* This is an unreported opinion. The opinion may not be cited as

* This is an unreported opinion. The opinion may not be cited as precedent within the

rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms

to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

**During the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a

constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of

Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December

14, 2022.

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAEF15-16453

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND**

No. 989

September Term, 2022

______________________________________

DARYL GREEN

DIANE S. ROSENBERG, ET AL.

______________________________________

Leahy,

Albright,

Raker, Irma S.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Leahy, J.

______________________________________

Filed: August 14, 2023

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

This case returns to us for the third time on appeal as Daryl Green, (“Appellant”),

challenges the order issued by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on April 21,

2022, denying the latest in a series of emergency motions filed by Appellant to stay the

foreclosure sale and dismiss the underlying foreclosure action. Appellant also challenges

the court’s order, issued on July 6, 2022, denying his motion to reconsider its ruling.

In 2007, Appellant executed a promissory note on a loan of $417,000.00, along

with a deed of trust secured against his home in Accokeek, Maryland. The Appellant

defaulted on his mortgage loan in August 2009. Appellees Diane Rosenberg, et al.

(“Trustees”)—substitute trustees appointed under the deed of trust—initiated foreclosure

proceedings in the circuit court in June 2015. After the circuit court denied the latest

motion to stay and dismiss the foreclosure action, the foreclosure sale was finalized and

ratified on August 16, 2022. Appellant presents three questions for our review, which we

restate and condense as follows:

The questions presented by Appellant in his brief are:

I. (a) Did the lower court err by finding that the copy of the note at

issue was enforceable, even after the filing of a lien release with the

Appellant in possession of the actual note?

(b) Did the lower court abuse its discretion by refusing to have an

evidentiary hearing to determine who had the right to enforce the

note, as it was not Wells Fargo, which was acting as the servicer?

II. Should this court remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary

hearing as suggested by defense counsel and agreed to by plaintiff’s

counsel in the April 21, 2022, lower court hearing?

III. Do the above circumstances eliminate any grounds for sanctions

under Md. Rule 1-341?

(continued)

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied

Appellant’s request for an additional hearing on

Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Stay and Dismiss

Foreclosure?

II. Did the circuit court act within its discretion when it

denied Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Stay and

Dismiss Foreclosure?

III.

Did the circuit court act within its discretion when it

granted Trustees’ motion for sanctions in response to

Appellant’s Exceptions to the foreclosure sale.

Discerning no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court, we shall

affirm the court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

2007 Promissory Note and Deed of Trust

On August 24, 2007, Appellant executed a promissory note and a deed of trust for

a loan of $417,000.00 (“2007 Note”) with C&F Mortgage Corporation (“C&F”). The

deed of trust (“Deed”) was secured by Appellant’s principal residence located in

Accokeek, Maryland (“Property”), and was recorded in the land records for Prince

George’s County. The Deed conveyed property in trust with the power of sale to the

original trustees on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”),

The Supreme Court of Maryland (then, the Maryland Court of Appeals) has

explained the growing role that MERS plays in the bundling and securitization of

mortgages. “Mortgage-securitization investors utilize the Mortgage Electronic

Registration System (MERS), a private land-title registration system created by mortgage

banking companies to expedite the securitization process[,]” in which “the mortgage

broker names MERS as a nominal mortgagee in the mortgage. Then, subsequent

(continued)

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

acting as nominee for the note holder, and provided that the 2007 Note could be sold

without prior notice to Appellant. The record indicates that the 2007 Note was

transferred multiple times, and three undated indorsements on the Note show that: 1)

C&F sold and indorsed the 2007 Note to Franklin American Mortgage Company

(“FAMC”); 2) FAMC sold and indorsed the note to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells

Fargo”); and 3) Wells Fargo executed a blank indorsement.

There is no documentation

in the record of when C&F’s assignment of the 2007 Note to FAMC took place;

however, the record includes documents that demonstrate C&F was no longer the holder

transfers of the mortgage are recorded electronically and entirely on MERS while the

original mortgage, recorded in the public land title records, remains unchanged.”

Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 237-38 (2011) (internal citations to Jackson v. Mortg.

Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490-49 (Minn.2009) removed).

A negotiation of an instrument payable to an identified person, “requires the

holder to transfer possession and indorse the instrument,” with the result that the

“recipient of a negotiated instrument is a holder.” Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232,

246–47 (2011) (citing Maryland Code (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law Article

(“CL”), section 3–201(a)–(b) & cmt. 1). The negotiation by indorsement is made one of

two ways. A “‘special indorsement’ identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument

payable[,]” with the result that in a future transfer, the instrument “may be negotiated

only by the indorsement of that person.” CL § 3-205(a). If, however, a holder indorses

the instrument without identifying the person to whom it is to be payable, it is a “blank

indorsement.” CL § 3-205(b). In that case, the “instrument becomes payable to bearer

and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.” Id.

The dates of the indorsements do not appear on the 2007 Note. Appellees adopt

Mr. McCann’s assertion, in an email included in the record, that C&F sold the 2007 Note

to FAMC in September 2007, and “has never owned the loan since[.]”

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

of the 2007 Note as of 2009. One of the key documents in the underlying litigation is the

2009 Modification Agreement.

2009 Modification Agreement

Appellant defaulted on the loan on or about August 1, 2009. On October 28,

2009, he executed a loan modification agreement with Wells Fargo pursuant to which he

agreed that he owed $424,323.19 on the loan and that he would resume payments on

January 1, 2010. The Agreement identified Wells Fargo as the “Lender” as well as the

servicer of the loan. It stated that it was not “a satisfaction or release of [Appellant’s]

obligations under the [2007] Note or Security Instrument” and that the parties remained

bound by its terms and provisions, as amended.

Foreclosure Proceedings and Prior Appeals

On June 2, 2010, Appellant again defaulted on his loan payments, and over the

next five years, the 2007 Note was transferred several more times. As explained in one

of our prior opinions in this case:

[A]t the time of the order to docket, Wilmington Savings Fund Society,

FSB, not it its individual capacity but solely as Trustee for the PrimeStar-H

Fund I Trust, was the holder of the [2007 N]ote, and Statebridge Company,

LLC, was the loan servicer. Subsequent to the filing of the order to docket,

the note was transferred to ‘PROF-2014-S2 Legal Title Trust, by U.S. Bank

National Association, as Legal Title Trustee,’ with Fay Servicing, LLC, as

the loan servicer.

[

]

The most current assignment as of the date of this appeal reflects that the 2007

Note and Deed of Trust were conveyed to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as

Owner Trustee of The Residential Credit Opportunities Trust VII-A (“Wilmington VII-

A”).

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

Green v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, et. al., No. 724. September Term 2017 (“Green

I”), slip op. at 2-3 (filed October 2, 2018).

On June 11, 2015, the Trustees, in their capacity as substitute trustees appointed

by Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee for PrimeStar, the

contemporaneous holder of the Note, initiated foreclosure proceedings against Appellant.

The Order to Docket Foreclosure attached copies of the 2007 Deed of Trust as well as the

2007 Note containing the three indorsements by C&F, FAMC, and Wells Fargo.

Appellant responded with a barrage of filings in the circuit court. On March 21,

2016, he filed an Emergency Motion to Stay and Dismiss Foreclosure Sale, alleging

“major gaps and endorsement fraud in the alleged transfers of the note” and claimed that

the 2007 Note provided by the Trustees was forged; a motion he later withdrew pending

the outcome of the foreclosure mediation that he requested. However, before mediation,

Appellant filed a “counter complaint” alleging that C&F had provided him with

“improper and unlawful predatory loans” and that all subsequent conveyances of the

2007 Note were fraudulent. Appellant further alleged that in 2012, he entered into a

settlement agreement with C&F whereby he agreed to forego litigation against C&F in

consideration for C&F’s release of his obligations under the 2007 Note.

Appellant did

Additional documentation showing that C&F was not the holder of the 2007

Note in 2012 include: 1) a Notice of Intent to Foreclose dated August 1, 2010 identifying

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as the “secured Party”; an assignment of the Deed of Trust dated

November 16, 2010, from MERS to Wells Fargo, which was duly recorded in the county

land records; and, 3) an Appointment of Substitute Trustees filed in the land records on

(continued)

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

not provide any documentary support for this alleged settlement agreement, nor did he

explain how he convinced representatives of C&F that he had a viable claim against

them. Appellant sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief against the Trustees

and servicers of the loan.

On May 4, 2016—the same day as the mediation conference—Appellant filed a

second motion to dismiss, alleging that he was not in default under the 2007 Note and

Deed of Trust because he “owns [h]is home outright” and the 2007 Note provided by the

Trustees “was fictitious and was a forgery.” The mediation conference did not result in

an agreement. While those motions were pending, the circuit court entered an order on

August 22, 2016, permitting the Trustees to schedule a foreclosure sale “subject to the

right of [Appellant] to file a motion pursuant to Rule 14-211 to stay the sale and dismiss

the action.”

