Climate Change and Social Inequality*

DESA Working Paper No. 152

ST/ESA/2017/DWP/152

October 2017

Climate Change and Social Inequality

Department of Economic & Social Affairs

By S. Nazrul Islam and John Winkel

* is paper is based on a background paper that the authors prepared for the World Economic and Social Survey

(WESS) 2016, devoted to the topic, “Building Resilience to Climate Change – An Opportunity to Reduce In-

equalities.” e authors would like to thank the WESS team members for their comments. anks are also due

to the outside experts – in particular, Julie Ann Silva – for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are

due to the two anonymous reviewers who provided excellent comments that led to improvement of the paper.

All remaining errors and shortcomings are of the authors. e views expressed in this paper are authors’ personal

and need not be ascribed to the organizations to which they belong. Please send your comments to S. Nazrul

Islam, the corresponding author, at islamn@un.org

Multidimensional

Inequality

(Endnotes)

1 For a recent discussion on climate justice, see, for example Pleyers (2015).

See also Bali Principles of Climate Justice (http://www.ejnetindiaresource.

org/ejissues/bali.pdfenergycc/2003/baliprinciples.html) (August 29, 2002),

Climate Change and Justice: On the Road to Copenhagen (https://www.

boell.de/sites/default/les/BoellThema_english_2-09.pdf), Heinrich Boll

Foundation, Berlin 2009. For discussion on environmental justice, see, for

example, Chakraborty (2017) and Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts (2009).

2 The AR5 WGII report uses the term assets to refer to “natural, human,

physical, nancial, social and cultural capital,” as part of the “ensemble or

opportunity set” including capabilities, assets and activities that make up

livelihoods (IPCC, 2014, p 798). This paper uses this term in similar sense.

Inequality regarding assets and income inuences inequality regarding political

power and access to public resources. The relationship between the two goes in

reverse direction too. Similarly, demographic inequalities often lead to inequali-

ties with regard to asset, income, political voice, and access. Inequalities with

regard to the latter often reinforces the demographic inequalities.

ABSTRACT

is paper oers a unifying conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between

climate change and “within-country inequalities,” referred here collectively as “social inequal-

ity.” Available evidence indicates that this relationship is characterized by a vicious cycle, whereby

initial inequality causes the disadvantaged groups to suer disproportionately from the adverse

eects of climate change, resulting in greater subsequent inequality. e paper identies three

main channels through which the inequality-aggravating eect of climate change materializes,

namely (a) increase in the exposure of the disadvantaged groups to the adverse eects of climate

change; (b) increase in their susceptibility to damage caused by climate change; and (c) decrease

in their ability to cope and recover from the damage suered. e paper presents evidence to

illustrate each of the processes above. It also notes that the same analytical framework can be

used to discuss the relationship between climate change and inequality across countries. Finally,

it points to the ways in which the analysis can be helpful in making relevant policy decisions.

JEL Classication: Q53, Q56, Q59

Keywords: Climate change; inequality; exposure; susceptibility; ability to cope and recover;

adaptation.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction .............................................................1

2. Evolution of the discussion of the social impact of climate change..................3

3. Analyitical Framework .....................................................5

4. Effects of inequality on exposure to climate change hazards .....................12

5. Effects of inequality on susceptibility to damages caused by climate change ........15

6. Effects of inequality on the ability to cope and recover .........................17

7. Combination of channels ..................................................22

8. From within-inequality to across-inequality ...................................22

9. Concluding Remarks .....................................................24

References .............................................................25

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Climate Change and Social Inequality

1 Introduction

Inequality has been a persistent issue in the climate

change discussion. In general, it has been part of the

discussion on “climate justice” issue, which in turn

is a particular case of the “environmental justice” is-

sue.

However, the focus in this discussion has been

mainly on inequality across countries. For example,

debates have raged and are still raging over dierenc-

es across countries regarding the responsibility for

causing climate change and the consequent responsi-

bility for mitigation (and adaptation) eorts. e Rio

principle of “Common but Dierentiated Responsi-

bility (CBDR)” was adopted to resolve this “burden”

issue. Nevertheless, the inter-country inequality issue

continues to dominate the international discussion

of climate change. By contrast, within-country or

social inequality has not received much attention.

To be accurate, there were attempts to incorporate

within-country inequality in the mitigation discus-

sion. For example, some researchers drew attention

to the fact that people within a country diered re-

garding their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, and

hence the mitigation burden should be distributed

according to the GHG contribution not of countries

but of individuals (see, for example, Chakravarty

et al. 2007). Accordingly, they proposed a GHG

emission cut-o and suggested imposition of the

mitigation burden (responsibility) on all individu-

als who were above that cut-o, irrespective of the

1 For a recent discussion on climate justice, see, for example

Pleyers (2015). See also Bali Principles of Climate Justice

(http://www.ejnetindiaresource.org/ejissues/bali.pdfen-

ergycc/2003/baliprinciples.html) (August 29, 2002), Cli-

mate Change and Justice: On the Road to Copenhagen

(https://www.boell.de/sites/default/les/Boellema_eng-

lish_2-09.pdf), Heinrich Boll Foundation, Berlin 2009.

For discussion on environmental justice, see, for exam-

ple, Chakraborty (2017) and Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts

(2009).

country in which they lived. Of course, it is possible

to aggregate the individual burdens at the country

level and revert the discussion to the cross-country

framework. However, the resulting cross-country

distribution of the burden would then incorporate

the within-country inequality in GHG emission,

and will not be based on just the country aggregates

or averages. ough sensible from many viewpoints,

this proposal however did not receive much traction,

in part, due to the diculties in measuring GHG

emission at the individual level. Also, in some devel-

oped countries – for example, the USA – attention

has been paid to within country inequality while re-

maining less aware about across-country inequality.

is has been possible because of greater availability

in these countries of household level data, which has

not been the case in most other countries. As a re-

sult, the international discussion of climate burden

continues to be conducted in terms of aggregates

or averages of GHG emissions at the country level.

Furthermore, with the switch to the “voluntary prin-

ciple” – as embodied in the Paris Agreement – the is-

sue of accurate determination of burden has become

moot. us, attempts to incorporate within-country

inequality regarding the responsibility for climate

change did not go too far in the international cli-

mate change discussion.

e within-country inequality regarding the impact

of climate change has received even less attention.

e discussion of the impact was initially focused on

its physical side, i.e. on the impact of climate change

on the nature. With time, the social impact received

attention, and evidence was presented regarding the

relationship between climate change and poverty and

livelihood. However, the interlinkages between cli-

mate change and within-country inequality have not

yet received necessary attention. is paper aims at

overcoming this weakness.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

Needless to say, there are many types of inequali-

ties to consider even in a within-country setting.

On the one hand, there are inequalities based on

demographic characteristics, such as gender, race,

ethnicity, religion, and age. A second type of ine-

quality is regarding assets and income. A third type

of inequality is regarding public decision making

(political power) and access to public resources, such

as publicly nanced health, education, housing, -

nancing, and other services. Needless to say, these

dierent types of inequalities are interrelated.

use the term “social inequality” to refer to all these

dierent types of within-country inequalities. is

is, rst of all, in the interest of parsimony. Second,

the term “social inequality” gets to the heart of the

matter more directly and intuitively than the term

“within-country inequality” does. ird, regional

(spatial) inequality within a country often overlaps

with inequality regarding race, ethnicity, and reli-

gion, and nds expression in the form of inequal-

ity in income and assets. Hence, within-country

spatial inequality can also be subsumed under so-

cial inequality. It should be noted that important

inequalities exist within households too. Amartya

Sen, for example, highlighted the intra-household

bias against girls and women (see, for example, Sen

1990). In this paper, however, we do not extend the

discussion to intra-household inequalities.

e concept of social inequality used in this paper

is thus multi-dimensional. Due to reasons of data

availability, most of the evidence it presents pertain

to income inequality, showing that the people living

2 e AR5 WGII report uses the term assets to refer to “nat-

ural, human, physical, nancial, social and cultural capi-

tal,” as part of the “ensemble or opportunity set” including

capabilities, assets and activities that make up livelihoods

(IPCC, 2014, p 798). is paper uses this term in similar

sense.

