer has reasonable cause to be-
lieve an employee is guilty of a crime for which a sentence
of imprisonment can be imposed. In such cases, the Em-
ployer is not required to give the employee the full thirty (30)
days advance notice of indefinite suspension, but shall
give such lesser number of days of advance written notice
as under the circumstances is reasonable and can be jus-
tified. The employee is immediately removed from a pay sta-
tus at the end of the notice period.
B. The just cause of an indefinite suspension is grievable. The
arbitrator shall have the authority to reinstate and make the
employee whole for the entire period of the indefinite suspension.
C. If after further investigation or after resolution of the crim-
inal charges against the employee, the Employer deter-
mines to return the employee to a pay status, the employee
shall be entitled to back pay for the period that the indefi-
nite suspension exceeded seventy (70) days, if the employee
was otherwise available for duty, and without prejudice to
any grievance filed under B above.
Arbitrator Nolan rejected the Postal Service’s position that the
back pay provisions of Article 16.6.C apply only where the
Postal Service unilaterally “determines to return the em-
ployee to a pay status” and not when the employee is re-
turned to work as a result of a grievance settlement or, as in
the case before him, the decision of a Dispute Resolution
Team. He explained his decision as follows:
‘The Employer’ can act in many different ways. Officials
at many different levels may have the authority to make re-
instatement decisions. Any official making such a decision
will necessarily be influenced by a variety of factors including
the nature of the criminal charges, the evidence support-
ing them, the manner of their disposition, arguments and
suggestions from the employee and the Union, the likelihood
of a grievance if the Employer denies reinstatement, and
the prospects for success if such a grievance goes to arbi-
tration. No decision, in other words, is totally unilateral.
Union pressure, actual or potential, is a normal part of the
process. Moreover, any official’s decision is subject to review
in the Postal Service hierarchy and to reconsideration at
any appropriate level. The Employer’s determination can
be totally willing or extremely reluctant, but the presence
of external concerns and pressures will make the decision
no less one by ‘the Employer.’
Whether management makes a reinstatement decision be-
fore or after a grievance is filed thus changes nothing. A de-
cision to reinstate an employee made before a grievance is
filed is a decision by “the Employer,” but so is a reinstatement
decision made after. So, most importantly, is a reinstatement
decision explicitly made to resolve a grievance. A grievance
settlement (at least one that does not purport to limit back
pay under Paragraph C.) is no less a decision by “the Em-
ployer” than any other properly authorized decision.
Membership on the [DRT] teams is not random. To the
contrary, each member serves as a “representative” of a
party. To put it more clearly, the management-appointed
member “represents” the Postal Service while the Union-
appointed member “represents” the Union. Decisions of the
DRT are thus no different from decisions of any other two
representatives who resolve a dispute. That the parties
have allowed their DRT “representatives” to act relatively
independently changes nothing. The Postal Service joined
in stipulating at the hearing that “a DRT decision is the
same as the settlement of a grievance, minus some steps.”
If a formal grievance settlement is a determination by the
Employer, so is a DRT decision.
***
Award: The grievance is sustained. Reinstatement of an em-
ployee pursuant to a Dispute Resolution Team decision re-
solving a grievance over that employee’s removal entitles
that employee to back pay under Article 16, Section 6, Para-
graph C., providing the employee was otherwise available
for duty. The Grievant is therefore entitled to the appropriate
back pay for the period of his emergency suspension ex-
ceeding 70 days, less any earnings he had or reasonably
should have had during that period.
Arbitrator Nolan’s entire award in C-22652 is available
from the NALC Web site at www.nalc.org.
Indefinite suspension
arbitration
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION UNIT
Ronald G. Brown, Vice President
Jane E. Broendel, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
Gary H. Mullins, Director of City Delivery
Alan C. Ferranto, Director of Safety and Health
Thomas H.Young Jr., Director, Health Benefit Plan