On August 31, 2016, Appellant filed an affidavit with the circuit court in which he

asserted his ownership of the “cancelled” 2007 Note and provided, for the first time in the

proceedings, a purported reproduction of the 2007 Note which bore the stamp

April 29, 2011, by Wells Fargo, as “the present holder or authorized agent of the holder”

of the 2007 Note. Under RP 7-105 it is the holder who has the power to make such an

appointment.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

“cancelled” (“the Green Note”); however, the three indorsements that appeared on the

third page of the 2007 Note were missing.

Appellant followed the filing of this affidavit with two more motions to dismiss or

stay the foreclosure sale, reasserting in each motion that he was “the owner and holder of

his canceled notes” and thus “owns his home outright without any encumbrances.” In an

order entered on April 13, 2017, the circuit court granted Appellant’s March 17, 2017

Motion to Stay Foreclosure and ordered that the sale be “stayed until May 12, 2017.”

Appellant responded with “a ‘Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order for

Emergency Stay Rule 2-534,’ requesting the court to modify its order granting the

temporary stay and to enter a permanent stay and to dismiss the case.” Green I, slip op.

at 2. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, observing that “[Appellant]

has failed to provide a valid legal basis or present a meritorious argument” and “raises no

new facts or issues sufficient to persuade this [c]ourt to reconsider its previous order.”

The court held a hearing on May 12, 2017, to address Appellant’s outstanding

motions, but Appellant did not attend. Green 1, slip op. at 2. In a bench ruling, the court

denied Appellant’s motion to stay, dismissed his counter-complaint, and resolved several

other outstanding motions regarding discovery. Id. at 2-3. Appellant noted a timely

appeal from those orders.

The record reflects that the Green Note is identical to the 2007 Note provided by

the Trustees, except for two key discrepancies: (1) the three indorsements appearing on

the third page of the 2007 Note provided by the Trustees are missing and (2) the bottom

of the third page, where the indorsements should appear, is stamped “cancelled.”

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

In Green I, we explained that, because the foreclosure sale had not yet taken place,

there was no final judgment from which to appeal, and the only appealable interlocutory

order before us was the denial of Appellant’s motion to stay. Id. at 3-4. We held that the

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily staying the sale, explaining that

the claim was moot, and that the denial of Appellant’s motion was a permissible

application of Rule 14-211(c). Id. at 4-5. We went on to note:

[Appellant] also contends that the circuit court erred in denying his

motion to stay on the merits, claiming that he owns the home “outright

without any liens or encumbrances” and that the substitute trustees lack

standing to foreclose. But [Appellant] was given an opportunity to present

these claims, and all other claims raised in his motion to stay, at the May

12, 2017 hearing; yet, he failed to appear. As the moving party on the

motion to stay, [Appellant] had the burden of proof as to his defenses, and

he clearly could not carry that burden if he was not present.

Id. at 5-6 (citation omitted).

Thereafter, Appellant filed two motions in the circuit court: one requesting that the

court issue a summons for his counter-complaint and another seeking to strike the May

12 order for deficient notice of the scheduled hearing pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-

324(a). Green v. Rosenberg, No. 3466, Sept. Term 2018 (“Green II”), slip op. at 2 (filed

Sep. 10, 2020). The circuit court denied the motions and we ultimately affirmed in Green

II in an unreported per curiam opinion. Id.

Bankruptcy Proceedings

Meanwhile, on March 18, 2019—shortly after the circuit court issued the orders

underlying the Green II appeal—Appellant filed for bankruptcy in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, invoking an automatic stay on foreclosure

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

proceedings. The court dismissed Appellant’s claim, thus lifting the stay, on September

20, 2021. Appellant filed a second bankruptcy petition on November 22, 2021, which the

court likewise dismissed on January 12, 2022.

Additional Filings in Federal Court

Appellant removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland on May 15, 2017. The case was remanded back to state court on December 28,

2017.

Just prior to his removal filing, on March 17, 2017, Appellant filed suit in the

federal District Court for the District of Maryland against the Trustees and a number of

individuals (the “Rosenberg Defendants’), as well as several other banks and companies

that serviced the 2007 Note, including Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as trustees

for Primestar; Statebridge Company, LLC; and Fay Servicing. Green v. Rosenberg &

Assocs., LLC, No. CV PJM 17-732, 2018 WL 1183655, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2018).

Appellant alleged seven causes of action, including violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act and violations of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization

(“RICO”) statute. Id. at 3. All of the federal claims were dismissed with prejudice by

Judge Peter Messitte in a written opinion dated March 7, 2018, for failure to state a claim

as Appellant’s complaint fell “short of even the minimal pleading requirements[.]” Id. at

10. Judge Messitte declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims, asserting causes of action under the Maryland Consumer Debt

Collection Act and Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (as well as a tort claim

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

for intentional infliction of emotional distress), and dismissed those claims without

prejudice. In so doing, however, the Judge Messitte stated in a footnote that:

However, if within ten days, Green files with the Court the original

of the purported cancelled note, or a copy of the note, certified by a duly

authorized notary public, along with an affidavit by Green affirming, under

the penalties of perjury, when the note was paid off as well as how, when,

and by whom it was cancelled, the Court may reconsider its ruling herein.

Id. at *8 n. 5. Appellant failed to make the suggested filing.

Additionally, Appellant litigated the validity of the foreclosure claim in

bankruptcy proceedings in federal court. As part of those proceedings, the then-current

holder of the 2007 Note, 1900 Capital Trust II, by U.S. Bank Trust National, filed a claim

for the unpaid loan evidenced by the 2007 Note and secured by the 2007 Deed of Trust.

Appellant’s objection to the claim was initially overruled by the bankruptcy court, but

that order was vacated in part by the United States District Court of the District of

Maryland and remanded for the bankruptcy court to consider Appellant’s allegations

“regarding the purported fraudulent nature of the Note.” A hearing for the bankruptcy

court to address those allegations was never scheduled because of delays attributable to

“Green’s numerous other motions and proceedings” and “the case was dismissed prior to

the hearing because Green had failed to make child support payments.” Green v. Prince

George’s County Office of Child Support, 641 B.R. 820, 827-28 (D. Md. 2022) aff’d No.

22-1705, 2023 WL 3051812 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023).

Judge Messitte offered overarching comments about Appellant’s adversary

proceedings in the federal courts:

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

Daryl Anthony Green, a resident of Accokeek, Maryland, acting pro

se, has a history of filing frivolous, repetitive, and vexatious pleadings in

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland and the

United States District Court for this District. His litigation activity since

2019, which has been extraordinarily reckless, even at times malicious, has

consisted of three bankruptcy petitions, five bankruptcy adversary

proceedings, twenty bankruptcy appeals to the District Court, and eight

appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. His

numerous pleadings, all substantially identical, include rambling allegations

of fraud and civil rights violations, even crimes on the part of his

adversaries. These tactics have placed a substantial burden on his

adversaries, the Clerk’s Offices of the Bankruptcy and District Courts, and

the Judges of both Courts, and have been detrimental to bona fide users of

the bankruptcy system.

Green v. Prince George’s Cnty. Off. of Child Support, 641 B.R. 820, 825 (D. Md. 2022),

aff’d No. 22-1705, 2023 WL 3051812 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023). The court imposed a pre-

filing injunction and monetary sanctions on Appellant and warned him that “if he persists

in his vexatious conduct in the future, he may face contempt proceedings, civil and/or

criminal in nature.” Id. at 841-44.

Underlying Emergency Motion to Stay and Dismiss Foreclosure Action

On March 28, 2022, Appellant filed yet another emergency motion in the circuit

court to stay the foreclosure sale and dismiss the foreclosure action under Maryland Rule

14-211. In the motion, Appellant reasserted that C&F released his obligations under the

2007 Note and Deed of Trust in 2012 as compensation pursuant to a settlement

agreement. For the first time, Appellant produced two documents to substantiate his

claim.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

March 6 Letter and Certificate of Satisfaction

Appellant alleged in his March 2022 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay

and Dismiss that he learned of an investigation into C&F by the United States

Department of Justice (“DOJ”)

subsequent to a discussion he had with Kevin McCann,

Chief Financial Officer for C&F, on February 2, 2012. A letter dated the same day from

Mr. McCann to Appellant documents McCann’s request for a copy of Appellant’s 2006

tax returns and refers to conversation he had with Appellant earlier in the day. Appellant

alleged that on March 6, 2012, C&F “offered to cancel his Note and release him from the

Deed of Trust,” “[r]ather than have [Appellant] challenge his rights under the DOJ case,”

even though the case had already concluded in a consent order in 2011. Appellant

alleged that C&F sent him a letter, signed by Kevin McCann and dated March 6, 2012

(“March 6 Letter”), that enclosed the 2007 Note marked ‘CANCELLED’. The letter

reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Re: Daryl A. Green

Property – 15416 Cedar Drive, Accokeek, MD 20607

Mortgage note(s): 1) $159,000; 2) $417,000

Mr. Green,

Let me take the time to both thank you for your time and patience

regarding this matter and to congratulate you on the satisfaction of your

home loans with C&F Mortgage. I am very sorry for any inconvenience in

settling this matter and delivering those documents to you. Having noted

your satisfaction of the above captioned mortgage notes and pursuant to our

In August of 2010, the DOJ began an investigation of C&F’s allegedly

discriminatory lending practices that concluded in a consent order in October of 2011.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

agreement, please find enclosed, your original mortgage notes marked

cancelled as promised.

As Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, I am the duly

appointed agent for C&F Mortgage Corporation with authority to process

this release. Please consider this written communication as C&F

Mortgage Corporation[’]s acknowledgement of your fully satisfied and

discharged loan. C&F MORTGAGE CORPORATION was, at the time of

the satisfaction, the holder of the notes that were secured by a Deed of Trust

secured by you on August 24, 2007. Your Deed of Trust was recorded

among the land records of PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY MARYLAND

IN BOOK 28692 PAGE 672. The lien and Deed of Trust is now

acknowledged as FULLY RELEASED. The original mortgage notes

marked cancelled and attached are your evidence of full satisfaction of your

loans and are also included for your further individual processing and

handling.

(Emphasis added).

The Trustees vigorously disputed the existence of the alleged offer and the

authenticity of the March 6 Letter and the copy of the Green Note Appellant claimed that

it contained. In the motion, Appellant claimed that C&F stamped the original mortgage

note “CANCELLED” and enclosed it in the letter, and that this was the source of the

Green Note that he had submitted six years earlier with his August 31, 2016, affidavit.

Appellant asserted that he was “an African-American given a predatory loan by C&F in

2007[,]” and claimed that C&F released his obligations in consideration for his

forbearance to pursue other litigation against C&F. In further support of this contention,

Appellant produced a copy of a recorded certificate of satisfaction confirming the release

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

on February 18, 2022.

The Certificate of Satisfaction that Appellant revealed was duly

recorded in Prince George’s County land records on February 18, 2022. The certificate

states that C&F Mortgage is “the present holder of the Mortgage/Deed of Trust” and

certifies that it “is hereby RELEASED, SATISFIED, AND PAID IN FULL and the real

estate described herein is fully released from said Mortgage/Deed of Trust.”

The circuit court granted a temporary stay of the foreclosure sale, which was set to

take place on April 5, 2022, and scheduled a hearing on Appellant’s motion for April 21,

2022. The Trustees filed their opposition on April 14, 2022, arguing that Appellant had

not established any release under the Deed of Trust for the simple reason that “C&F no

longer owned the [2007] Note in 2012” and therefore “did not have the authority to

cancel the [2007] Note.” The Trustees reasserted the authenticity of the 2007 Note

originally appended to the order to docket containing the three indorsements.

Referencing several other actions filed by Appellant in federal court, as well as the prior

appeals in the present litigation, the Trustees also asserted that Appellant’s forgery

defense was barred by res judicata because “[t]he state and federal courts have rejected

all of [Appellant’s] challenges to the Deed of Trust and [2007] Note[.]” Finally, the

As explained by Appellant’s counsel at the hearing, the 2022 Certificate of

Satisfaction was prepared and recorded by Kevin McCann in response to an inquiry from

Appellant’s counsel about the status of the loan. Mr. McCann later stated in an email

message that this was done in error as he later realized that “we sold this loan in

September 2007 to Franklin American Mortgage Company” and no copy of the March 6,

2012 letter was found in his records.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

Trustees urged the court to dismiss the motion as untimely—by nearly 6 years— under

Rule 14-211.

April 2022 Motions Hearing

The circuit court held a remote hearing on April 21, 2022. The court had before it

the conflicting versions of the 2007 Note presented by Appellant and the Trustees as well

as the 2009 Modification Agreement, 2012 letters allegedly from C&F, and the January

2022 Certificate of Satisfaction, which were exhibits attached to the June 2015 Order to

Docket, the March 2022 Motion to Stay and Dismiss, and the April 2022 Opposition to

the Motion to Stay and Dismiss. Counsel also shared the exhibits on screen to be

identified and marked for the record.

Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that “[t]he Land Records do show about l3

assignments” but asserted that “C&F Mortgage returned the original Notes to [her] client,

prior to these assignments,” and stated that the 2007 Note was “paid off” in “March of

2012.” She stated that the January 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction proved “that this

Maryland Rule 14-211(a)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n an action to

foreclose a lien on owner-occupied residential property, a motion by a borrower to stay

the sale and dismiss the action shall be filed no later than 15 days after the last to

occur of: (i) the date the final loss mitigation affidavit is filed; (ii) the date a motion to

strike postfile mediation is granted; or (iii) if postfile mediation was requested and the

request was not stricken, the first to occur of: (a) the date the postfile mediation was

held[.]” Md. Rule 14-211(a)(2) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(1) of the Rule, in turn,

provides that the “court shall deny the motion, with or without a hearing, if the court

concludes from the record before it that the motion: (A) was not timely filed and

does not show good cause for excusing non-compliance with subsection (a)(2) of this

Rule.” Md. Rule 14-211(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, postfile mediation between

the parties was held on May 4, 2016.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

mortgage can no longer be attempted to be enforced by the Substitute Trustees[.]”

Therefore, she said, the several transferees succeeding C&F “have to fight amongst

themselves” because “here, the homeowner is clearly out of the picture.”

The court then challenged the authenticity of the Green Note, observing that

Appellant had failed to produce it when the federal district court judge offered to reopen

its dismissal of Appellant’s federal action, in 2021, if he provided “the original of the

reported cancelled Note, a copy of the Note certified by a duly authorized notary public,

along with an Affidavit, [] agreeing and affirming under the penalties of perjury when the

Note was paid off, as well as how, when and by whom it was cancelled.” Appellant’s

counsel affirmed that “Mr. Green has them in his possession. I presented a copy of it -- so

we met in person and I copied it. He wanted to keep it in his possession.” She claimed

that the 2007 Note attached by Trustees to their Order to Docket has “similar font, similar

terms, but it appears to be a digitized image where the signature was definitely different

and, you know, there’s some markings behind the G in his signature,” and concluded that

Appellant “does not recognize that to be his signature” on the document.

The Trustees’ counsel asserted that, “under Maryland law, assignments are not

necessarily for enforcement of the instrument,” but serve to “put the world on notice.”

She observed that “in this case, we do have a pretty complete chain of assignments from

the beginning.” She displayed the image of the 2007 Note from the Order to Docket and

identified the indorsements in chronological order, “the first one was from C&F Bank

paid to the order of Franklin. And then Franklin, you see, has an endorsement to Wells

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

Fargo Bank. And then Wells Fargo Bank has a blank endorsement where they are just

endorsing in blank.” She explained that as “a blank endorsed Note, […] whoever holds

the original is entitled to enforce the Deed of Trust.” She concluded, “C&F is certainly

not now the holder of this Note, and we would also argue that they were not in 2012.”

Trustees’ counsel next displayed the 2009 Modification Agreement in which

Appellant acknowledged his debt of a “modified unpaid principal of $424,323.19.” She

continued, Appellant “agrees that he’s going to pay these sums to Wells Fargo for the

mortgage, who at that time was the investor.” She noted that “to our understanding, C&F

Mortgage never -- we purchased this loan. There’s certainly nothing to indicate it in the

endorsements or in the assignments to indicate that C&F ever owned this loan again after

this period of time.” Counsel acknowledged “[w]e don’t know when they sold it . . .

They do not date endorsements on a Note. But we know that as of 2009, certainly, Wells

Fargo was the owner of this loan.” She asserted that “since Mr. Green has still never

provided any evidence of actual payment of the loan, and the documentation from C&F

In one of the bankruptcy actions, Appellant acknowledged that in 2011, Wells

Fargo initiated a “foreclosure attempt” by placing an Order to Docket Foreclosure notice

ownership on his front door, but never filed the Order with the Circuit Court. Appellant’s

exhibits include a September 8, 2011 Notice of Intent to Foreclose executed by Kristine

D. Brown, Esquire for the Substitute Trustees Shapiro & Burson, LLP; and another

affidavit “certifying ownership of the debt instrument” dated July 8, 2011 by Camille

Garcia, Vice President of Loan Documentation of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that Federal

National Mortgage Association is the owner of the loan, and that Wells Fargo is the

holder for purposes of conducting the foreclosure action.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

was all provided after they no longer owned the loan. We would submit that this was

never satisfied and the current investor is entitled to enforce.”