3 Inequality regarding assets and income inuences inequal-

ity regarding political power and access to public resources.

e relationship between the two goes in reverse direction

too. Similarly, demographic inequalities often lead to ine-

qualities with regard to asset, income, political voice, and

access. Inequalities with regard to the latter often reinforces

the demographic inequalities.

in poverty suer disproportionately more from the

adverse eects of climate change than the rich.

However, the paper presents evidence regarding sim-

ilar disproportionate eects suered by other social

groups who nd themselves disadvantaged due to

gender, age, race, ethnicity, etc.

Some researchers have earlier noted that climate

change aggravated inequality, and they provided

evidence in support of this claim. ere are, how-

ever, two weaknesses in this discussion so far. First,

the evidences are often indirect and not focused on

inequality. e implications regarding inequality are

presented as an afterthought, so to speak. Second,

the evidences presented are generally of scatter-shot

character and there is no connection among them.

is paper tries to overcome these weaknesses – par-

ticularly the second one – by presenting a unifying

conceptual framework for discussing and studying the

relationship between climate change and inequali-

ty. It shows that the relationship between climate

change and social inequality is characterized by a

vicious cycle, whereby initial inequality makes dis-

advantaged groups suer disproportionately from the

adverse eects of climate change, resulting in great-

er subsequent inequality. e paper identies three

channels through which the above process unfolds.

First, inequality increases the exposure of the disad-

vantaged social groups to the “adverse eects of cli-

mate change” (“climate hazards,” for short). Second,

given the exposure level, inequality increases the dis-

advantaged groups’ susceptibility to damages caused

by climate hazards. ird, inequality decreases these

groups’ relative ability to cope with and recover from

the damages they suer. e paper presents evidence

supporting each of these three channels.

e paper is global in scope, in the sense that it con-

siders the relationship between climate change and

social inequality in both developing and developed

countries. It is aware that despite the commonalities

there are dierences in the concrete manifestations

of this relationship. e paper tries to oer evidence

from both developed countries (such the Hurri-

cane Katarina experience of the United States) and

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

developing countries. However, more evidence has

been drawn from developing countries, partly be-

cause it is the tropical developing countries which

are witnessing more of the adverse eects of climate

change so far.

e analytical framework presented in this paper

helps in several ways. First, it helps to collect, un-

derstand, and present the available evidence more

meaningfully and systematically. Second, it helps to

identify the gaps in evidence, and thus point to the

necessary future research. ird, it helps to promote

the discussion of policies necessary to break the vi-

cious cycle between climate change and inequality.

e paper nally notes that, though the analytical

framework presented in it focuses on within-coun-

try inequality, it can also be applied to describe and

analyse the relationship between climate change and

across-country inequality. Greater across-country

inequality may indeed increase the exposure of the

disadvantaged countries to climate hazards. It may

also increase their susceptibility to damage caused

by climate hazards. Finally, it may also decrease their

capability to cope with and recover from the dam-

ages suered. us, climate change may aggravate

across-county inequality too. However, to keep its

scope manageable, this paper limits its attention to

within-country inequality and does not extend it to

across-country inequality.

e 2030 Agenda for sustainable development has

brought the issues of both within- and across-coun-

try inequality to the fore and calls for the reduction

of both. is paper suggests that an opportunity

in the otherwise formidable challenge of climate

change may be seen in the expansion of the policy

space regarding inequality. is is because emergency

situations often make it possible to undertake steps

that are not possible in normal situations. e emer-

gency posed by climate change may facilitate reduc-

tion of inequality, which is otherwise deemed to be a

dicult political issue.

e discussion of the paper is organized as fol-

lows. Section 2 reviews the evolution of the climate

discussion from its initial focus on the impact on na-

ture to the impact on poverty and livelihood and then

on to the impact on inequality. Section 3 presents the

analytical framework that can unify the discussion

of the relationship between climate change and in-

equality. Sections 4 reviews the evidence regarding

inequality’s eect on exposure of the disadvantaged

groups to climate hazards. Section 5 does the same re-

garding susceptibility to damage by climate hazards.

Section 6 reviews the evidence on inequality’s impact

on the ability of the disadvantaged groups to cope and

recover. Section 7 discusses the combined eects of

more than one channel. Section 8 notes how the ana-

lytical framework presented in the paper can also help

to analyse the relationship between climate change

and across-country inequality. Section 9 concludes.

2 Evolution of the discussion of the

social impact of climate change

2.1 Initial focus on the physical impact

e discussion of climate change was originally

focused on its physical impact, with relatively less

eort devoted to documentation and discussion of

the implications for the livelihood and social posi-

tion of the aected people. As Skouas (2012, p. 2)

put it, “while the eyes of the world have been riv-

eted on polar bears, Antarctic penguins, and other

endangered inhabitants of the Earth’s shrinking

ice caps, relatively few researchers have turned seri-

ous attention – until recent years – to quantify the

prospective long-term eects of climate change on

human welfare.”

2.2 Discussion of effects of climate

change on poverty and livelihood

e broader social impacts of climate change and

their feedback eects received more attention over

time. An early study in this regard was the report

by the World Bank (2002) and presented at the 8

conference of the UNFCCC. It noted that climate

change was making achievement of MDGs dicult

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

by reducing access to drinking water, decreasing

food security, and having adverse health eects.

Other studies followed up on the issue. e Stern

report (2007) noted that climate change was expect-

ed to increase poverty owing to its eects on agri-

culture, ooding, malnutrition, water resources and

health. e 2007/2008 Human Development Report

devoted a chapter to the discussion of vulnerabili-

ty and risks arising from climate change (UNDP,

2008). e World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report

2008, titled “MDGs and the Environment: Agenda

for Inclusive and Sustainable Development,” pointed

to potential impacts of climate change on poverty

and development (World Bank, 2008). Brainard et

al. (eds) (2009) looks in to a wide range of impacts

of climate change on poverty. Some recent studies

examined the issue using cross-country data, and

Skouas et al. (2011) provides a review of several

such studies, taking note of the dierent method-

ologies used, dierent units of analysis adopted, and

various policy suggestions oered.

Some studies had a more limited geographical fo-

cus. For example, Paavola (2008) focused on the

Morogoro region of Tanzania; Somanathan and So-

manathan (2009) on India; and Gentle and Narayan

(2012) on mountain communities in Nepal. Many

studies focused on poverty impacts in specic sec-

tors, such as agriculture (see for example, Ahmed et

al. 2009; Hertel et al. 2010; Hertel and Rosch 2010;

and Müller et al. 2011) or in particular areas, such

as urban areas (see for example, Satterthwaite et al.

2007; Douglas et al. 2008; and Hardoy and Pandiel-

la 2009).

From broad evidence of the eects of climate change

on poverty, research gradually moved to examining

the mechanisms through which these eects work.

e concept of Shared Socio-economic Pathways

(SSP) was used to consider the human development

aspects of climate change. Hallegatte et al. (2014)

identify four channels through which households

may move in and out of poverty – prices, assets,

productivity, and opportunities – and examine the

eect of climate change on each of these. Lichenko

and Silva (2014) provide a synthesis, noting that the

connections between climate change and poverty

are, “complex, multifaceted, and context-specic.”

