EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
6
New weapons: New START does not bar the US and Russia from modernising their nuclear arsenals.
However, it gives each party the right to raise concerns about new kinds of weapons, such as Russia's
Poseidon
and
Burevestnik
(see below), in a bilateral consultative commission, and to discuss
whether treaty limits apply to them.
New START and missile defence
As already mentioned, SALT and START I, which limited offensive nuclear missiles, were flanked by
the ABM Treaty on missile defences. However, the link between offensive and defensive strategic
weapons was broken in 2002, when the US pulled out of the ABM Treaty. According to Washington,
the latter was no longer needed because relations between Russia and the US had improved and
the risk of a nuclear conflict had receded; as a result, maintaining a strategic balance between the
two nuclear powers had become less of a concern than the need to protect the US and its European
allies from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.
Since then, the US has developed missile defence
systems, some of which would have been banned
under the ABM Treaty (see box). Washington
insists that these systems are intended to block
limited ballistic missile attacks, for example, from
Iran or North Korea, and are not a threat to Russia,
which has more than enough missiles to
overwhelm the limited number of interceptors.
Nevertheless, missile defence remains a bone of
contention, with Vladimir Putin warning in 2018
that it could result in 'the complete devaluation of
Russia's nuclear potential', thus tipping the
strategic balance in Washington's favour.
These differing perspectives are reflected in
unilateral statements by the US and Russia on
missile defence in relation to New START.
According to Russia, 'the Treaty can operate and
be viable only if the United States of America
refrains from developing its missile defense
capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively', whereas the
US argues that 'missile defense systems are
not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia', and that such systems are needed for
protection from limited threats. New START itself does not include provisions on anti-ballistic
missiles other than prohibiting the conversion of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles to hold anti-ballistic missile interceptors. As a compromise
between the two sides, its preamble acknowledges 'the interrelationship between strategic
offensive arms and strategic defensive arms'.
Conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles
Russia also sees itself as potentially disadvantaged by US conventional weapons, such as those
envisaged by the Conventional Prompt Global Strike programme
, which aimed to develop ICBMs
and SLBMs carrying conventional warheads. Given that such missiles could have the accuracy to
destroy some targets that previously would have required nuclear-armed missiles and can be easily
mistaken for them, Russia insisted that New START constrained strategic warheads, whether nuclear
or conventional. The same concern is reflected in its nuclear deterrence policy, which reserves Russia
the right to fire nuclear weapons when attacked by ballistic missiles, including conventional ones.
As in the case of missile defence, the preamble to New START acknowledges Russian concerns about
'the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability'. In initial negotiations
on New START, the US did not accept Russia's demands for a ban on such missiles, but it did agree
Missile defence after the end of the ABM
Treaty
Russia has kept its Cold War missile defences
around Moscow – a system that was allowed
under the ABM Treaty, as it only protects the
capital city. Russia's new S-500 system, expected
to become operational in 2025, will also
reportedly be able to intercept missiles.
The US has developed a Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
protects the entire US and therefore would not
have been allowed under the ABM Treaty. It has
also deployed regional missile defence systems in
other parts of the world, such as a NATO missile
shield in Europe. Being designed for use against
shorter-range missiles, these systems would not
have been constrained by the treaty.