The court offered each party the opportunity to explain how there came to be two

Notes of different appearance in the possession of the two parties. Neither attorney could

answer from knowledge, but both speculated accounts that favored their party, without

alleging outright fraud. At the end of the hearing, the counsel for the Trustees suggested

that “if Your Honor wanted to have a further hearing where everybody brought their

original copies to the Court, we would be happy to do that,” to which Appellant’s counsel

added, “I would definitely support that, Your Honor.” However, the court determined

that there wasn’t a “need for an additional hearing.” The judge outlined the

considerations most pertinent to her decision in her bench ruling:

And upon review of all of the documents and the cancellation that

was provided by the Defendant in this case, that in order to proceed on

foreclosure, that there is a lien on that property and that property, there was

a default in the lien.

And in this case, understanding this Certificate of Satisfaction from

the loan that was signed back in 2007, the Court also has this Loan

Modification Agreement from 2009 that it says Wells Fargo -- it says,

“Loan Modification Agreement (‘Agreement’), made on October 24th,

2009, by and between Daryl Green (the ‘Borrower’) and Wells Fargo Bank

(the ‘Lender’), together with the Borrower be considered ‘the parties.’”

And that was to pay the balance of 424 -- he had a loan for $424,323.19.

And the balance as of October 24th, 2009, the unpaid -- the amount payable

under the Note and security interest, the unpaid balance, is $408,810.97.

And this Agreement hereby modifies those terms and outlines what the

modification is, and that that Agreement was dated October 28th, 2009,

signed by Daryl Green and by an officer of Wells Fargo, the Vice President

of Loan Documentation.

— Unreported Opinion —

________________________________________________________________________

And there appears to Note and with all of the assignments, the Court

had an opportunity to look at all the assignments, that there is a lien on the

property that has not been paid.

Thereupon, the court denied Appellant’s Motion to Stay and Dismiss and entered

that decision on the docket on May 19, 2022. The foreclosure sale was held May 31,

2022.

Post-Hearing Motions and Appeal

Motion for Reconsideration

On May 31, 2022, Appellant timely moved for reconsideration of the circuit

court’s ruling denying his motion to stay and dismiss, identifying three “points for

reconsideration.” First, Appellant asserted that the circuit court’s reliance on the 2009

Modification Agreement with Wells Fargo was misplaced because “the satisfaction of the

original Note from 2007 made by C&F results in the satisfaction of all modifications

stemming from it[.]” Second, Appellant asserted that he did not need to show any proof

of payment because his purported agreement to forego litigation against C&F constituted

an accord and satisfaction discharging his debt. Third, Appellant alleged that he wished

to present new evidence, primarily consisting of the documents purportedly prepared by

Wells Fargo in 2011 as part of the order to docket that was never filed.

Trustees, in their June 5 response to the motion for reconsideration, did present

new evidence in the form of the email from Mr. McCann dated May 26, 2022 (“May 26

email”), stating that he “did not prepare nor sign the letter dated March 6, 2012 to

— Unreported Opinion —

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Appellant canceling his notes and declaring them paid in full[,]” and stating that he is

“willing to sign a rescission” of the release “assuming that is an option.”

In the May 26 email, Mr. McCann said that he was contacted by Lexicon Title in

January of 2022, on behalf of Appellant, who requested him to execute a lien release on

the 2007 Note. An attached a copy of the March 6, 2012 Letter that purported to cancel

the 2007 Note. Mr. McCann wrote that he “executed the lien release without any further

research and sent it back to Lexicon Title.” He asserted: “Based on the fact C&F sold

this loan to FAMC in September 2007 and I personally responded to audit findings from

FAMC in February 2012, I did not prepare nor sign the letter dated March 6, 2012 to

Appellant canceling his notes and declaring them paid in full. I do not know who created

the letter, but I believe my letter to Appellant on February 2, 2012 was used to prepare

the letter dated March 6, 2012.” Mr. McCann concluded, “I should not have executed the

lien release dated January 19, 2022 on the subject loan[,]” and offered to sign a rescission

of the release.

The court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration by written order entered

on July 6, 2022.

Exceptions to Foreclosure Sale

On May 31, 2022, the Trustees held the long-delayed foreclosure sale and sold the

Property to Wilmington Savings Society Fund, FSB, as Owner Trustee of The Residential

Credit Opportunities Trust VII-A. Appellant filed exceptions to the sale on July 3, 2022,

reiterating the same essential arguments presented in his motion to stay and motion for

— Unreported Opinion —

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reconsideration regarding the authority of the Trustees to exercise their power of sale

under the Deed of Trust. In their response to Appellant’s exceptions, the Trustees moved

for sanctions against Appellant pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, asserting that he had

“repeatedly litigated the same issues in an effort to forestall a valid foreclosure action”

through “continuous, repetitive filings[.]” In an order entered on August 5, 2022, the

court denied Appellant’s exceptions to the foreclosure sale and granted the Trustees’

motion for sanctions while exercising its discretion to not award costs or attorneys’ fees.

Appellant noted the appeal in this case on that same day.

The court later ratified the foreclosure sale by written order entered on August 16,

2022,

and referred the matter to an auditor in accordance with Rule 2-543(e). The

auditor’s report was filed on September 14, 2022, and thereafter ratified by the court by

an order entered on November 3, 2022.

DISCUSSION

At the threshold, we observe that Appellant’s claims—that C&F cancelled the

2007 Note in 2012, and that the 2007 Note that the Trustees submitted with their Order

To Docket in June of 2015 was invalid—are not new and have been litigated multiple

times in State and federal courts. Nonetheless, we decline to embark upon a lengthy

exposition on the application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to this

As explained in our discussion, Appellant’s appeal from the August 5 order

imposing sanctions is not properly before us because his notice of appeal was filed prior

to the ratification of the foreclosure sale on August 16, 2022.

— Unreported Opinion —

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case—doctrines that the parties did not brief on appeal and trial court did not address—in

order to dismiss this appeal on those grounds sua sponte.

Instead, we will affirm the

trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s emergency motion to stay the foreclosure sale

and dismiss the foreclosure on the merits.

We simply observe, however, that Appellant’s repetitious and frivolous

allegations that the 2007 Note is fraudulent have been rejected multiple times by the

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, this Court, and the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland.

At the appellate level, “‘[a]n appellant can, of course, abandon some of the

issues raised below and stand here on a narrower ground.’” Harmon v. State Roads

Comm’n, 242 Md. 24, 30 (1966) (quoting Weil v. Free State Oil Co. of Md., 200 Md. 62,

66 (1952)). “This Court has consistently held that a question not presented or argued in

an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for

review.” Health Servs. Cost Rev. Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp. of Maryland, Inc., 298 Md.

651, 664 (1984). See Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 569–70 (2019). In fact, we “may

dismiss an appeal “or make any other appropriate order with respect to the case” for a

party’s failure to comply with the rule. Md. Rule 8–504(c).” Klauenberg v. State, 355

Md. 528, 552 (1999).

Conversely, Maryland Rule 8–131(a) “‘grants the appellate courts of this State

discretion to review any unpreserved issue.’” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,

PA. v. Fund for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 431, 466–67 (2017) (quoting Jones, 379 Md. at

715, 843 A.2d at 784–85). However, while an appellate court has the discretion to raise

collateral estoppel sua sponte, there is no requirement for the appellate court to do so.

See Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 375 (1991) (holding that where the “Court of

Special Appeals in this case could have, in its discretion, considered the arguments” that

the plaintiff failed to address in her opening brief, the Court’s “refusal to do so, however,

was not an abuse of discretion.”). Collateral estoppel is not a jurisdictional issue that the

court must address where it is not promulgated by the parties, and unlike lack of

jurisdiction, does not survive a failure of a party to plead. See Fund for Animals, Inc.,

451 Md. at 464.

Appellate courts also have the discretion to raise the related issue of res judicata

sua sponte. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 105 (2005) (citing

Arizona v. California, 120 S. Ct. 2304, 2318, supplemented, 121 S. Ct. 292 (2000) for the

proposition that the exercise of an appellate court’s discretion to dismiss an action sua

(continued)

— Unreported Opinion —

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STATUTORY DUE PROCESS FOR A MOTION TO STAY AND DISMISS

FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS

We reject Appellant’s categorical proposition that he did not receive an

evidentiary hearing. He asserts that he was unfairly denied the opportunity “have a

further hearing where everybody brought their original copies to court,” after the April

21, 2022, remote hearing. He contends the circuit court should not have ruled without

comparing the parties’ “original copies” of the 2007 Note. Appellant writes, “THIS

DENIAL IS THE CRUX OF APPELLANT’S APPEAL.” (Emphasis in original). He

further demands that “[b]oth sides should be entitled to pre-hearing discovery, and to

subpoena witnesses” at this additional hearing.