Hallegatte et al. (2016) provides comprehensive

guidance on joint solutions so that poverty reduction

policies and climate change mitigation and adapta-

tion policies can reinforce each other.

e contribution of the Working Group II to the

IPCC periodical Assessment Reports (AR) also in-

creased gradually its focus on the human dimensions

of the climate change impact. In particular, this

group’s contribution to AR5 (particularly Chap ter

13) provides an extensive compilation of the evidence

– both statistical and anecdotal, and from all parts

of the world – regarding the dynamic interaction

between climate change, livelihoods, and poverty.

2.3 From poverty to inequality

effects of climate change

Not surprisingly, the discussion of the impact of cli-

mate change on poverty often extended to the impact

of climate change on inequality. AR4 already noted

that “socially and economically disadvantaged and

marginalized people are disproportionally aected by

climate change” (IPCC 2014, p. 796; italics added).

Similarly, Skouas (2012, p. 6) notes that “climate

change impacts tend to be regressive, falling more

heavily on the poor than the rich.” In the context of the

eects of climate change on Brazil, the study notes

that “there is signicant variation, with already poor

regions being more aected than prosperous regions”

(Skouas, 2012, p. 5, italics added).

References to inequality are more frequent in the

AR5 WGII report. Its overall conclusion is that cli-

mate change “exacerbates inequalities” (IPCC 2014,

p. 796, italics added). It notes that socially and geo-

graphically disadvantaged people – including people

facing discrimination based on gender, age, race,

class, caste, indigeneity and disability – are particu-

larly aected negatively by climate hazards (ibid). As

noted above, exacerbation of inequality can happen

through disproportionate erosion of physical, hu-

man, and social assets. AR5 WGII nds evidence

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

regarding each of these. Even climate change adapta-

tion expenditure is often found to be driven more by

wealth than by need, so that these expenditures end

up aggravating inequality (Georgeson et al. 2016).

2.4 Deﬁciencies of the discussion of

the linkages between climate

change and inequality

Despite the progress above, the discussion of the

interlinkages between climate change and inequal-

ity so far suers from several deciencies. e most

important of these is the lack of a unifying conceptual

framework. As a result of this lacking, the evidence

presented has a scattershot character. AR5 itself

recognizes this deciency, noting that “despite the

recognition of these complex interactions [between

climate change and inequality], the literature shows

no single conceptual framework that captures them

concurrently” (IPCC, 2014, p. 803, italics added).

Second, the evidence provided so far is often of

indirect and conjectural nature. In many cases, the

discussion remains limited to general statements.

Often the evidence provided is location and impact

specic, and extrapolations are made on its basis.

Relatively few studies have attempted to examine

directly the eect of climate change on inequality.

is paper aims at addressing the weaknesses above.

In particular, it oers a unifying conceptual frame-

work for capturing and studying the interlinkages

between climate change and social inequality. e

framework helps to collect, understand, present and

discuss the evidence in a more organized, logical,

and meaningful way. It helps to identify the gaps

that exist in the evidence gathered so far, and thus

to point out future directions of research necessary

to ll these gaps. Finally, it also helps to discuss the

policies needed to address the problems of inequality

in the context of climate change.

3 Analytical Framework

In this section, we present the analytical framework

for the discussion of the relationship between cli-

mate change and inequality. We begin by noting the

Figure 1

Three effects of inequality on disadvantaged groups

Source: Authors, based on the discussion in the text.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

three channels through which inequality aggravates

the situation of the disadvantaged groups vis-à-vis

climate change.

3.2 Three channels of inﬂuence of

inequality

e evidence suggests that inequality aggravates the

position of the disadvantaged groups of the socie-

ty vis-à-vis climate change impact in the following

three major ways (Figure 1).

a. increase in the exposure to climate hazards,

b. increase in the susceptibility to damage caused by

climate hazards, and

c. decrease in the ability to cope with and recover

from the damage.

To have a preliminary idea about how these channels

work, consider the following example. One of the

consequences of climate change is increased ood-

ing. Evidence shows that inequality often compels

the disadvantaged groups to live in areas that are

more prone to ooding, thus increasing their expo-

sure to ooding caused by climate change. Second,

among all living in the ood zone, the disadvantaged

groups prove to be more susceptible to the damages

caused by ooding. For example, their houses get

completely washed away or be damaged seriously,

because these are often made of imsy materials. By

contrast, the houses of the more well-to-do suer less

damage because these are generally made of sturdier

materials, such as brick and concrete. Finally, the

disadvantaged groups have less ability to cope with

and recover from the damages caused by oods. For

example, the rich may buy insurance and thus get

compensated for the damages. By contrast, the dis-

advantaged groups may not be able to aord such

insurance and thus have to absorb the entire loss,

leading to greater loss of their asset position.

3.3 “Climate change – inequality”

Figure 2

Inequality and climate change vicious cycle

Source: Authors, based on the discussion in the text.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

vicious cycle

As a result of the combined eect of the three chan-

nels above, climate change and inequality are locked

in a vicious cycle, whereby climate change hazards

end up aggravating inequality. Figure 2 explains how

this cycle works. It begins with multidimensional in-

equalities, which then cause greater exposure of the

disadvantaged groups to climate hazards, increase

their susceptibility to damage caused by these haz-

ards, and decrease their ability to cope with and re-

cover from the damage. As a result, when the climate

hazards actually hit, disadvantaged groups suer

disproportionate loss of income and assets (physical,

nancial, human, and social). Climate change thus

makes inequality worse, thus perpetuating the cycle.

3.4 Endogeneity of climate change

and the reinforced vicious cycle

e scheme in Figure 2 treats climate change eects

as exogenous. In reality, however, there is a feedback

eect of inequality on climate change, making the

above vicious cycle stronger and more worrisome.

is happens in several ways.

In a previous paper (Islam 2015), we discussed how

inequality aggravates environmental deterioration,

including climate change. Reviewing the evidence,

the paper showed, for example, that among OECD

countries, those with higher inequality tend to have

higher per capita levels of waste generation (Figure 3),

consumption of water (Figure 4), and consumption

of meat and sh (Figure 5). In view of these positive

associations, it may be expected that countries with

higher inequality will tend to have higher levels of

per capita GHG emissions. Figure 6 provides some

evidence in this regard showing that the correlation

between inequality and per capital GHG emissions

is at least weakly positive. Inequality thus indeed

aggravates climate change.

Figure 7 presents the reinforced vicious cycle be-

tween inequality and climate change, with the

feedback eect of the former on the latter taken

Figure 3

Inequality and municipal waste generated across countries

Source: Dorling 2014.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

Figure 4

Inequality and consumption of water across countries

Source: Dorling 2014.

Figure 5

Inequality and consumption of ﬁsh and meat across countries

Source: Dorling 2014.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Figure 6

Positive relationship between inequality and per capita GHG emission among OECD countries

Figure 7

Reinforced vicious cycle between inequality and climate change

Source: Author, based on data from OECD (on GHG emissions) and Salt () (on inequality).

Source: Author, based on the discussion in the text.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

into account. Instead of being exogenous to the caus-

al ow, climate change is now endogenous, working

through the outer loop of the scheme. Needless to

say, this endogeneity makes the task of breaking the

vicious cycle between climate change and inequality

even more important and urgent.

e analytical framework presented above is not

entirely new. Various earlier studies have used sim-

ilar frameworks. Some of these have used the term

“vulnerability,” and accordingly these have often

been described as the “vulnerability” frameworks.

For example, AR5 considers the impact of climate

hazards with respect to “vulnerability” and “expo-

sure.” (see IPCC 2014, Summary for policymakers,

p. 3). e discussion however makes it clear that by

vulnerability, the authors include both “susceptibil-

ity” and “ability to cope and recover,” as dened in

this paper. Others, however, dene “vulnerability”

as to include “exposure” and “ability to cope and

recover.”

To avoid these terminological ambiguities,

we prefer in this paper to spell out the dimensions

in their “primary form,” so to speak, and avoid an

additional, intermediate layer of terms, about which

the literature does not seem to have a consensus. An-

choring the discussion to the “primary forms” of the

eects also leads to a sharper understanding of the

relationship between inequality and climate change.

