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Those structural changes have not only reduced the number of small and medium-sized
carriers that could benefit from the CBER but also called into question the
appropriateness of a dedicated block exemption for the sector. While those changes
certainly pre-dated the evaluation period, their full impact on the functioning of the
global supply chain could only be measured over the last three years, when the stressed
market conditions triggered chain reactions and exposed the weaknesses of the EU trade
system.
Those weaknesses cannot and should not be attributed to block-exempted consortia. This,
however, should neither detract from the opposition to the CBER expressed by the
transport users and port operators, nor hamper an objective, comprehensive and
evidence-based evaluation of the CBER.
The evidence collected from carriers points towards the – at best limited – effectiveness
and efficiency of the CBER during the evaluation period. Indeed, both the small number
of unique consortia falling within the scope of the CBER in 2020 (13 out of 43) and the
profile of these consortia (always involving one of the top-five carriers which was also a
member of a non-exempted consortium on the same trade) tend to show that the CBER
brought limited compliance cost savings to carriers and was no longer serving its
objective. This objective was to facilitate the creation and operation of pro-competitive
consortia, in particular between small- and medium-sized carriers. In addition, carriers
submit that the key terms of the CBER are clear, unambiguous and accessible to all
carriers, in particular small ones. However, their feedback tends to show diverging
interpretations of the CBER, even among large carriers with proven antitrust experience
and compliance resources. Finally, carriers confirm that the decision to enter into a
consortium is guided by commercial needs and that antitrust rules play – at most – a
subordinate role.
In addition, stakeholders other than carriers generally call for strengthened supervision of
the sector rather than administrative simplification, which calls into question the added
value of a dedicated block exemption regulation at EU level. Furthermore, putting an end
to sector-specific rules and bringing the liner shipping sector under the general Article
101 regime would allow stakeholders to benefit from the Commission’s efforts of
clarification put into both the new Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation and the
new Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements.
The question of the relevance of the CBER requires an assessment of whether (i) it can
still be concluded with a sufficient degree of certainty that consortia which meet the
conditions of the CBER generally fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU; and (ii)
cooperation between carriers continues to help both to improve the competitiveness of
the EU liner shipping industry and to develop EU trade, as expected under the Enabling
Regulation.
With regard to the first part of the assessment, the evidence submitted by carriers to
support the claimed efficiencies is inconclusive, due in particular to the impossibility of
overcoming certain methodological limitations. These limitations make it difficult to