Maryland Rule 14-211(b)(1) provides that the “court shall deny the motion [to stay

or dismiss foreclose proceedings], with or without a hearing, if the court concludes from

the record before it that the motion: (A) was not timely filed and does not show good

cause for excusing non-compliance with subsection (a)(2) of this Rule.” Appellant’s

sponte on grounds of res judicata may be consistent with “the avoidance of unnecessary

judicial waste.”). However, res judicata is an enumerated affirmative defense under

Maryland Rules, which in the trial courts must be asserted in an answer. Md. Rule 2-

323(a), (g). As with collateral estoppel, “a court is not required to apply res judicata sua

sponte[.]

”

50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1203. See, e.g., Chambco, Div. of Chamberlin

Waterproofing & Roofing Sys., Inc. v. Urb. Masonry Corp., 101 Md. App. 664, 669–70

(1994), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Chambco, Div. of Chamberlin Waterproofing

& Roofing, Inc. v. Urb. Masonry Corp., 338 Md. 417 (1995) (finding the parties had not

“properly presented the issue” of res judicata and deciding to “resolve the matter on

other grounds”).

— Unreported Opinion —

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motion was filed nearly six years after post-file mediation concluded, rather than the

fifteen days allotted under Maryland Rule 14-211(a) from the last to occur in a menu of

events. We note, therefore, that under Maryland Rule 14-211(b)(1), the circuit court

could have denied his motion without any hearing because it was filed six years late, and,

because—even if it had been filed in time—he was still not entitled to a hearing.

Nonetheless, the record is clear that Appellant received a hearing on his motion at

which he received a full and fair opportunity to present his evidence. On April 21, 2022,

the court heard argument from counsel and received documentary evidence—including

the conflicting versions of the 2007 Note presented by Appellant and the Trustees as well

as the 2009 Modification Agreement with Wells Fargo, 2012 letters allegedly from C&F,

and the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction.

Appellant’s further assertion that the court was obligated to put the matter before a

jury for them to examine the physical original documents, is not grounded in law.

Neither the rule nor the statute governing hearings on motions to stay and dismiss

foreclosure actions require jury hearings or original documents. See Huertas v. Ward,

248 Md. App. 187, 211–12 (2020) (holding rules governing foreclosure under a power of

sale contain no requirement that substitute trustees produce “original documents in wet

ink[.]”).

— Unreported Opinion —

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CIRCUIT COURT’S DECISION TO DENY

MOTION TO STAY AND DISMISS

Before this Court, Appellant presents at least two arguments that he has recycled

in countless motions and actions that he has filed since 2015. First, he claims the circuit

court erred in allowing the foreclosure action to proceed because the 2007 Note attached

to the Trustees’ Order to Docket Foreclosure was not authentic. Second, he contends the

circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to stay the foreclosure sale and

dismiss the case because the Trustees failed to prove their standing to enforce the 2007

Note. What was new about the underlying emergency motion to stay and dismiss was

Appellant’s presentation of the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction. Appellant now argues

that, because of the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction, under Maryland Code (1974, 2015

Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article (“RP”), section 7-103, “[t]here is a conclusive

presumption that if the mortgage is clearly released of record (as here), it has been

paid[.]”

Appellant states that “if the note, has been paid or satisfied and is marked ‘paid’ or

‘cancelled’ and recorded (as here) it is effective as a release of the property[.]” (citing RP

§ 3-105(d)). He claims the Note’s original holder, C&F, accepted alternative

performance from him in satisfaction for the loan in 2012, cancelled the 2007 Note, and

returned the original documents to him. Appellant argues that the circuit court should

have recognized the 2007 Note as cancelled because the evidence he presented should

have been more persuasive than the Trustees’ 2007 Note filed with the 2015 Order to

— Unreported Opinion —

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Docket, which “contained multiple undated endorsements.” Appellant further contends

that “there is no proof Wells Fargo purchased the Note from C & F[,]” and insists that

Wells Fargo was “only the servicer in 2009 at the time of the loan modification.”

The Trustees respond

that they have the power of sale under the Deed of Trust

because the 2007 Note’s original holder, C&F, sold the Note in 2007, initiating a chain of

transactions, under which the entity that appointed the Trustees now holds the 2007 Note

and legal title to the Property. According to the Trustees, the record demonstrates that

Appellant never satisfied the loan, and no holder has released or offered to release the

Deed of Trust or to cancel the 2007 Note.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit court’s determination made

after having considered the evidence and the testimony presented in the motions and

during the April 21, 2022 hearing, including the Loan Modification Agreement dated

The background events that Trustees recount in their brief which are at variance

with those asserted by Appellant are briefly noted here. Trustees say that in September of

2007, C&F sold and specifically indorsed the Promissory Note (“Note”) to Franklin

American Mortgage Company (“FAMC”), that at some later time, FAMC sold and

specifically indorsed the Promissory Note to Wells Fargo Bank, and that Wells Fargo

subsequently blank-indorsed the Note. Trustees agree that Appellant and Wells Fargo

entered into the Loan Modification Agreement in October of 2009, but they say that

Wells Fargo was the holder of the Note at the time, not solely the servicer. Trustees state

that a chain of assignments of the Deed of Trust followed, and in April of 2015

PrimeStar-H Fund I Trust (“PrimeStar”) acquired the beneficial interest of the Deed of

Trust and appointed Trustees to act for them.

Trustees flatly deny Appellant’s claim that on March 6, 2012, the CFO of C&F

sent a letter to Appellant that stated the loan was satisfied, “and which purportedly

included a copy of two cancelled promissory notes.” Trustees state that the purported

author has searched and found “no copy of the March 6, 2012 letter in C&F’s records and

believes that the February 2, 2012 letter was used to create the March 6, 2012 letter.”

— Unreported Opinion —

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October 24, 2009, which declares itself to be “by and between Daryl Green (the

‘Borrower’) and Wells Fargo Bank (the ‘Lender’).” It was well within the trial court’s

discretion to disregard the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction by C&F based on the evidence

presented and conclude that the Trustees had the right to foreclose on the Property.

A. Legal Framework

“The grant or denial of injunctive relief in a property foreclosure action lies

generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md.

232, 243 (2011) (citing Wincopia Farm, LP v. Goozman, 188 Md. App. 519, 528 (2009)).

Abuse of discretion means that a ruling will be reversed when that ruling “‘does not

logically follow from the findings from which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable

relationship to its announced objective.’” Anderson, 424 Md. at 243 (quoting Eastside

Vend Distrib., Inc., 396 Md. at 240). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and

“‘we will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court if there is any competent

evidence to support those factual findings.’” Jones v. Ward, 254 Md. App. 126, 138,

cert. denied, 478 Md. 520 (2022) (quoting Dickerson v. Longoria, 414 Md. 419, 433

(2010)). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions, however, without deference. See

Moscarillo v. Prof’l Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 169 Md. App. 137, 145 (2006).

Section 7-103(a) of the Real Property Article provides:

The title to any promissory note, other instrument, or debt secured by a

mortgage, both before and after the maturity of the note, other instrument,

or debt, conclusively is presumed to be vested in the person holding the

record title to the mortgage. If the mortgage is duly released of record, the

promissory note, other instrument, or debt secured by the mortgage, both

— Unreported Opinion —

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before and after the maturity of the promissory note, other instrument, or

debt, conclusively is presumed to be paid as far as any lien on the property

granted by the mortgage is concerned.

A mortgage note may be enforced by “the holder of the instrument,” or by “a nonholder

in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder,” as well as by “a person

not in possession of the instrument” who is otherwise entitled by statute. Maryland Code

(1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law Article (“CL”), section 3-301. “[O]nce the

note is transferred, ‘the right to enforce the deed of trust follow[s].’” Deutsche Bank Nat.

Tr. Co. v. Brock, 430 Md. 714, 728 (2013) (quoting Svrcek v. Rosenberg, 203 Md. App.

705, 727 (2012)). Where a mortgage or deed of trust authorizes such, the note holder

may appoint a trustee or substitute trustee to exercise a power of sale of the property upon

default on the note. RP § 7-105(b)(1), (5).

A “power of sale” foreclosure is “‘intended to be a summary, in rem proceeding’

which carries out ‘the policy of Maryland law to expedite mortgage foreclosures.’” Wells

Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 726 (2007) (quoting G.E. Capital

Mortgage. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 245 (1995)). The foreclosure process

itself is one with limited pleadings and defenses and limited discovery. Kevin

Hildebeidel, Introduction to Foreclosure of Secured Interests in Maryland in 5 GORDON

ON MARYLAND FORECLOSURES (Maryland State Bar Association, Deutsch & Nadel, eds.,

2021).