3.5 Economic and political channels

of inﬂuence of inequality on

differential effects of

climate change

It may be noted further that the three eects of ine-

quality identied above can be transmitted through

two channels, namely the economic channel and the

political channel (Figure 8). e economic channel

works through reduction of private resources avail-

able to the disadvantaged groups. For example, in

4 See Turner et al. (2003) for a discussion of alternative

vulnerability frameworks. See also https://www.wea-

dapt.org/knowledge-base/vulnerability/vulnerability-

frameworks.

Source: Authors, based on the discussion in the text.

Figure 8

Economic and Political transmission channels of the effects of inequality on disadvantaged groups

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

an unequal society, the disadvantaged groups have

less asset and income from their own resources, and

hence they cannot but be more exposed and suscep-

tible to climate hazards and be less capable to cope

and recover.

e political channel, on the other hand, works

through the state power. In an unequal society, the

advantaged groups (who own most of the productive

assets) usually “capture” or exert dominating inu-

ence on the state and skew its policies in their favour.

As a result, they can deploy more of the public (state)

resources for their protection against climate hazard,

leaving the disadvantaged groups less.

Boyce (1994, 2003) oers a formalization of the

political channel through which inequality aggra-

vates environmental degradation, including climate

change. He points out that in reality social decisions

are not based on maximization of the simple sum

of utilities that accrue from a particular decision to

dierent members of the society. Instead they are

based on a weighted sum, in which the utilities of the

advantaged (powerful) groups get greater weights,

resulting in Power Weighted Social Decision Rule

(PWSDR). It so happens that the GHG-intensive

activities serve more the utilities of the advantaged

groups, who can also shield themselves from the

adverse eects of climate change through greater

protection. As a result, inequality leads to public

policies that leave the disadvantaged groups more

exposed and susceptible to climate hazards. As noted

earlier, even adaptation policies often benet the ad-

vantaged groups more than the disadvantaged. e

inuence of politics on determining the eect that

disadvantaged groups suer due to adverse climate

eects can be quite pervasive.

3.6 Direct physical vs. indirect,

market-mediated effects of

climate hazards on the

income and asset position of

the disadvantaged groups

e evidence also shows that the disadvantaged

groups suer disproportionately from both direct and

indirect eects of climate hazards. is is illustrated

in Figure 9. For example, the destruction of crops by

Source: Authors, based on the discussion in the text.

Figure 9

Direct and indirect effects of climate hazards on disadvantaged groups

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

climate change-induced ooding is a direct eect.

However, the ood may also cause the general food

price level to rise, causing additional diculties for

those disadvantaged groups who have to buy food

from the market. is is the indirect, market-medi-

ated eect. Similarly, climate hazards may cause the

insurance premiums to increase, making it harder for

the disadvantaged groups to buy insurance coverage.

e framework above shows how the relationship be-

tween social inequality and climate change is char-

acterized by a vicious cycle and identies the various

causal channels through which this cycle operates.

We now turn to the empirical evidence that, on

the one hand, validates the vicious cycle hypothesis

and, on the other hand, shows how the analytical

framework above helps to present, understand, and

analyse this evidence.

e empirical evidence presented below often con-

cerns extreme weather events, the more frequent

recurrence of which is generally attributed to climate

change. is is in part because these events have

sharp cut-o points regarding their timing. Also,

they draw more attention and are more amenable

to before-and-after impact study. By contrast, the

slow-onset hazards are more diuse and more prone

to confounding factors. However, this does not mean

that the slow onset hazards are less important from

the viewpoint of the inequality reinforcing eect of

climate change.

4 Effects of inequality on

exposure to climate change

hazards

In general, exposure tends to be determined primar-

ily by the location of dwelling and work. Given the

location, however the exposure is inuenced by the

nature of work and tasks performed for livelihood.

Both economic and political channels of inuence

of inequality play a role in determining the location

and livelihood.

4.1 Greater exposure to ﬂood,

erosion, salinity, mudslides, etc.

According to Neumann et al. (2015), a signicant

part of the population in developing regions now

live in “low-elevation coastal zone” and 100-year

ood plains, and their number is increasing in both

absolute terms and as proportion of the population

(Table 1). In general, coastal and near-shore habi-

tats and their ecosystems are more exposed to the

Table 1

Population living in low-elevation coastal zones and 100-year ﬂood plains in developing countries

Population Low elevation 100-year ood plain

Region 2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030

Africa 811 1562 54 109 13 24

Asia 3697 4845 461 640 137 200

Latin

America &

Caribbean

521 702 32 40 6 8

Total 5029 7109 547 789 156 232

Least

Developed

Countries

645 1325 93 136

World 6101 8626 625 939 189 282

Source: B. Neuman et al., 2015, tables 4 and 5 (scenario B). Scenario B is based on projections from UN population data

at the “low end” of global population growth, meaning global population is expected to be 7.8 billion by 2030. It also

assumes inclusive social, political and economic governance. In other words, the most generous of the four scenarios

examined in the paper – the other three have higher estimates.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

eects of climate change (Barbier, 2015). Generally,

it is the disadvantaged groups, who nd themselves

compelled to live in these areas, because they can-

not aord to live in safer areas. A large percentage

of the populations of low elevation coastal zones are

rural – 84 per cent in Africa, 80 per cent in Asia, 71

per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 93

per cent in the least developed countries (Neuman

et al., 2015). As is known, the incidence of poverty is

greater in rural areas than in urban areas.

It is also instructive that more people now live in

deltas, which are frequently subject to ooding of

both types – coastal ooding due to sea level rise

and river ooding due to higher precipitation

(Table 2). Researchers nd that more of the people

living in the precarious parts of the deltas belong to

the disadvantaged groups (Lou et. al 2015 and Brou-

wer et al. 2007).

In addition to ooding and erosion, the people living

in coastal areas and in deltas also suer from salinity

intrusion (Dasgupta et al., 2014 and Rabbani et al.

2013). Shameem et al. (2014) estimate that 70 per

cent of farmers in some coastal areas partially or ful-

ly ceased farming due to high levels of salinity. Due

to their concentration in coastal areas and deltas,

the disadvantaged groups are thus more exposed to

salinity intrusion caused by climate change.

However, greater exposure of the disadvantaged

groups to climate hazards is not limited to rural are-

as only. Even among urban populations, it is the dis-

advantaged groups that are particularly exposed to

climate hazards. An example of this can be observed

in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where Braun and ABheure

(2011) nd that slum dwellers are more likely to live

in areas prone to natural hazards. In general, many

slums are located in low-lying spots of urban areas

that are at high risk of ooding. Similarly, in many

Table 2

Deltas in developing regions (in countries with population greater than 2 million people)

Region

Population living in deltas

(2015 estimates, in millions)

Africa

Nile (Egypt) 49.2

Niger (Nigeria) 31.5

Limpopo (Mozambique) 4.4

Asia

Ganges-Brahmaputra

(West Bengal-India/Bangladesh)

166.2

Mekong (Viet Nam) 35.2

Changjiang (Yangtze)(China) 33.1

Pearl (China) 27.1

Huang He (Yellow)(China) 16.6

Chao Phraya (Thailand) 16.4

Red (Hong)(Viet Nam) 16.1

Irrawaddy (Myanmar) 12.1

Krishna (India) 6.8

Godavari (India) 5.9

Mahanadi (India) 4.5

Indus (Pakistan) 4.4

Sources: Woodroffe, 2010, Overeem and Syvitski, 2009.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

Latin American countries disadvantaged groups are

found to set up their dwellings along risky hill slopes

in urban areas, exposing them to mudslides that

are becoming more frequent due to climate change

(Painter, 2007).

