IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 7-334 / 06-1750

Filed June 27, 2007

PHYLLIS REELFS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,

Judge.

Phyllis Reelfs appeals from a district court ruling that upheld the decision

of the Employment Appeal Board denying her claim for unemployment

compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.

J. Richard Johnson of White & Johnson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for

appellant.

Richard Autry, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

HUITINK, P.J.

Phyllis Reelfs appeals from the district court ruling that upheld the decision

of the Employment Appeal Board (Board) denying her claim for unemployment

compensation benefits. We affirm the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Reelfs began working at the University of Iowa in 1985. In September

2004, while working as a secretary, she started to use sick leave and vacation

time to cover work missed for various mental health issues. Her last full day of

work was September 24, 2004. Reelfs filed a request for leave under the Family

and Medical Leave Act. Over the next four months, Reelfs supplied her

employer with numerous notes excusing her from work. Each note excused her

from work for a specific period of time. As a note neared expiration, she would

arrange to have a new note sent to her employer. On January 19, 2005, the

employer requested documentation in order to finalize the approval of the

designation of FMLA leave. Reelfs did not respond to this request.

The last medical note received by her employer excused her absence

through February 9, 2005. Reelfs did not appear for work on February 10 or

contact her employer. On Friday, February 11, her employer drafted a letter

stating the following:

This notice is to advise you of our withdrawal of FMLA

designation of your current leave due to your failure to provide the

requested documentation as stated in my memo to you on January

. Your FMLA protected leave therefore ended December 31,

2004.

In order for your continued absence to remain authorized,

we require a medical certificate or other appropriate verification,

pursuant to Article IX, §10(B)(1) of the collective bargaining

agreement between the State of Iowa and AFSCME Council 61.

Please provide verification by the close of business on Friday,

February 18, 2005. Failure to provide verification or a release to

return to work by that date may result in our regarding your

continued absence as job abandonment, and would constitute

grounds for terminating your employment.

Please call me . . . if you have any questions.

This letter was sent to Reelfs via certified mail on Monday, February 14. When

Reelfs did not respond by the close of business on Friday, February 18, the

University terminated her employment on Monday, February 21, for job

abandonment.

Reelfs filed the present claim for unemployment compensation benefits.

An Iowa Workforce Development representative issued a decision denying

benefits. The decision stated: “Our records indicate you voluntarily quit work on

2/09/05, by failing to report to work for three days in a row and not notifying your

employer of the reason. Your quitting was not caused by your employer.” Reelfs

appealed, and hearings were held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on

May 11 and May 23, 2005.

At the hearings Reelfs presented a letter from her doctor stating that he

had faxed her employer notes excusing her from work on two occasions:

January 17 (excusing her from work for thirty days) and February 17 (excusing

her from work for two weeks). Her employer denied receiving either fax.

A representative for the employer testified that the United States Postal

Service website confirmed the above-quoted letter was delivered to Reelf’s

address at 8:56 a.m. on February 15. Reelfs testified that she was unable to

check her mail during this time frame because her depression would not allow

her to function or perform daily activities. Despite her inability to function, Reelfs

admitted she left her home on either February 17 or 18 for a medical

appointment and left her home to visit her union representative on February 19.

Reelfs testified that she learned of the termination on February 23, when a co-

worker called to ask why she had left. Reelfs then immediately checked her mail

and discovered the letter.

The ALJ issued a decision affirming the representative’s decision. The

ALJ concluded Reelfs voluntarily left her job because she stopped

communicating with her employer and failed to return to work. In doing so, the

ALJ made the following pertinent findings of fact: (1) the employer did not

receive a response to its January 19 request for FMLA documentation; (2) Reelfs

received the certified letter on February 15 and did not respond because she did

not read the letter until February 23; (3) Reelfs did not follow up on whether any

excuses or documentation were received by her employer.