Under Maryland Rule 14-207, a secured party or that party’s agent may

commence an action to foreclose on a lien pursuant to a power of sale by filing an order

— Unreported Opinion —

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to docket. Md. Rule 14-207(a)(1). Amongst other exhibits, the order to docket must

include:

(1) a copy of the lien instrument supported by an affidavit that it is a

true and accurate copy, or, in an action to foreclose a statutory lien, a copy

of a notice of the existence of the lien supported by an affidavit that it is a

true and accurate copy;

(2) an affidavit by the secured party, the plaintiff, or the agent or

attorney of either that the plaintiff has the right to foreclose and a statement

of the debt remaining due and payable;

(3) a copy of any separate note or other debt instrument supported by

an affidavit that it is a true and accurate copy and certifying ownership of

the debt instrument;

(4) a copy of any assignment of the lien instrument for purposes of

foreclosure or deed of appointment of a substitute trustee supported by an

affidavit that it is a true and accurate copy of the assignment or deed of

appointment;

Md. Rule 14-207(b)(1)–(4).

The Real Property Article imposes corresponding requirements, in that an order to

docket or a complaint to foreclose on a mortgage or deed of trust on residential property

shall be accompanied by, inter alia:

(i) The original or a certified copy of the mortgage or deed of trust;

(ii) A statement of the debt remaining due and payable supported by

an affidavit of the plaintiff or the secured party or the agent or attorney of

the plaintiff or secured party;

(iii) A copy of the debt instrument accompanied by an affidavit

certifying ownership of the debt instrument;

(iv) If applicable, the original or a certified copy of the assignment

of the mortgage for purposes of foreclosure or the deed of appointment of a

substitute trustee; . . .

RP § 7-105.1(e)(2)(i)–(iv).

— Unreported Opinion —

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Under the Maryland Rules, there are “‘two avenues by which a borrower may

challenge a foreclosure sale.’” Huertas v. Ward, 248 Md. App. 187, 201 (2020) (quoting

Hood v. Driscoll, 227 Md. App. 689, 693 (2016). “‘One is a motion to dismiss the

foreclosure action or stay or enjoin a threatened sale; the other is to file exceptions to a

sale that already has occurred.’” Id. at 202. See Md. Rule 14-211, Md. Rule 14-305(e).

Unlike the motion to dismiss the foreclosure action, the function of which is to contest

“whether there should be a sale at all[,]” the post-sale exceptions must directly challenge

“the conduct of the sale[.]” Hood v. Driscoll, 227 Md. App. 689, 694, 695 (2016). The

foreclosure sale transaction remains incomplete until the sale is approved by the court,

and borrowers may file exceptions “setting forth any allegations of irregularities in the

sale.” Huertas, 248 Md. App. at 202. Examples of irregularities that could merit setting

aside a sale are “deficiencies in the advertisement of sale, conduct that inhibited bidding

on the property, or an unconscionable sale price.” Id. at 203. These procedures are

equitable in nature and must only be approached with clean hands. Mitchell v. Yacko,

232 Md. App. 624, 637 (2017).

A mortgagor seeking a pre-sale injunction must file a Motion to Stay and Dismiss

according to Maryland Rule 14-211, which, amongst other requirements, shall:

(A) be under oath or supported by affidavit;

(B) state with particularity the factual and legal basis of each defense

that the moving party has to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument or

to the right of the plaintiff to foreclose in the pending action;

in the possession or control of the moving party and any request for the

— Unreported Opinion —

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discovery of any specific supporting documents in the possession or control

of the plaintiff or the secured party; …

Md. Rule 14-211(a)(3).

As previously noted, under Maryland Rule 14–211(b)(1), the court “shall deny the

motion, with or without a hearing, if the court concludes from the record before it that the

motion:

(A) was not timely filed and does not show good cause for excusing

non-compliance with subsection (a)(2) of this Rule;

(B) does not substantially comply with the requirements of this Rule; or

the lien instrument or to the right of the plaintiff to foreclose in the

pending action.”

Md. Rule 14–211(b)(1). Finally, if the court grants a hearing on the merits, and at its

conclusion “the court finds that the moving party has established that the lien or the lien

instrument is invalid or that the plaintiff has no right to foreclose in the pending action, it

shall grant the motion and, unless it finds good cause to the contrary, dismiss the

foreclosure action. If the court finds otherwise, it shall deny the motion.” Md. Rule 14-

211(e).

B. Analysis

As previously stated, we give great deference to the circuit court’s determination

that the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction did not operate in this case to release Appellant’s

obligations under the 2007 Note. In those cases tried before the court in which the

authenticity of material evidence is in dispute, we defer to the trial court’s unique role as

the finder of fact, and we “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the

— Unreported Opinion —

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evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]” Md. Rule 8-131. “If any competent material

evidence exists in support of the trial court’s factual findings, those findings cannot be

held to be clearly erroneous.” MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki, 465 Md. 457, 474 (2019)

(quoting Webb v. Nowak, 433 Md. 666, 678 (2013)). “The trier of fact may believe or

disbelieve, accredit or disregard, any evidence introduced.” Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v.

Schruefer, 34 Md. App. 706, 725 (1977) (citing Phelps v. Goldberg, 270 Md. 694, 705

(1974)). “We may not-and obviously could not-decide upon an appeal how much weight

must be given, as a minimum to each item of evidence.” Id.

At the hearing, the evidence before the judge included the Trustees’ Order to

Docket a Foreclosure attaching the 2007 Note with a blank indorsement. As a blank

indorsed negotiable instrument is negotiated by transfer of possession alone, under the

evidence presented, Trustees were holders of the Note, and thus entitled to the instrument

under CL § 3–301. See also CL § 3–301(b). In previous actions, courts had already

determined that Appellant’s possession of the Green Note failed to “raise[] a presumption

of payment” as a “creditor’s cancellation of the evidence of indebtedness.” See Brady v.

Brady, 110 Md. 656 (1909). The balance of presumptions attendant upon the documents

competing for authenticity can be resolved by the fact-finder’s credibility determinations,

and the fact that “[o]rdinarily there is no presumption of payment of a debt, and in the

absence of any evidence on the subject there is a rebuttable presumption against

payment.” 70 C.J.S. Payment § 67 (Karl Oakes, ed., West 2023).

— Unreported Opinion —

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In her ruling on the Appellant’s Motion to Stay and Dismiss, the judge explained

the evidence which she had accorded the greatest weight. The judge noted that she had

reviewed “all of the documents and the cancellation that was provided by the Defendant”

and that she inspected the Trustees’ “Note and with all of the assignments,” before

concluding that “there is a lien on that property and . . . there was a default [on] the lien.”

The judge specifically weighed the Certificate of Satisfaction of the 2007 Note from C&F

against the 2009 Modification Agreement with Wells Fargo and found the 2009

Modification Agreement to be dispositive. The court noted that the agreement that

Appellant signed in 2009—three years prior to the Green Note and purported March 2012

Letter from C&F—identified Appellant, Daryl Green, as “(the ‘Borrower’) and Wells

Fargo Bank (the ‘Lender’).” The court concluded that “there is a lien on the property that

has not been paid” based on the 2009 Modification Agreement, documenting an unpaid

balance of $424,323.19 that Appellant committed to pay the balance to the holder of the

2007 Note at the time, Wells Fargo.

Indeed, the 2009 Modification Agreement is not only documentary evidence of

Wells Fargo’s status as holder of the 2007 Note, but Appellant’s formation of the

agreement is evidence that he was on notice of that fact. See Jones v. Ward 254 Md.

App. 126, 151–52 (2022) (holding mortgagors’ formation of a loan modification

agreement with Wells Fargo and subsequent payments to be “strong evidence that Wells

Fargo was the secured party[.]”). See also Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 251 n.22

(2011) (finding that the appellant conceded his debt by listing the appellee as a secured

— Unreported Opinion —

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creditor; renegotiating his mortgage payments; and making mortgage payments to the

appellee). Further evidence of Wells Fargo’s ownership of the 2007 Note follows from

their appointment of Substitute Trustees under Real Property 7-105 in 2011; not to

mention Appellant’s own admissions to the same contained in his numerous bankruptcy

filings. See note 11 supra.

To controvert the evidence of the Trustees’ note and the presumption of

enforceability that attend it, Appellant had to persuade the court that C&F had the

authority to release the 2007 Note in 2012. Having failed multiple times in the past,

including his prior submission of the Green Note in 2016, he presented the trial court in

the underlying case with the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction and claimed that it carried a

statutory presumption that the lien was released under RP § 3-105(d). However, the trial

court did not find the condition precedent necessary to effectuate the release of a debt

secured by a deed of trust under RP 3-105(d): namely that C&F was the “holder of the

[2007 N]ote or his agent,” in 2012 or in when the 2022 Certificate of Satisfaction was

recorded.