4.2 Greater exposure to drought,

heatwaves, water scarcity, etc.

About 40 percent of the Earth’s land surface and

29 percent of the world’s population live in arid,

semi-arid, and dry sub-humid aridity zones, which

are facing additional challenges due to climate

change (Table 3). ere is a larger concentration of

disadvantaged groups of people (such as pastoralists

and ethnic minorities) in these areas (WRI, 1997).

Two thirds of the global population are estimated

to live under conditions where water is severely

scarce for at least one month of the year (Mekon-

nen and Hoekstra, 2016). is exposure is expected

to increase with climate change. For example, the

number of people exposed to droughts could rise by

between 9 and 17 per cent by 2030 under scenarios

where emissions growth rates aren’t reduced (Winse-

mius, et al., 2015). Drought exposure is also higher

in rural than in urban areas (43 per cent versus 32

per cent, respectively). Given larger concentration of

the people under the poverty line living in rural ar-

eas, this implies greater exposure to draught for the

disadvantaged groups of people.

Cross-country data also point to greater exposure

of the disadvantaged groups to water scarcity. In

countries with lower human development indexes

(HDI), this exposure is much greater (50 per cent)

than in countries with higher HDI (14 per cent)

(Christenson, et al., 2014). Given the higher rates

of households engaged in agricultural production in

rural areas and in low income countries, the rates

of exposure of disadvantaged groups to droughts is

likely to increase further with climate change.

4.3 Effect of inequality on exposure

via the political channel

Often the compulsion to live in areas that are more

exposed to the adverse eects of climate change is

of politico-administrative nature, reecting the po-

litical channel of causality noted in Section 3. For

example, Mutter (2015) notes that both economic

and administrative restrictions led to the concen-

tration of large numbers of disadvantaged people in

the Irawaddy Delta that was hard hit by the cyclone

Nargis in 2008. Often economic and political fac-

tors interact and combine to inuence the location

decision and exposure to climate hazard. For exam-

ple, economic and racial factors combined in creat-

ing the large concentration of low-income African

American people in the low-lying districts of New

Orleans before hurricane Katrina (Mutter 2015).

4.4 Greater exposure of

disadvantaged groups via

occupation and type of tasks

Given the location, an important role in determin-

ing the exposure to climate hazards belongs to oc-

cupation and type of tasks performed. For example,

whether somebody works outdoors and the degree

to which a person’s tasks depends on weather and

climate are important determinants of exposure.

Needless to say, inequality plays an important role

in the choice or allocation of occupation and type

of tasks performed. Apart from income and asset

inequality, gender and other types of inequality play

an important role in this regard. For example, rural

women’s lower asset positions as well as land tenure

Table 3

Dry lands populations (estimations as of 1995)

Region

Population

(million)

Dry lands

population

(million)

Africa 720 326

Americas &

Caribbean

1093 182

Asia 3451 1475

Developing

Regions

4533 1983

World 5702 2130

Sources: WRI, 19 97.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

arrangements and social restrictions limit the land

available to them. is leads women farmers to work

on more marginal land which is exposed to greater

climate related hazards (Perez, et al., 2015). Also,

social norms in many places require the women to

collect water and rewood, often compelling them

to travel long distances and confront hazardous

situations in places where these are scarce. Conse-

quently, they face greater exposure to adverse eects

of climate change.

5 Effects of inequality on

susceptibility to damages

caused by climate change

Given the same level of exposure, the disadvantaged

groups are generally more susceptible to damage

from climate hazards. As noted above, of the peo-

ple living in the same oodplain, those with houses

constructed of imsy materials are more susceptible

to damage from ood than those with houses made

of sturdy materials. Similarly, in an arid area, people

having air conditioning are less susceptible to health

damages from excessive heat than those who do not

have such facilities. e livelihoods that the disad-

vantaged groups nd compelled to pursue may also

increase their susceptibility to damage from climate

hazards.

Wodon et al. (2014), for example, report that the

poorest households in ve MENA countries – Al-

geria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen – experi-

enced higher losses of income, crops, livestock and

sh caught due to climate related changes than did

the rich households. Lost income reported for the

lowest income households was more than double

the rate for the richest (46.4% vs 20.7%). Similarly,

Gentle et al. (2014) nd that low income house-

holds in the middle hills region of Nepal are more

susceptible to damages from climate hazards than

the wealthy households. Hill and Mejia-Mantilla

(2015) show that low income farmers in Uganda lost

greater shares of income from limited rainfall than

the average farmer because of their limited options

for changing crop patterns, limited ability to apply

water saving technology, and limited access to agri-

cultural extension services and water storage sources

(UNDP, 2006). Patankar (2015) shows that low in-

come families in Mumbai required repeated repairs

to their homes to secure them against 2005 ood

damage, and the cumulative cost often proved to be

much greater as proportion of their income than it

was the case for the rich. Sometimes, the disadvan-

taged groups suer more climate damage even with

less exposure. For example, low income households

in Honduras reported considerably higher asset

loss (31 per cent) due to Hurricane Mitch than did

the non-poor (11 per cent), even in areas where the

former had less exposure to this hurricane than the

latter (Carter, et al., 2007).

e disadvantaged groups are more susceptible

to climate damages in part because of the lack of

diversication of their assets. For example, the ur-

ban poor tend to have their savings in the form of

housing stock, which is vulnerable to oods (Moser,

2007). Similarly, the rural poor often have their sav-

ings in the form of livestock, which is susceptible to

droughts (Nkedianye, et al., 2011). eir situation

contrasts with that of the wealthier households, who

can diversify their assets, both spatially and nan-

cially and are therefore less susceptible to damage

caused by climate hazards.

One of the important ways in which inequality in-

creases susceptibility of the disadvantaged groups

to damages caused by climate change is through it

health eects. Hallegatte, et al. (2016) nd that the

people living in poverty are more susceptible to the

diseases that many climate hazards help to spread,

including malaria and water borne diseases causing

diarrhoea. is may be due to several reasons. For

example, disadvantaged people may not have access

to piped water sources, forcing them to drink water

5 e greater levels of damage as well as the more limited

diversication of savings and assets feed into greater ine-

quality of assets as a result of climate hazards. Greater sus-

ceptibility of the disadvantaged groups can therefore lead

to widening of future inequality, as children of the poor

families are left with diminished future capacities.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

containing pathogens during oods. Indeed, there

were reports of greater incidence of diseases among

residents of low-income slums in Mumbai in the

wake of monsoon oods (Hallegatte, et al., 2016).

Similarly, disadvantaged people suer more adverse

health eects from heatwaves and high tempera-

tures, because they cannot aord heat alleviating

amenities, including air conditioning.

e greater susceptibility to health eects frequently

undermines the income and asset position of disad-

vantaged groups in both short run and long run. In

the short run, they suer from loss of productivi-

ty, employment and income. In the long run, they

suer from loss of human capital (from lost school

days, the development of chronic conditions such as

stunting, and from general health and growth im-

pacts, even future morbidity and higher mortality)

(Somanathan, et al., 2014; Li, et al., 2016; Zivin and

Neidell, 2014).

5.1 Gender and age inequality

and susceptibility

Gender and age play an important role in determin-

ing the susceptibility to damage caused by adverse

eects of climate change. As noted above, the fact

that women in many countries are tasked with

collecting water and rewood means that they are

more susceptible to damages from climate hazards

(Egeru, et al., 2014 and IPCC 2014, p. 796).

Sher-

wood (2013) nds that prolonged drought created

poverty traps for women in Gituamba, Kenya. Using

household surveys and village focus group studies

conducted across nine countries in Africa, Perez et

al. (2015) nd that there are a number of issues af-

fecting women that make them more susceptible to

impacts of climate change than men.

6 IPCC (2014, p. 796) notes that climate hazards increase

and heighten existing gender inequalities. is happens be-

cause in many cases the women have to perform tasks that

are more exposed to climate (such as fetching water from

afar or gathering fuelwood from forests).