Reelfs appealed her decision to the Board. The Board adopted the ALJ’s

decision as its own and affirmed. However, one member of the Board dissented

because Reelfs’s “mental health problems complicated her communication with

the employer.” Reelfs filed a petition in district court for judicial review. The

district court affirmed the Board’s decision, noting there was substantial evidence

to support the Board’s decision.

II. Analysis

The sole argument raised on appeal is “Whether substantial evidence

supports the Agency’s decision that Phyllis Reelfs’s actions constituted

misconduct.” Specifically, Reelfs argues there was no “reasonable basis” to

disregard her evidence that the medical excuses were faxed to the employer

within the appropriate time frame. She contends the ALJ decision is not

supported by substantial evidence because a letter from her doctor indicates he

faxed appropriate documentation excusing her from work. She also argues there

was not substantial evidence to support the finding that she received the above-

quoted letter on February 15 because the employer did not produce a return-

receipt substantiating this assertion.

Our review of an agency finding is at law and not de novo. Terwilliger v.

Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995). Because our review is

not de novo, we must not reassess the weight to be accorded various items of

evidence. Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 710 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa

2005). “Weight of evidence remains within the agency’s exclusive domain.”

Burns v. Board of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). “We will reverse

an agency’s findings only if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine

that substantial evidence does not support them.” Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at

271.

Faxed Documentation. At the hearing, Reelfs presented a letter from her

doctor indicating he had faxed notes to her employer on January 17 and

February 17. However, she did not present any computerized confirmation letter

or other documentation to substantiate her claim that the employer received the

faxes. The employer presented evidence that it did not receive either fax. The

employer also pointed out that Reelfs did not make any effort to confirm the faxes

were received. After reviewing this conflicting testimony, the Board concluded

the employer did not receive either fax.

The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the same

evidence does not mean the agency’s findings were not supported by substantial

evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Iowa 2001). Substantial

evidence is what a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a given

conclusion. Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 755

(Iowa 2002). The question is not whether there was substantial evidence to

warrant a decision that the agency did not make, but rather whether there was

substantial evidence to warrant the decision it did make. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d

at 271. Judged by this standard, we conclude there was adequate evidence from

which a reasonable mind could find that the employer did not receive either fax.

This constitutes substantial evidence for the Board’s conclusion that the

employer did not receive timely authorization for Reelf’s absence.

Certified Letter. A representative for the employer testified that the letter

was sent by certified mail and received by Reelfs on February 15. Reelfs

contends this does not constitute substantial evidence because there is no

written document corroborating the date of delivery. We disagree. The

employer’s witness provided a detailed description of how the receipt was

verified. Reelfs testified that the letter was present when she checked her mail

on February 23. We find this constitutes substantial evidence from which a fact

finder could conclude the letter was mailed and received by Reelfs on February

15. Cf. Montgomery Ward, Inc. v. Davis, 398 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Iowa 1987)

(“Proof that a document was properly mailed raises a presumption that it was

received.”).

Job Abandonment. Under Iowa Code section 96.5(1), an individual is

disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits if he or she

voluntary quits without good cause attributable to the employer.

In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment

because the employee no longer desires to remain in the

relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the

employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving

that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code

section 96.5 . . . . The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall

be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:

. . . . The claimant was absent for three days without giving notice

to employer in violation of company rule.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(96) (2005). Chapter 681 of the Iowa

Administrative Code sets forth personnel administration rules for employees of

the Iowa Board of Regents. Iowa Admin. Code r. 681-3.2(8A). One such rule

specifies: “Employees who are absent from duty for three consecutive work days

without proper notification and authorization thereof shall be deemed to have

resigned their positions.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 681-3.104(5). Evidence at the

hearing indicated Reelfs was absent for more than three consecutive work days

without proper notification and authorization. This is presumed to be a quit

without good cause. We find no error in the Board’s decision to deny Reelfs

unemployment benefits. The district court’s ruling is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.