The statute provides, in relevant part:

When the debt secured by a deed of trust is paid fully or satisfied, and any

bond, note, or other evidence of the total indebtedness is marked “paid” or

“canceled” by the holder or his agent, it may be received by the clerk and

indexed and recorded as any other instrument in the nature of a release.

The marked note has the same effect as a release of the property for which

it is the security, as if a release were executed by the named trustees, if

there is attached to or endorsed on the note an affidavit of the holder, the

(continued)

— Unreported Opinion —

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Appellant failed to provide any explanation for why he did not produce the Green

Note prior to August 2016, nor why a certificate of satisfaction was not filed in land

records until 2022 when the 2007 Note was allegedly satisfied in 2012. The 2009

Modification Agreement, by contrast, which Appellant signed, clearly shows that C&F

had already conveyed its interest in the 2007 Note years before the purported 2012

cancellation and release.

Furthermore, Appellant failed to demonstrate why C&F would agree to release the

2007 Note for no monetary consideration. The sole evidence he produced of this is the

March 6 Letter, allegedly sent to him by Mr. McCann for C&F. At the April 2022

Motions Hearing, Trustees repeatedly denied the authenticity of the letter, demonstrating

that C&F could not have been the holder of the 2007 Note in 2012. Further, in response

to Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, C&F through Mr. McCann, directly repudiated

authorship of the letter. See Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 35 Md. App. 19, 26 (1977) (“[I]f

a release of mortgage is mistakenly recorded, that release is effective as to subsequent

bona fide purchasers, but the mortgage remains valid as between the parties and equity

will enforce it.”). Appellant did not produce the original of the March 6 Letter or the

Green Note over a ten-year period, despite United States District Court for the District of

party making satisfaction, or an agent of either of them, that it has been

paid or satisfied, and specifically setting forth the land record reference

where the original deed of trust is recorded.

R § 3-105(d)(1).

— Unreported Opinion —

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Maryland’s invitation in 2018 to re-open his action if he were to present some evidence

that the 2007 Note was cancelled.

Further, Appellant failed to provide any explanation for why he had not produced

the March 6 Letter at any earlier point in the legal proceedings that commenced with the

Trustees first initiation of foreclosure proceedings in 2015, including when he filed his

motion to dismiss or stay the foreclosure with the circuit court in 2016 on the ground that

he was the “holder of his cancelled notes.” Nor did he explain why he did not even

allege its existence at any time before he used it to persuade Mr. McCann to sign a

Certificate of Satisfaction in January of 2022. Further, Appellant did not present any

testimony or affidavit from the Mr. McCann to support his statement that C&F accepted

this forbearance as consideration for the loan. He failed to offer any evidence of the

consideration he offered, nor of C&F’s acceptance of it, and he did not produce any

negotiated agreement or release such as the release form that parties to the 2011 consent

order signed discharging C&F’s obligations to them under that litigation.

Finally, the account that Appellant provided of C&F’s consideration for the

alleged release of the 2007 Note lacks logical consistency. The terms of the 2007 Note

specify payment by money. Where money is loaned, “[i]n the absence of any showing to

the contrary it is to be presumed that the medium for payment of a debt is money,”

C.J.S. Payment § 72 (Karl Oakes, ed., West 2023). Here, Appellant claims that in 2012

he discovered that C&F had been the subject of federal investigation. But that matter had

been resolved in a consent order in October 2011, pursuant to which C&F agreed to

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create a settlement fund containing a total of $140,000 “for the purpose of compensating

aggrieved persons,” which was to be distributed amongst 191 mortgagors identified in the

agreement. The Order concludes “C&F’s compliance with its terms “shall fully and

finally resolve all claims of the United States relating to the alleged violations by C&F of

the fair lending laws,” and that after those terms were enforced the case would be

dismissed with prejudice, thus effectively curtailing its exposure to further liability. In

light of the terms or the consent order, it is not surprising that Appellant’s explanation

that C&F agreed to forgive his debt of over $400,000 in exchange for his forbearance to

“challenge his rights under the DOJ case,” a year after the consent order strained the

credulity of the circuit court. Furthermore, the alleged forbearance would not be

recognized as consideration for a cancellation of debt under Maryland decisional law. As

outlined in Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352 (1956):

We have thus adopted the rule that the surrender of, or forbearance

to assert, an invalid claim by one who has not an honest and reasonable

belief in its possible validity is not sufficient consideration for a contract. 1

Restatement, Contracts, sec. 76(b). We combine the subjective requisite

that the claim be bona fide with the objective requisite that it must have a

reasonable basis of support. Accordingly a promise not to prosecute a

claim which is not founded in good faith does not of itself give a right of

action on an agreement to pay for refraining from so acting, because a

release from mere annoyance and unfounded litigation does not furnish

valuable consideration.

Id. at 360.

Appellant has entirely failed to show that his threat of joining the DOJ action was

a bona fide claim, or that it had any reasonable basis of support.

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All of the above are factors that a reasonable jurist would consider in her

credibility determinations, which are within the exclusive province of the trial court.

Taken in sum, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the

Emergency Motion to Stay and Dismiss the foreclosure action.

III

SANCTIONS UPON APPELLANT’S EXCEPTIONS TO FORECLOSURE SALE

We decline to address Appellant’s challenge to the circuit court’s August 5, 2022

order granting the Trustees’ Motion for Sanctions for Bad Faith Filing of exceptions to

the foreclosure sale under Maryland Rule 1-341 because his notice of appeal was filed

prior to the ratification of the foreclosure sale on August 16, 2022.

That issue was not raised by either party. Instead, Appellant’s argument on brief

is that the circuit court’s grant of the Trustees motion for sanctions was inappropriate

because Maryland Rule 1-341 “is not intended to penalize a party and/or counsel for

asserting a colorable claim,” and his entire argument is a rehash of his arguments

challenging the foreclosure sale.

Trustees respond that sanctions are warranted because

Appellant’s arguments “are made simply to delay foreclosure of the Subject Property, on

which he has not made a loan payment for 13 years.” Trustees argue, as an affirmative

Appellant stresses that “possession of the original note marked CANCELLED

as received from his original lender, three years before the Trustees even filed their order

to docket, justifies a pro se Defendant to engage in vigorous litigation. Appellant posits

that his lack of bad faith is established by the fact that the circuit court initially granted a

stay of the sale and scheduled a full hearing on the merits.

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defense, that “neither the denial of exceptions or award of sanctions is before this court”

because Appellant failed to specify that he was appealing from the grant of the motion for

sanctions in his notice of appeal.

We need not explore either party’s arguments due to the non-appealability of the

interlocutory order that granted the sanctions.

A. Legal Framework

It is well established that “an order of a circuit court must be appealable in order to

confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court, and this jurisdictional issue, if noticed by an

appellate court, will be addressed sua sponte.” Johnson v. Johnson, 423 Md. 602, 605-06

(2011). “Appellate jurisdiction in Maryland is a ‘creature of statute.’” Doe v. Sovereign

Grace Ministries, Inc., 217 Md. App. 650, 660 (quoting Kurstin v. Bromberg Rosenthal,

LLP, 191 Md. App. 124, 131 (2010)). Broadly speaking, an appellate court “has

jurisdiction over an appeal when the appeal is taken from a final judgment or is otherwise

permitted by law, and a timely notice of appeal was filed.” Id. at 661. An order qualifies

as a final judgment when it “fully adjudicates all claims in the case by and against all

parties to the case.” Huertas v. Ward, 248 Md. App. 187, 200 (2020). In the context of a

foreclosure action, “a court does not enter a final judgment at least until it has ratified the

We disagree. The Supreme Court of Maryland has previously noted that “the

purpose of a notice or order of appeal is not to designate or limit the issues on appeal”

and that “the designation of issues on appeal is a function of the information

report required by Rule 8–205, the prehearing conference under Rule 8–206(b), and the

briefs.” B & K Rentals & Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127-

133-34 (1990).

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foreclosure sale.” McLaughlin v. Ward, 240 Md. App. 76, 83 (2019). There are only

three exceptions to the final judgment rule: “appeals from interlocutory orders

specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602;

and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order

doctrine.” Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 (2005).

B. Analysis

Although not raised by the parties in their briefing before this Court, we must

conclude that Appellant’s appeal, as related to the issue of the motion for sanctions, was

prematurely filed.

Specifically, Appellant noted his appeal on August 5, 2022, eleven

days before the court ratified the foreclosure sale on August 16, 2022. Upon noting this

defect, we are duty bound to determine the appealability of the underlying order because

“an order of a circuit court must be appealable in order to confer jurisdiction upon an

appellate court, and this jurisdictional issue, if noticed by an appellate court, will be

addressed sua sponte.” Johnson v. Johnson, 423 Md. 602, 605-06 (2011).