7 Among such issues are: limited control of land (in terms of

both quantity and quality of land); less secure tenure; less

access to common property resources; less cash to obtain

goods or services; and less access to formally registered,

Both the young and the old prove to be more sus-

ceptible to damage caused by climate hazards than

the adults. is is not surprising, given their relative

fragility. For example, IPCC reports that ood relat-

ed mortality in Nepal among girls was twice as high

as for women (13.3 per 1000 girls). e mortality

was also higher for boys than for men (IPCC, 2014,

p. 807-808). Hallegatte, et al. (2016) reports great-

er incidence in ailments among children following

oods in Ho Chi Minh City. Heatwaves have no-

table eects on the elderly, particularly as they are

already more likely to suer from chronic illnesses,

such as coronary heart disease or respiratory diseas-

es that can be exacerbated by heat (Hutton, 2008).

Elderly people are also more susceptible to greater

health eects from oods and are less able to relo-

cate in the event of disasters (Hutton, 2008). Elderly

residents of Limpopo, South Africa lacked access to

labour, necessary to construct their houses to with-

stand ooding. Consequently, their dwellings suf-

fered greater damage (Khandlhela and May, 2006).

ese dierential impacts apply across a variety of

disadvantaged groups. For example, it was found

in Vietnam that the elderly, widows, and disabled

people – in addition to single mothers and wom-

en-headed households with small children – were

most susceptible to damages caused both by oods

and storms and by slow-onset events such as recur-

rent droughts (IPCC, 2014, p. 808-809). Similarly,

Macchi et al. (2014) note that lower caste families,

women and other marginal groups in the Himalayan

villages in northwest India and Nepal are more sus-

ceptible to climate related eects.

5.2 Ethnic and racial inequalities

and susceptibility

e degree of susceptibility often depends on eth-

nicity and race. For example, the minority farmers,

who make up the bulk of the population in the Ir-

rawaddy delta in Myanmar, were more susceptible

to damages due to lack of eective warning systems

public and private external organisations that foster agri-

culture and livestock production.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

and infrastructure and therefore suered the most

in terms of lost lives, incomes and assets as a result

of the cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Mutter, 2015). IPCC

(2014) notes the important role of social positions of

dierent groups in determining the impact of cli-

mate change. For example, in many places in Latin

America, Afro-Latinos and indigenous groups were

found to suer from disproportionate climate eects.

(IPCC, 2014, p. 810). Moreover, dierential eect

of climate change with respect to race is found in

both developing and developed countries, although

in both cases low income status is also intertwined

with race and ethnicity status.

Eects on health were noted as an important con-

cern regarding impacts of climate change on indige-

nous populations in Latin America. Climate hazards

allow diseases to spread in areas where they could

not previously thrive, leading to increases in rates

of respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases. It has also

exacerbated nutritional issues, which has further

feedback eects on health outcomes for these popu-

lations (Kronik and Verner, 2010).

ere are also dierences in susceptibility of dier-

ent population groups, depending on whether they

are engaged in agricultural activities or they are

pastoralists. is refers both to the types of climate

related eects, such as changes in rainfall that may

aect crops or forage for grazing animals in dierent

ways, and to the dierent lifestyles of the two groups.

For example, on the one hand, pastoralists’ housing

maybe temporary or less sturdy, meaning that they

are more exposed to the elements. On the other

hand, their way of life may limit their susceptibility

because of their ability to relocate if local conditions

are not conducive to their lifestyle.

5.3 Indirect market based effects

of inequality on susceptibility

e disadvantaged groups often prove more suscep-

tible via the market and price changes. In the rural

areas, the disadvantaged households generally do not

own much land and thus are net buyers of food. Con-

sequently, they suer more from food price increase

caused by climate hazards. By contrast, the wealthy

households, owning surplus crop available for sale,

may even benet from the food price increase. In the

cities, the disadvantaged groups obviously suer due

to rise in food prices, and since expenditure on food

comprises a much larger share of their budget than it

is the case for the rich, they suer disproportionately

more (Ivanic, et al., 2012). According to Hallegatte

et al. (2016, p. 56), the poorest households in the

developing world spend between 40 and 60 per cent

of their income on food and beverages, compared to

less than 25 per cent of wealthier households.

6 Effects of inequality on the

ability to cope and recover

Coping and recovery are the third channel through

which the “inequality-climate change vicious cy-

cle” works. Inequality implies less resources for the

disadvantaged groups to undertake coping and re-

covery measures. ese resources can generally take

four forms: (i) households’ own (private) resources,

(ii) community resources, (iii) resources provided

by various non-government organisations (NGOs),

including religious and philanthropic organizations

and philanthropic activities of private companies,

foundations, etc., and (iv) public resources provided

by the government, including local governments.

Disadvantaged groups are likely to be lacking in

some, if not all, of these resources. As a result, their

relative situation worsens further.

6.1 Recovery trajectories

To see how the lack of ability to cope with and recov-

er from climate damages exacerbates inequality, we

may consider recovery trajectories. In the wake of a

climate disaster, even if one assumes equal exposure

and susceptibility to damage between advantaged

and disadvantaged households (which has been

demonstrated not to be the case in the two preced-

ing sections) the rate of recovery can be an impor-

tant determinant of future inequality. If both the

advantaged and disadvantaged households recover

at the same rate, then the inequality (measured as

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

Figure 10

Differential rates of recovery from climate disasters of wealthy and poor households

(based on Mutter (2015) Technical Appendix 1)

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

proportion) will remain constant (Figure 10a). On

the other hand, if the disadvantaged groups fail to

recover at the same rate as the advantaged ones, the

inequality (measured as proportion) will increase

(Figures 10b and 10c).

ere is considerable evidence that the disadvantaged

groups indeed experience slower recoveries from ad-

verse impacts of climate change (Verner, 2010; Cart-

er, et al, 2007; Kraay and McKenzie, 2014; Ravallion

and Jalan, 2001). Barbier (2010) and Barrett et al.

(2011) show that the lack of resources often forces the

disadvantaged groups to cope with climate hazards

in such detrimental ways as put their future adaptive

and growth capacity at risk. McDowell and Hess

(2012) also reach similar conclusions. In the follow-

ing, we consider how inequality reduces resources

of dierent types for disadvantaged groups and how

that aects their coping and recovery ability.

6.2 Own resources

Own resources are obviously the most important

determinant of the ability of a household to cope

with and recover from damages caused by climate

hazards.

Insurance as a coping and

recovery mechanism

Having insurance is an important way to cope with

and recover from unexpected damages. Unfortunate-

ly, lack of own resources often prevents the disadvan-

taged groups from buying necessary insurance. For

example, Verner (2010) reports from Latin America

that asset losses by households with higher income

levels are much more likely to be insured. Mosely

(2015) emphasizes micro-insurance as a way of ex-

tending insurance to those lying at the lower end of

the asset and income distributions. Micro-insurance

is generally targeted toward disadvantaged groups

and tends to focus on particular risks, such as health

risks. However, more recently, micro-insurance has

extended its coverage to crop risks, using rainfall and

other such objective indexes as the criteria. India’s

BASIX program, relying on rainfall measure, is one

such example (ibid). However, unlike micro-credit

schemes, micro-insurance schemes are still very few,

and the rural population’s most disadvantaged parts,

who do not own cultivable land, cannot generally

benet from schemes focused on crop risks. us,

unlike the advantaged sections of the society, the

disadvantaged groups generally cannot avail them-

selves of insurance facilities as a way of coping with

and recover from the damages they suer due to

climate change.

Another important way in which the inability to get

insurance aects the well-being of the disadvantaged

people is the following. In absence of insurance, the

disadvantaged households often cannot avail them-

selves of the high return but high risk crops. Instead

they remain stuck with low risk but low yielding

crop cultivation, leading to greater inequality over

time (Clarke and Dercon 2015).

