3
Former Husband and Former Wife both claim that the Mahr agreement
is enforceable under Florida law. They are correct in this assertion. We
have previously stated that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they
were entered into freely—even if the agreement is objectively unreasonable.
Waton v. Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Casto v.
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987)). While Florida caselaw regarding
Mahr agreements is sparse, the Second District has held that they are
enforceable as prenuptial agreements. See Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 248 (“[A
Mahr’s] secular terms are enforceable as a contractual obligation,
notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony.”
(quoting Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 123, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985))).
Here, the parties’ primary point of disagreement concerns how the
terms of the Mahr agreement should be interpreted. Former Husband
claims that, under traditional Islamic (“Shari’a”) law, a Mahr agreement
functions as a type of insurance meant to protect a dependent spouse in
the event of a divorce. According to Former Husband, concepts such as
equitable distribution and alimony are foreign in Islam and, outside of the
distribution of Former Wife’s equitable share of the marital home, the Mahr
should be read as the entirety of Former Wife’s recovery. Former Wife, on
the other hand, points to the total lack of language in the Mahr agreement
stating an intent to abrogate traditional notions of equitable distribution
and temporary support.
Akileh held that “Florida contract law applies to the secular terms of [a
Mahr agreement].” Id. Thus, while the parties to a prenuptial agreement—
Islamic or secular—may contract away their traditional marital rights, they
must do so in a way that comports with Florida law, which has a rebuttable
presumption in favor of equitable distribution of property in the event of a
divorce. See § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2020).
To overcome that presumption, the prenuptial agreement’s plain
language must unambiguously express a desire to waive equitable
distribution. See Ledea-Genaro v. Genaro, 963 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007). Overcoming the presumption in favor of equitable distribution
requires more than a “boilerplate” reference to waiver. See Weymouth v.
Weymouth, 87 So. 3d 30, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Furthermore, “[t]he
court may resort to rules of construction and extrinsic evidence only where
the contractual language is ambiguous.” Ledea-Genaro, 963 So. 2d at 752.
The same rules of contractual analysis apply to any prenuptial waiver
of temporary support. Khan v. Khan, 79 So. 3d 99, 100 (Fla. 4th DCA