In McLaughlin, we recently confronted a premature appeal from the denial of the

appellant’s exceptions to a foreclosure sale and motion to abate the purchase price.

There, the appellant, Dominion, had previously purchased the subject property at a

foreclosure sale that was not ratified due to deficiencies in the affidavit of service. Id. at

Appellant did file a motion in this appeal requesting that this Court “order nunc

pro tunc the ratification of the [sale] order within the scope of this appeal.” That motion

was denied by an order entered February 9, 2023.

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81-82. After making improvements to the property, Dominion again bought the property

at a second foreclosure sale, but for a higher purchase price. Id. at 82. Dominion timely

filed exceptions to the sale and a motion to abate the purchase price due to the increased

cost of sale. Id. The lower court denied the motion and the exceptions and Dominion

noted an immediate appeal “without waiting for the ratification of the sale” and “did not

note another appeal after the ratification of the sale.” Id.

We concluded that the appeal was premature, explaining that there is no final

judgment to appeal from in a foreclosure action until ratification of the sale because the

need for determining error in each prior phase of the proceeding may be obviated if the

court ultimately declines to ratify the sale. See id. at 84 (“[h]ad the court declined to

ratify the second sale after Dominion appealed from the denial of its exceptions, the

appeal would have become completely superfluous”). Accordingly, since Dominion’s

appeal was premature, we dismissed the appeal because “we acquire no appellate

jurisdiction over a premature appeal” and none of the exceptions to the final judgment

rule applied. Id. at 84-85.

Here, as in McLaughlin, Appellant noted his appeal prior to the court’s August 16,

2022, order ratifying the foreclosure sale and did not note a second appeal thereafter. To

be sure, as we explained in Green I, that was entirely proper with respect to the denial of

Appellant’s motion to stay and dismiss. Although the appeal of that order preceded the

entry of final judgment, pursuant to the statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule

provided in Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings

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Article (“CJP”), section 12-303, “an order denying a request for a stay of the sale of the

property is appealable as an [interlocutory] order refusing to grant an injunction.”

Huertas, 248 Md. App. at 202; CJP § 12-303(3)(iii) (providing that a party may appeal

from an interlocutory order “[r]efusing to grant an injunction”). But just because an

appeal from one interlocutory order is permissible, does not mean that we ipso facto

possess the “authority to consider other interlocutory orders that are not independently

appealable.” Md. Bd. Physicians v. Geier, 451 Md. 526, 553 (2017). Indeed, the

Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear that “orders that do not independently

[constitute an appealable interlocutory order] may not be appealed by ‘piggybacking’

onto another interlocutory order that does” fall under one of the exceptions. Id. at 554-

55. Therefore, we must determine whether the circuit court’s order granting the Trustees’

motion for sanctions was independently appealable.

We shall address each of the three exceptions to the final judgment rule in turn,

starting with the narrow categories of immediately appealable interlocutory orders

delineated in CJP § 12-303. As we recently explained in McLaughlin, CJP § 12-303,

among other things, “authorizes interlocutory appeals from orders granting, dissolving, or

denying certain injunctions; from certain orders appointing a receiver; from orders

depriving a parent, grandparent, or guardian of the care and custody of a child; from

orders granting a petition to stay an arbitration proceeding; and from orders denying

certain claims of statutory immunity.” McLaughlin, 240 Md. App. at 85. Although CJP

§ 12-303(3)(v) authorizes an immediate appeal from an order for “the payment of

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money[,]” the order here did not provide for any monetary award, and regardless, we

have previously explained that a sanctions award is “not immediately appealable under

[CJP § 12-303(3)(v)] as an order for the payment of money, because it [is] not ‘equitable

in nature’ and d[oes] not ‘proceed directly to the person so as to make [him] directly and

personally answerable to the court for noncompliance.’” Tobin v. Marriott Hotels, Inc.,

111 Md. App. 566, 570 (1996) (quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 302 Md. 232, 236 (1985)).

Next, pursuant to Rule 6-202(b), a party may appeal from an interlocutory order

that is certified as a final judgment when the lower court “expressly determines in a

written order that there is no just reason for delay” and directs “in the order the entry of

final judgment (1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.” Md.

Rule 2-602(b). That procedure is, of course, unavailing in the present case because the

circuit never certified its order granting the motion for sanctions as a final judgment, nor

was it ever requested to do so. That reality, however, does not necessarily end our

inquiry due to operation of the related savings provision contained in Maryland Rule 8-

602(g)(1). Under that provision:

If the appellate court determines that the order from which the

appeal is taken was not a final judgment when the notice of appeal was

filed but that the lower court had discretion to direct the entry of a final

judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b), the appellate court, as it finds

appropriate, may (A) dismiss the appeal, (B) remand the case for the lower

court to decide whether to direct the entry of a final judgment, (C) enter a

final judgment on its own initiative or (D) if a final judgment was entered

by the lower court after the notice of appeal was filed, treat the notice of

appeal as if filed on the same day as, but after, the entry of the judgment.

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Md. Rule 8-602(g)(1). Rule 8-602(g)(1) thus, under appropriate circumstances,

empowers this Court to manifest a legal fiction whereby a premature appeal is treated as

timely filed if it could have properly been certified under Rule 2-602(b). That discretion,

however, is to be applied only “in the most extraordinary circumstance” and should be

especially closely guarded when the circuit court was never requested to pass on the

issue. Smith v. Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc., 386 Md. 12, 26 (2005). We need not wrestle

too fiercely with the narrow confines of our discretion, however, because we are

unconvinced that the order in this case would have even been eligible for certification

pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602(b).

The “term ‘claim,’ as used in [Rule 2-602(b)], refers to a complete, substantive

cause of action.” Eubanks v. First Mount Vernon Indus. Loan Ass’n, Inc., 125 Md. App.

642, 649 (1999). It is unclear whether a motion for sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule

1-341, which is a procedural device ground in the court’s remedial authority, would fall

under that heading. See Md. Rule 1-341(a). And even if it did, as in McLaughlin, there

was almost certainly was a “just reason” for delay “when the ratification of the sale, and

thus the end of the case for all parties, was close at hand.” McLaughlin, 240 Md. App. at

87. We therefore decline to consider Appellant’s premature appeal as having been filed

after the ratification of sale pursuant to Rule 8-602(g)(1).

Finally, there remains the possibility the order granting the Trustees’ motion for

sanctions was appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which rests on a “judicially

created fiction, under which, certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final

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judgments, even though such orders are clearly not final judgments.” Dawkins v. Balt.

City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64 (2003). To qualify under the doctrine, the relevant

order must satisfy a four-part test: “(1) the order must conclusively determine the

disputed question; (2) the order must resolve an important issue; (3) the order must

resolve an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) the issue

would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final

judgment.” Geier, 451 Md. at 546.

Certainly, an order granting a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 1-341 might

be able to satisfy some of those requirements as they are “supplemental proceedings”

separate from the merits of the action. Litty v. Becker, 104 Md. App. 370, 376 (1995) (“a

trial court may entertain a motion for costs even though the principle [sic] suit has been

concluded” because “a motion for costs pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341 is an ‘independent

proceeding supplemental to the original proceeding[.]”) Yet, we have made clear that

such orders—at least when directed to a party—cannot meet the fourth prong of the test

(i.e., that the issue be effectively unreviewable upon entry of final judgment) because any

error “can be corrected on review after final judgment.” Yamaner v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321,

326 (1987).

At bottom, then, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to address Appellant’s

appeal from the order granting the Trustees’ motion for sanctions. The appeal was

prematurely filed because it was noted before the ratification of the foreclosure sale on

August 16, 2022, which constituted the final judgment in this case. McLaughlin, 240

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Md. App. at 83. Nor, as we have explained, do any of the exceptions to the final

judgment rule apply in the present case.

Accordingly, because we “we acquire no appellate jurisdiction over a premature

appeal[,]” we lack the ability to address the merits of his arguments challenging the grant

of the motion for sanctions. Id. at 84-85. Appellant’s appeal from that order—not from

the order denying his motion to stay and dismiss—is therefore, on initiative of this court,

dismissed. See Md. Rule 8-602(a) (“[t]he court may dismiss an appeal pursuant to this

Rule on motion or on the court’s own initiative”); Md. Rule 8-602(b) (“The Court shall

dismiss an appeal if (1) the appeal is not allowed by these Rules or by other law”).

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AS

TO DENIAL OF MOTION TO STAY AND

DISMISS IS AFFIRMED. APPEAL

DISMISSED AS TO GRANT OF MOTION

FOR SANCTIONS. COSTS TO BE PAID

BY APPELLANT.