Conﬂicting choice between

physical and human capital

In coping with climate hazards, the disadvantaged

groups often face a dicult choice between protect-

ing their human capital and preserving their physical

capital. Because of the absence of health insurance,

these households face large expenses when hit by

diseases in the wake of climate hazards. To meet

these expenses, they often sell physical assets, thus

undermining their future income earning ability

(Clark and Dercon, 2015). Poverty-stricken house-

holds in Ethiopia were found to be forced to sell

livestock assets during droughts whereas the more

well-o households were not (Little, et al, 2006). In

fact, the latter often benetted from the low prices at

which the former had to conduct their distress sales.

After the famines in Ethiopia in 1984-1985, it took

a decade for asset-poor households to bring livestock

holding levels back to pre-famine levels (Dercon,

2004). ese are examples of disadvantaged house-

holds trying to maintain a minimum consumption

level by liquidating their physical assets.

On the other hand, sometimes disadvantaged house-

holds reduce their consumption and human capital

investments to dangerously low level to hold on to

their meagre physical assets (Carter, et al., 2007).

However, such drastic reductions often have delete-

rious long-term eects on the health and education

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

of the members of the households. In Sub-Saharan

Africa, asset-poor households are more likely to

provide their children with lower-quality nutrition

and are less likely to take sick children to medical

consultations following climate hazards. is can

have long term impacts on these children and their

prospects for development (Hallegatte et al. 2016).

Often disadvantaged households withdraw their

children from school to save expenses, thus jeopard-

izing their future education outcomes. For example,

it was found in Mexico that the children who are

temporarily withdrawn from school are 30 per cent

less likely to complete primary school than those

children who stay in school (de Janvry et al., 2006).

e damage to health and education of the chil-

dren can perpetuate inequality through generations

(Baez, et al, 2010; Mancini and Yang, 2009)

6.3 Common property and

social resources

Common property resources shared by the commu-

nity can be an important part of coping and recovery

strategy of the climate aected people. For example,

coastal populations in Bangladesh with closer prox-

imity to mangrove reserves were better able to cope

in the wake of Cyclone Aila (Akter and Mallik,

2013).

e disadvantaged groups generally rely more heavi-

ly on access to the commonly owned ecosystems for

getting timber, sh, and other means of sustenance,

which help them to smooth consumption and tide

over climate shocks (Barbier, 2010).

For example,

households in tropical and subtropical smallhold-

er systems in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

8 e availability and access to social capital can provide

households that may have limited access to other resourc-

es the means to cope with climate hazards. For example,

Braun and Aßheure (2011) nd that social capital plays an

important role in the ability to cope with oods in Dhaka,

Bangladesh.

9 Continuously growing resource stocks such as sh and tim-

ber are less sensitive to weather uctuations than annual

crops, which may aid resilience.

derive considerable fractions of their incomes from

commonly owned ecosystems.

Unfortunately, the benets of the common property

resources traditionally accruing to the disadvantaged

groups are getting threatened in several ways. First,

climate change is leading to degradation of many of

the commonly owned ecosystems. is degradation

is undermining the wellbeing of the disadvantaged

groups more than that of the advantaged groups.

For example, Noack et al. (2015) nds that in many

communities in Latin America, South Asia and East

Asia, the top quintile relies on these services to a less-

er degree than all other quintiles, meaning that the

highest income residents are least exposed to the ad-

verse eects of climate change on these ecosystems.

Second is over extraction, leading to resource deple-

tion, which then aects the wellbeing of the disad-

vantaged groups more.

ird, advantageous groups

in many cases are establishing their control over

common property resources and are either restrict-

ing or shutting o the access of the disadvantaged

groups to these resources. is encroachment and

private appropriation of what used to be commonly

held resources undermines the resource position of

the disadvantaged groups.

Often the discrimination in access to commonly

owned resources has a gender and ethnic dimen-

sions. For example, Perez et al. (2015) note that

women have more limited access to common prop-

erty resources, and this limitation serves as a factor

leading to dierential impacts from climate change

hazards. Matin et al. (2014), on the other hand, pro-

vide evidence showing that dominant ethnic groups

can control resource management and resource use

at the expense of other ethnic groups.

10 Howe et al. (2013) surveyed literature on climate change

and ecosystem services and they point to eects of hazard

regulation and soil and water regulation in low elevation

coastal zones and dryland margins as the main avenues of

eect on lower income households.

11 e use of these types of ecosystem resources can act as

coping mechanisms for periods of reduced income, but this

can lead to over-extraction and reduced sustainability of

these ecosystems (Hallegatte, et al., 2016).

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

6.4 Public resources

e use of public resources for coping and recovery

is frequently a function of political dynamics of the

society and which groups are in a position to direct

resources to serve their interests. We noticed above

the Power Weighted Social Decision Rule, according

to which social decisions are taken based on welfare

functions in which the utilities of the advantaged

groups receive greater weights.

A striking example of disadvantaged groups get-

ting less public resources needed for coping with

and recover from climate damage is provided by

the Hurricane Katrina experience in New Orleans,

USA. ough areas inhabited by low income and

black population suered worse damage, the public

recovery eorts in these areas proceeded at much

slower rates than in areas inhabited by wealthier and

while population (Mutter 2015, Finch et al. 2010).

12 For example, the Lakeview neighborhood was one of the

neighborhoods with lowest elevation in the New Orleans

Parish, and yet it was able to recover much quicker than

other areas, due to, in part, the relative wealth of that

neighborhood (Srinath et al. 2014).

Discouraged by slow and inadequate recovery eorts

in their neighborhoods, many African Americans,

displaced by Katarina, did not return. eir slow

return helped to justify devotion of less resources for

recovery. A vicious circle thereby emerged, resulting

in permanent non-return by many African-Ameri-

cans (Figure 11). For example, almost 100,000 Af-

rican-Americans did not return to the city of New

Orleans by 2013, as compared to around 11,500 white

residents. As a result, the share of African-American

in the population of the city decreased from 66.7

to 59.1 per cent in 2013 (Srinath et al. 2014). e

ability to return to the city had long-term eects,

as those who could return had better labour market

outcomes than non-returnees (Groen and Polivika

2008). It has been pointed out however that the low

recovery eort in the African-American inhabited

areas was in part a conscious policy choice aimed

at discouraging construction and habitation in these

areas which were also more vulnerable to ooding

due to their low elevation.

e Katarina experience therefore illustrates how

economic and racial inequalities combined to allo-

cate less resources for coping and recovery by disad-

vantaged groups, resulting in perpetuation or even

aggravation of inequality.

Similarly, in Bangladesh, following the great ood of

1988, a huge amount of public resources was devot-

ed to the construction of the Greater Dhaka Western

Embankment, aimed at protecting the capital city

residents from future ooding, ignoring the fact that

the embankment will aggravate ooding for the ru-

ral population outside the city perimeter. is was

possible because the utility of the city residents, who

on average have higher income and greater political

clout, received greater weight in the social welfare

function than did the utility of the rural folks

(Islam 2016).

13 See for example, FEMA (2016) Hurricane Katrina: A Dec-

ade of Progress through Partnerships, https://www.fema.

gov/hurricane-katrina-decade-progress-through-partner-

ships (accessed on September 7, 2017).

Figure 11

Vicious circle between recovery effort and

non-return of African-Americans of New Orleans

city following Hurricane Katarina

Source: Authors, based on the discussion in the text.

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

us, discrimination with regard to allocation of

public resources may combine with less private and

community resources available to disadvantaged

groups to make coping with and recover from cli-

mate change inicted damages very hard for them,

perpetuating and even aggravating inequality.

7 Combination of channels

In the above we saw evidence of inequality rein-

forcing eects of climate change through the three

channels separately. ough these channels are

conceptually distinct, often the evidence represents

the combined eect of all three or any two of them.

is is in part because of the absence of an analytical

framework so far. In part, this is also because it is

not always easy to distinguish in actual evidence the

eect of the dierent channels, despite their concep-

tual distinction.

Also, important in this connection is the prevalence

in the literature of terms standing for eects of var-

ious combinations of the channels above. One term

that has been used widely is “vulnerability,” which

did not always have the same meaning in dierent

works. IPCC (2015) denes vulnerability to refer to

a combination of “susceptibility” and “ability to cope

and recover.” Consequently, evidence has often been

presented for “vulnerability” without distinguishing

its two components.

Evidence of combined eect can be found, for exam-

ple, in Medeksa (2009), who, using a disaggregated

General Equilibrium (GE) model for Ethiopia, con-

cludes that climate change will reduce agricultural

production and output in sectors linked to agricul-

ture, and will also raise the Gini coecient of ine-

quality in the country. Dennig et al. (2015), running

a variant of the Regional Integrated model of Climate

and the Economy (RICE), point to greater vulnera-

bility to climate change of lower income households

versus higher income households and consequent

increases in inequality. Yamamura (2013), using a

panel dataset of 86 countries over almost 40 years,

nds that the immediate eect of natural disas ters

– including those related with climate change – is

to increase inequality. Verner (2010) shows that the

inequality enhancing eect of the natural disasters

tends to persist.

While helpful for general understanding of the re-

lationship between inequality and climate change,

these (composite) evidences do not clarify the cau-

sality and hence prove to be less useful from policy

viewpoint. e analytical framework presented and

the three channels identied in this paper may there-

fore prove helpful in future eld level study of the

relationship between inequality and climate change.

8 From within-inequality to

across-inequality

e analytical framework presented in this paper can

be used to study and understand the relationship be-

tween climate change and across-country inequality.

First of all, looking across the world, we see that

low-income countries are more exposed to the adverse

eects of climate change. More of these countries

are, inter alia, located in tropical areas; have low ele-

vation; lie in hurricane, cyclone, and tsunami zones;

situated in arid areas, already facing water scarcity;

and so forth. Consequently, they are more exposed

to such climate change eects as sea level rise; salini-

ty intrusion; increased incidence, scope, and ferocity

of cyclones and hurricanes; precipitation imbalance;

and so forth. By contrast most of the high-income

countries are located in cold and temperate zones,

where some people in fact welcome temperature in-

crease, arguing that it will elongate the crop growing

season, increase the crop area, reduce home heating

expenses, and so forth, leading to increase in out-

put and well-being. While experience has tempered

some of these early expectations, it remains the case

that these countries are generally less exposed to sea

level rise, increase in the incidence of hurricanes, and

other adverse consequences of climate change. us,

it is a historically given fact that low-income coun-

tries are generally more exposed to the adverse eects

of climate change.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Second, low-income countries are also more suscepti-

ble to the damages caused by climate change eects.

e reasons are not too far to see. For example, the

Netherlands – a high-income country – is also low

lying and is exposed to sea level rise. However, it has

built sea walls and other structures, so that it is not

as susceptible to damages caused by sea level rise as is

the case with many low-lying, low-income, tropical

island countries.

Some proximate evidence of the fact that low-income

countries suer more damage from climate change

eects can be seen from the information presented in

Figure 12. It shows that losses from weather related

disasters during 1995-2015 accounted for 5 percent of

the GDP of the low-income countries, as compared

to only 0.2 percent for the high-income countries.

Finally, the low-income countries also have less

capability to cope with and recover from the dam-

ages caused by climate change eects. For example,

unlike in high-income countries, most people in

low-income countries lack insurance, so that they

cannot muster private resources to cope with and

recover from climate damages. Also, low-income

countries have less public resources to be devoted to

help the aected people to overcome their losses. e

United States allocated about $60 billion to com-

pensate for the damages suered by the people and

areas that suered from the Hurricane Sandy. e

entire GDP of most of the low-income countries is

less than that amount.

We thus see that low-income countries in general

are more exposed to the adverse eects of climate

change. ey are also more susceptible to the dam-

ages caused by climate change. ey also have less

ability to cope and recover. Consequently, climate

change is worsening the relative position of the

low-income countries, thus aggravating inequality

across countries. Also, the climate change reinforc-

ing (feedback) eect is true for cross-country ine-

quality. e Power Weighted Decision Rule operates

to a certain extent at the international stage too.

14 ough formally all countries have the same weight (one

country, one vote principle) in the UNFCCC, in actual ne-

gotiations, the high-income countries generally enjoy more

leverage than the low-income countries.

Figure 12

Economic losses from weather-related disasters (billions of dollars) and as percentage of GDP

by income group, 1995-2015

Source: United Nations (2016).

DESA WORKING PAPER NO. 152

It wouldn’t be wrong to speculate that international

climate change mitigation eorts would have been

more vigorous if the countries across the world were

more equal.

e above brief discussion shows that the analytical

framework presented in this paper can be used for

studying the relationship between climate change

and across-country inequality too. Elaboration of

this relationship can be a topic for future research.

9 Concluding Remarks

is paper oers an analytical framework for stud-

ying the relationship between social inequality and

climate change. It shows that this relationship is

characterized by a vicious cycle, whereby initial in-

equality makes disadvantaged groups suer dispro-

portionate loss of their income and assets, resulting

in greater subsequent inequality. It shows that ine-

quality exerts the disproportionate eects through

three channels, namely (i) increased exposure of dis-

advantaged groups to climate hazards, (ii) increased

susceptibility to damage caused by climate hazards,

and (iii) decreased ability to cope with and recover

from the damage. e paper provides evidence sup-

porting the proposed analytical framework.

e climate discussion has proceeded through suc-

cessive stages. At the initial stage, the focus was on

the physical eects of climate change. At the next

stage, more attention was paid to the social eects.

e discussion at this stage frequently drew infer-

ences regarding inequality but did not quite focus

on it. e discussion now needs to move to the

next, third stage, with the focus on inequality. e

analytical framework presented in this paper can be

of much help in this regard. It may help to sharp-

en the research questions; identify the information

gaps; classify the gathered information in a uniform

manner and using uniform terminology; present the

information in a coherent way; and be comprehen-

sive in scope.

ere are signicant policy implications of the anal-

ysis presented in this paper. At a broad level, the dis-

cussion of the paper can help to achieve the SDGs.

SDG-11 calls for reduction of inequality while

SDG-13 calls for mitigation of climate change. e

discussion of the paper shows that it may be possible

to address these two goals simultaneously. e key

here is inequality reduction, which can help to con-

tain the adverse eects of climate change. Moreover,

through the feedback eect, it may mitigate climate

change itself. us, a virtuous cycle may replace the

current vicious cycle.

At a more concrete level, the distinction made by

the paper among “exposure,” “susceptibility,” and

“ability to cope and recover” should be of much help

in formulating policies that can address these dier-

ent inequality-enhancing eects. ere are overlaps

among these eects, as noted in the paper, and of-

ten policies are needed that can address more than

one of the eects above. However, the distinction

above should be helpful in knowing what is being

addressed and where to start from, instead of being

overwhelmed by the enormity and complexity of

the task. Also important is to note that the concrete

forms that the three eects take depend on a coun-

try’s concrete circumstances. us, the analysis of

this paper does not suggest “one-size-ts-all” type

policies. Instead, it points to the necessity of policies

based on deeper analyses of the concrete circum-

stances of a country.

Of course, to be successful in making use of the

linkages between inequality and climate change pre-

sented in this paper, it will be necessary to know how

to reduce inequality. is is a big question that re-

mains outside the purview of this paper. Here again,

much will depend on the concrete circumstances of

a country.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

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